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ABSTRACT
cAbd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025) represented one of the most outstanding Muslim
theologians in the fourth/tenth century. His importance stems from the fact that his
writings are the longest that have survived among Muctazilite works. This study
examines the relationship between cAbd al-Jabbar's epistemology and his theological
arguments on knowing God. Study of theological epistemology is important in order
to identify the foundation of his theological arguments, which in turn will enable us
to recognize the roots of contention among the mutakallimun. The thesis also
examines critical responses from the late Muctazilites toward cAbd al-Jabbar's
theological epistemology.
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One outlines the historical context
of cAbd al-Jabbar's theological epistemology. The topics discussed are the origin and
the development of epistemology in Islamic theology. I will then briefly outline the
biography of cAbd al-Jabbar, which includes an introduction to his scholarship and a
brief examination of the sociopolitical background of his time. Chapter Two
examines cAbd al-Jabbar's view on the definition of knowledge. After a brief
introduction on the theological background of the study, 1 will analyse cAbd al-
Jabbar's various definitions of knowledge in his works and examine the responses
from the late Muctazilites to his arguments.
Chapter Three analyses cAbd al-Jabbar's view on the types of knowledge. This
discussion is important since the differences among the types of knowledge will
result in a different set of theologies or a different set of arguments. Chapter Four is
devoted to the discussion of LAbd al-Jabbar's arguments on the obligation of
knowing God. The aim of this chapter is to examine how cAbd al-Jabbar establishes
the obligation of knowing God based on his theory of knowledge. Chapter Five
investigates cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on knowing God. The foundation and the
application of this proof in cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments on knowing God will be the
main concern of this chapter. I will also analyse Abu al-Husayn's responses to cAbd
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'Epistemology' is the branch of philosophy which is concerned with knowledge, the
value of knowledge, the tools of knowledge and what is related to it. It is an attempt
to answer the fundamental question of how to differentiate between true and false
knowledge. Its concern is to differentiate knowledge from feeling sure and mere
belief.1 Hence, what I mean by 'epistemological foundation' is the concept of
knowledge that becomes a foundation of one's doctrines and arguments relating to a
certain issue; in this study it is the concept of knowing God. 'Theology' or
'speculative theology' is a translation of cilm al-kalam (the science of kalam). It is a
branch of knowledge in Islam that discusses theological doctrines. One well-known
definition of kalam, provided by al-Iji (d. 756/1355), is 'the science which is
concerned with firmly establishing religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with
banishing doubts.'
Knowing God, according to cAbd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1015) is included in the
knowledge that every mature person must know. For him knowing God can be
achieved when one knows i) the existence of God, ii) the attributes of God, iii) the
oneness of God, and iv) divine justice. I will analyse his argument on knowing God
based on his epistemology. I will argue that his argument on knowing God is
applicable only when it is based on a certain type of theory of knowledge. Otherwise
the argument is flawed.
' Baldwin, J. M. 'Epistemology', i, 333; Ferguson. B. S., 'Epistemology', 225.
2 Al-Iji, Mcrwaqif 13. Another popular definition of cilm al-kalam was by lbn Khaldun (d. 807/1404).
He defines cilm al-kalam as 'the science that involves arguing with rational proofs in defence of the
articles of faith and refuting innovators who deviate from the belief of early Muslims and Muslim
orthodoxy.' See lbn Khaldun, Muqaddima, 2.
cAbd al-Jabbar is a prominent Muctazilite theologian, whose works have survived the
longest from amongst Muctazilite literatures. Many have been published. In his
works cAbd al-Jabbar discusses the theory of knowledge comprehensively. Based on
this theory of knowledge, he develops his theological arguments based on reason,
especially on knowing God. cAbd al-Jabbar is a supporter of the traditional
Muctazilite arguments on knowing God, which are based on analogical reasoning.
However, his view on this matter has been criticised by his immediate student, Abu
al-Husayn al-Basri (d. 435/1044).
Abu al-Husayn al-Basri is the founder of the late innovative school of the Muctazilite
kalam, the Husayniyya. Based on his philosophical knowledge, Abu al-Husayn
criticises many of cAbd al-Jabbar's and traditional Muctazilites' theological
arguments, especially on knowing God. In this regard he offers a different type of
argument. 1 suggest that the difference in Abu al-Husayn's argument is due to his
epistemological foundation, which is different from that of cAbd al-Jabbar.
Muctazilism is a school of rationalist Islamic theology, known as kalam, and one of
the important schools of Islamic thought. They prefer the primacy of reason and free
will and develop an epistemology, ontology and psychology which provide a basis
for explaining the nature of the world, God, man and the phenomena of religion, such
as revelation and divine law.
In this study, I do not intend to examine the whole of cAbd al-Jabbar's epistemology,
but rather to focus on certain issues that demonstrate its influence on his proofs on
2
knowing God. Therefore, I will focus my discussion on the two essential aspects of
his epistemology, namely 'the definition of knowledge' and 'the types of
knowledge'. Based on this knowledge I will examine how cAbd al-Jabbar develops
his arguments on knowing God, which include the existence of God, His attributes,
His oneness and His justice.
Before commencing the discussion on his proofs on knowing God, I will examine
cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments in order to establish the obligation of knowing God upon
every rational person. I will also investigate how cAbd al-Jabbar develops the key
proof of his argument on knowing God, which is the analogy between the seen world
and the unseen (istidlal bi- al-shahid cala al-ghaib). Finally, I will study the use of
this proof in his argument on knowing God. During my discussion on these issues I
will evaluate Abu al-Husayn al-Basri's critical view of his teacher's arguments.
Some of the questions that will be examined are: What is cAbd al-Jabbar's
epistemological foundation in dealing with theological doctrines? How did cAbd al-
Jabbar establish the obligation of knowing God based on his theory of knowledge?
What is the significance of the epistemological foundation in the application of the
proof of knowing God? What is the response of the late Muctazilites to cAbd al-
Jabbar's view on theological epistemology?
Sources on cAbd Al-Jabbar's Theological Epistemology
This study is mainly based on the method of textual analysis and historical study. In
the discussion on cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge, I refer mainly to his Mughn 'i
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fiabwab al-tawhid wa al-cadl, especially Book 12. This part bears the title Reflection
and knowledge (al-nazar wa al-macarif) and is divided into three major chapters. In
the first chapter cAbd al-Jabbar discusses the reality of reflection, the definition of
knowledge film) and cognition (mcirifa), the verification of the validity of
knowledge, the proofs of its authenticity (sihhatihi), and the ways (turuq) of
immediate (darurij and acquired (iktisabi) knowledge. This chapter will be my main
concern in this study. In the second chapter, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that human beings
are capable of reflection. He suggests that there is no excuse for those who consider
that reflection is something beyond human ability. Then, in the third chapter of
Mughni 12, cAbd al-Jabbar explains that after one knows that 'reflection' is an
achievable duty for human beings, one must perform it (fil al-nazar). He believes
that a person who performs it deserves a reward, and those who neglect it will be
punished.
Beside Book 12, I will also consult the other parts of the Mughni\ especially Book 6,
which discusses ethical knowledge, and Book 11, which covers the concept of taklif
(religious obligation). In the latter, cAbd al-Jabbar also discusses his view on the
maturity of the intellect (kamal al-caql), which becomes the foundation of his
concept of rational obligation {taklifcaqli). He maintains that immediate knowledge
will contribute to the maturity ofman's intellect.
However, despite the vast number of volumes he has produced, the extant parts of
Mughni do not cover all of the discussion on the theory of knowledge adequately.
The inclusive discussion on the type of knowledge, for instance, is not available in
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the extant parts of Mughni. This reality is due to the loss of the first three parts.
Therefore, 1 need to refer to cAbd al-Jabbar's shorter works, the Usui al-khamsa and
the Mukhtasar fi usul al-din. Both works, however, only provide a brief mention of
his theory of knowledge.
To examine cAbd al-Jabbar's argument in detail 1 need to refer to the works of his
students, such as Taliq shark al-usul al-khamsa by Mankdim and Majmif al-muhlt
bi al-taklif by Ibn Mattawayh, to identify cAbd al-Jabbar's views in the lost parts of
the Mughni. Margaretha Heemskerk has examined both works and concluded that the
views of both scholars are very similar to cAbd al-Jabbar's except in the area of the
imamate (Imama), where Mankdim holds a different opinion due to his Zaydite
inclination.3
After the recent discovery of the late Muctazilites' works, 1 can verify cAbd al-
Jabbar's views reported in Tacliq al-sharh and Majmif al-muhlt by referring to al-
Muctamad fi usul al-din of Ibn al-Malahimi (d. 536/1141). The publication of al-
Mutamad in 1991 after it was edited by Wilfred Madelung and Martin McDermott
has revealed the systematic arguments of the last innovative school of Muctazilites,
the Husayniyya.4 In this book and his other recently published work, al-Fa'iq fi usul
al-din (2007), Ibn al-Malahimi systematically analyses the views of his Muctazilite
predecessors, including cAbd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Husayn al-Basri. In both works
Ibn al-Malahimi reports a critical view of Abu al-Husayn towards the view of cAbd
al-Jabbar and his other Muctazilite predecessors.
3 See Heemskerk, Suffering, 3-4.
4 Al-Razi mentions the existence of this school in his time, but does not elaborate their arguments in
his work, see al-Razi, fliqadal, 42.
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Previous Studies
cAbd al-Jabbar's view on the theory of knowledge has been discussed in several
works. George Hourani's Islamic Rationalism is one of the earliest works that
discusses cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge. Hourani examines cAbd al-Jabbar's
concept of knowledge briefly as an introduction to his study on cAbd al-Jabbar's
ethical theory. Hourani states that knowledge ('ilm) is looked on as a species of
ftiqad, normally translated as 'belief. He explains that, according to cAbd al-Jabbar,
knowledge has two distinguishing characteristics: (1) it is related to its object as it is,
that is, it has truth value; and (2) it occurs in such a way that it necessitates repose of
mind.5
Another work on cAbd al-Jabbar that cannot be missed by Jabbarian students6 is
God's Created Speech by Jean Peters. In this book, Peters provides a valuable
overview of cAbd al-Jabbar's theological philosophy and elaborates on some aspects
of his theory of knowledge. He provides a definition of many epistemological terms,
including cilm, macrifa, and nazar. Peters' presentation in the book, however, lacks
coherence, since he does not provide an essay that combines all the definitions
together. Probably this approach is intentional, because he states at the beginning of
Chapter Two, 'Some remarks on cAbd al-Jabbar's philosophy', that it is only a
bird's-eye view of the problems.7
5 Hourani, G., Islamic Rationalism, 17.
6
Using the term introduced by Hourani, see his Islamic Rationalism, 16.
7
Peters J., God's Created Speech, 39-56.
6
The most comprehensive study of cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge is by Marie
Bernand. Two of her relevant works are Le Probleme De La Connaissance DApres
Le Mugni Du Cadi cAbd al-Gabbar and 'La Notion De cIlm Chez Les Premiers
Muctazilites'. Both works are very helpful in understanding the background of cAbd
al-Jabbar's and the early Muctazilites' theory of knowledge.
In both works, Bernand examines cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge and
compares it with G. Vajda's discussion of the passage in the Mughni that relates to
knowledge.8 By doing this she covers what was not done by Hourani in his Islamic
Rationalism? However, despite her in-depth analysis of cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of
knowledge, which is very useful for my study, Bernand does not explicitly study the
relation between cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge and his other theological
doctrines, such as the concept of knowing God. In addition the views of the late
Muctazilites on knowledge and their responses to their predecessors are not
adequately studied. Therefore, further study is necessary on this issue especially after
the discovery and the publication some of the late Mcutazilites' works.
In Le Probleme, Bernand analyses two definitions of knowledge attributed to cAbd
al-Jabbar. However, thanks to tireless efforts by Madelung and McDermott in editing
the manuscripts of the Muctazilites, I managed to detect two other definitions of
knowledge by cAbd al-Jabbar to make the total four. I will analyse all of these
definitions in Chapter Two ofmy thesis.
8
Vajda, G, "La connaissance chez Saadia', 135; Bernand, "La Notion De cIlm\ 23.
9
See L. Bermand's review of this work, 317.
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For cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on knowing God, again I need to refer to his shorter
works, the Usui al-khamsa and the Mukhtasar, for the basis of his view, and to his
students' works, Tcfliq al-sharh and Majmrf al-taklrf, for its explanation. Based on
Peters' reconstruction of the content of the lost Mughni, I suggest that cAbd al-
Jabbar's argument on knowing God is most likely in Book 3 of the Mughni{ which
was lost.10 Meanwhile Abu al-Husayn's argument on knowing God can be examined
in his work Tasaffuh al-adilla, which was edited by Madelung and Sabine
Schmidtke, and published in 2007. In this work, Abu al-Husayn argues against the
traditional views of the Muctazilites that were defended by cAbd al-Jabbar. Abu al-
Husayn disagrees with him on several issues; some of them are the concept of
accident (carad), state {Ml), and motive {da I). 1 will examine these concepts and
some others that relate to the theory of knowledge and the arguments on knowing
God. Abu al-Husayn's argument on the existence of God was summarized by
Madelung in his article 'AbO 1-Husayn al-Basri's Proof for the Existence of God'.
However, in this article Madelung does not discuss the relation between Abu al-
Husayn's proof of the existence of God and his theory of knowledge.
There are some modern works on the argument about knowing God that I refer to in
order to develop my understanding of this issue. A comprehensive examination of
the proof of the existence of God is by H. Davidson, Prooffor eternity, creation and
the existence ofGod in Medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy. Another significant
publication on the proof of the existence of God is by Ayman Shihadeh, 'The
10
Peters, J., God's Created Speech, 25-35.
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Existence of God' in The Cambridge Companion to classical Islamic theology. In
this work Shihadeh provides a useful overview of the arguments from design and the
cosmological arguments defended by Muslim theologians in general. For the
attributes of God, I mainly refer to Richard Frank's work, Beings and Their
Attributes, for an understanding of the classical Muctazilites' view. Frank's other
significant work is an article on the concept of attributes according to Abu al-
Hudhayl al-cAllaf, 'the Divine Attributes According to the Teaching of Abu al-
Hudhayl al-cAllaf.
I also use an array of different sources on general Islamic theology, Islamic Flistory
and Islamic epistemology. In my discussion on the place of epistemology in Islamic
theology, I refer mainly to Knowledge Triumphant by Franz Rosenthal. He made a
comprehensive study on the theory of knowledge in Islam. In Chapter Three of his
book, Rosenthal discusses 'books and chapters on knowledge', where he examines
the discussion of knowledge among early Muslim scholars. From this discussion he
states that the first work that discusses knowledge is al-Muwatta' by Malik b. Anas
(d. 179/795) who dedicates a chapter to 'the search after knowledge'." This
discussion was expanded by other hadlth scholars, including al-Bukhari (d. 256/870)
and Muslim (d. 261/875).12 Rosenthal also discusses some definitions of knowledge
among Muslim scholars. He provides a number of definitions of knowledge by
Muslim theologians and considers that cAbd al-Jabbar's Mughni is one of the most
" For more information on Malik and al-Muwatta' see Yasin Dutton, The Origin, 43-80.
12 For Rosenthal's analysis on knowledge in had/th works, see his Knowledge Triumphant, 70-96.
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complete references by classical Muslim theologians in dealing with the definition of
knowledge.13
In my discussions on the biography of cAbd al-Jabbar, 1 refer to some classical
works, such as his contemporary Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi's Mathalib al-wazirayn or
al-Imtac wa al-mu'anisa, Ibn al-Athir's al-Kamilfi al-tarikh and al-Dhahabi's Mizan
al-ftidal. I also refer to Hakim al-Jushami's Sharh cuyun al-masa'il and Ibn al-
Murtada's al-Munya wa-al-amal. For modern sources, I mainly refer to cAbd al-
Karim cUthman's work 'Qadi al-Qudat Abu al-Hasan cAbd al-Jabbar al-
Hamadhani'. Two articles by S.M. Stern and Wilfred Madelung, both entitled 'cAbd
al-Jabbar', in the Encyclopedia of Islam and Encyclopaedia Iranica respectively, are
also helpful in providing an overview of his life. I also refer to some recent works on
cAbd al-Jabbar's biography, such as G. Reynold's A Muslim Theologian in a
Sectarian Milieu.
For historical data on the socio-political background of his time, beside the classical
references such as al-Kamil fi al-tarikh by Ibn al-Athir, I also benefited from Hugh
Kennedy's work The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates. In this work, Kennedy
provides a concise and useful overview of the political development of the cAbbasid
caliphate during the fourth/tenth century. For the Buyids, beside Kennedy's
previously mentioned work, I also refer to the article by Heribert Busse 'Iran under
the Buyids', in the Cambridge History of Iran. Another important modern work that I
13
However, due to his relatively late access to cAbd al-Jabbar's Mughni 12 Rosenthal does not
adequately examine cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge, an approach that has been criticized by
Peters, see his, God's Created Speech, 48-50; Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 51-63.
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use in order to understand the sociopolitical background of the time is Humanism in
the Renaissance ofIslam by Joel Kraemer.
For the Qur'anic English translation, I have referred to M. Muhammad Picktall, A.
Yusuf cAli and M. A. S. Abdel Haleem making a slight modification to the
translations where 1 considered it appropriate.
The Aims of the Study
In this study, I will investigate cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge and its
relationship to his arguments on knowing God. I will aim to evaluate the overall
strength of his argument against other theologians, especially the late MuLtazilites.
This study will also include the critical responses from his student Abu al-Husayn al-
Basri, the founder of the last innovative school ofMuctazilite, the Husayniyya.
My study makes a contribution in two aspects. Firstly, it focuses on the relationship
between cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge and his doctrine of knowing God.
This information is important in order to identify the foundation of his theological
doctrines. Secondly, this study also examines the critical responses from Abu al-
Husayn al-Basri and his followers towards cAbd al-Jabbar's theological arguments
on knowing God. The Husayniyya school holds a different view from cAbd al-Jabbar
on many aspects of theology, including the theory of knowledge and the attributes of
God.
By knowing the foundation of the theological doctrines, one can comprehend the root
of the disputes between Muslim theologians on various Islamic doctrines. Fakhr al-
Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210), an Ashcarite theologian, is one of the mutakallimun who
observed the roots of contention among the mutakallimun. He states that the dispute
between the mutakallimun is around the premise of the attributes of perfection
(kamal) and imperfection (nuqsan). Every attribute of perfection should be
established in God and every imperfect attribute should not be established in Him.
The other premise is good and evil. Good actions must be performed and evil actions
must be abstained from (tark). Explaining his argument, al-Razi writes:
[The dispute between] the followers of de-anthropomorphism
(tanz/h) and anthropomorphism (tashblh) is that the former says,
if God is a body or an atom or in a certain place, He must be
similar to these creations (makhluqat), which are imperfect. The
similarity with imperfection implies imperfection. Therefore, this
cannot be applied to God. Meanwhile the anthropomorphist says
that if God is not partial (mutahayyiz) and cannot be perceived
(mushar) by the senses, also He is not in a place; therefore, God
is similar to non-existence (macdum), which is the highest level
of imperfection.14
One might observe that al-Razi's approach to this issue is 'understand your
opponents'. He chooses to identify the roots of disagreement between the
mutakallimun. In his method, al-Razi is not only concerned with the question of
'what (a) says on (x) issue', which is a typical kalam method, but also 'why (a) says
(x)'. By doing that, al-Razi manages to identify the ground for the dispute, and is
therefore capable of dealing with it more efficiently. This unsurprising that we
observe al-Razi emerging as one of the most prominent mutakllimun in Islam.
14 Al-Razi, at-Arbdin, 481-2.
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While al-Razi bases his argument on perfection and imperfection, in this study I
choose to examine the grounds for disputes among the mutakallimun based on their
theory of knowledge. cAbd al-Jabbar was chosen because his works on epistemology
are the most extensive among the classical mutakallimun, and his epistemology to a
certain degree is purely kalam. I have also limited the study to the area of knowing
God in order to make it more focused.
This thesis is divided into five chapters. In Chapter One I will discuss the historical
context of cAbd al-Jabbar's theological epistemology. I will examine the position of
epistemology in Islamic theology and argue that the command to know God
originates from the Qur'an. However, a systematic appearance of kalam
epistemology is related to the introduction of Greek philosophy into the Islamic
world through the translation project during the cAbbasid caliphate. 1 will then
briefly outline the biography of cAbd al-Jabbar, which includes an introduction to his
scholarship and a brief examination of the sociopolitical background of his time. The
latter is important in order to understand the development of Islamic scholarship in
the fourth/tenth century, which is considered by some as the renaissance of Islamic
thought, and also the reason behind the survival of cAbd al-Jabbar's works until
today.
In Chapter Two I will examine cAbd al-Jabbar's view on the definition of
knowledge. Firstly, 1 will examine the theological background of this discussion in
order to understand the stand taken by him and other Muctazilites on the definition of
knowledge. Secondly, I will study the early definition of knowledge made by the
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early mutakallimun, including cAbd al-Jabbar's predecessors, and his evaluation of
their definitions. Thirdly, I will analyse cAbd al-Jabbar's various definitions of
knowledge in his works and examine the responses from the late Muctazilites to this,
especially from the school of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri.
In Chapter Three I will analyse cAbd al-Jabbar's view on the types of knowledge.
This discussion is important in order to understand his foundation of knowledge. The
differences in the type of knowledge will result in a different set of theologies or a
different set of arguments. Therefore, I will compare cAbd al-Jabbar's view with that
of the Ashcarites and the late Muctazilites. Here 1 will indicate that because of their
disagreement on the type of knowledge with cAbd al-Jabbar, the Ashcarites and the
Husayniyya faced difficulties in applying the analogical proof in their argument on
knowing God that is based on the temporality of the world.
In Chapter Four 1 will examine the obligation to know God, according to cAbd al-
Jabbar. The aim of this chapter is to examine how cAbd al-Jabbar establishes the
obligation of knowing God based on his theory of knowledge. Therefore, firstly 1
will examine the foundation of this rational obligation, which is the fear (khciwj), the
notion (khatir), and the basic principles of ethics. All these principles, according to
cAbd al-Jabbar, are immediately known. Secondly, I will examine cAbd al-Jabbar's
concept of obligation (taklij), with attention to rational obligation. Thirdly, I will
investigate cAbd al-Jabbar's view on 'man's first obligation'. Then I will examine
the basis of obligation according to cAbd al-Jabbar and other Muctazilites. Finally I
will analyse ethical realism from the perspectives of the mutakallimun.
14
In Chapter Five, I will investigate cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on knowing God. I will
scrutinise the foundation of his proof, which is the analogy (qiyas) from the seen
world to the unseen world. Then 1 will examine the application of this proof in cAbd
al-Jabbar's argument on the existence of God, His attributes, divine justice, and the
oneness of God. Finally I will analyse Abu al-Husayn's responses to cAbd al-
Jabbar's arguments on these issues.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF
CABD AL-JABBAR'S THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the historical context of cAbd al-Jabbar's
theological epistemology. This chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first
section, I will examine the position of epistemology in Islamic theology. In this
section, I will indicate that although the root of knowledge is available in the Qur'an,
the systematic appearance of epistemology in kalam gained momentum after the
penetration of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world through the translation project
during the cAbbasid caliphate.
The second section will discuss a biography of cAbd al-Jabbar, which will include his
educational background, his intellectual environment, and his contribution to the
Islamic intellectual library. Also included in this section is the sociopolitical
background of his time, the fourth/tenth to the fifth/eleventh centuries. The study of
this background is important since cAbd al-Jabbar lived in a period considered by
many scholars to be the renaissance period of Islamic thought,1 and to understand the
reason behind the survival of cAbd al-Jabbar's works.
1.1. Epistemology in Islamic Theology
Epistemology plays an important role in Islamic theology, since the difference in
epistemology influences the formation of other theological doctrines. The decision
about which epistemology to base one's theology on will influence the result of one's
' Cf. Joel Kramer, Humanism, 4.
belief and action. For instance, the difference between the views of the Ashcarites
and the Muctazilites in their theological doctrines is partly due to the differences in
the epistemological backgrounds they based their theological arguments on.
However, as S. Nuseibeh observes, to provide a complete outline of kalam
epistemology is not an easy task. One of the problems is that there are diverse views
held on the subject, not only between two classical schools, the Muctazilites and the
Ashcarites, but also between adherents of the same school.2 As a result, we do not as
yet possess a complete consensus account of a kalam theory of knowledge. For every
theologian (mutakallim) develops his theory of knowledge to suit not only his
theological school but also his personal interpretation.
1.1.1. The Origin of Epistemology in Islamic Theology
The debate on the theory of knowledge is part of many disputes in Islamic kalam}
Albeit relatively late compared to other issues such as free will and predestination,
the emergence of the epistemological issues in kalam is almost contemporary with
the appearance of the problem of the createdness of the Qur'an (khalq al-Qur'an).
Both were widely studied during the time of al-Ma'mun. However, because of
political interference, the latter has become very significant while the former remains
less significant.4
2
Nuseibeh, S., "Epistemology" in History of Islamic Philosophy, 831.
3 For an introduction of the formation of kalam, see W. Watt, Formative Period, 182-204; J. Van Ess,
"Beginning of Kalam", 87-111; M. Cook, The Origin of "Kalam", 32-43; M. Abdel Haleem, "Early
Kalam", 71-88.
4
Van Ess, "Beginning of Kalam", 89-92; Abdel Haleem, "Early Kalam", 78-80.
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There are a very large number of references to knowledge in the Qur'an and the
hadith. Both exhort believers to make the best use of reason in their search for the
ultimate and to make the acquisition of knowledge and scientific comprehension a
part of the community's life. As for knowing God specifically, there is a verse in the
Qur'an: "Know that there is no god but Allah."5 This verse indicates that the issue of
knowing God originated from the Qur'an. Therefore, it is hard to agree with some
scholars who state that there is no mention in the Qur'an about knowing God.6
However, in dealing with the Qur'anic proof, there is disagreement among the
mutakallimun. The Muctazilites,7 for instance, accept the Qur'anic proof only after its
validity has been proved by reason. For they consider that in the hierarchy of
knowledge intellect is before the Qur'an. Therefore, in their discussion on knowing
God, they depend merely on reason.8 I will investigate further their epistemological
reason for this view in the discussion on the type of knowledge in chapter two.
Meanwhile, the Hanabila,9 who maintain the superiority of revelation over reason,
used Qur'anic evidence from the beginning. Accordingly, their arguments in
theology must be based on revelation.10 Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855)," for
5
Qur. 47: 19.
6 F. Rosenthal in this regard most likely following A. S. Tritton's claim that there is no verse in the
Qur'an that speaks on human knowledge of God. See Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 125; Tritton.
"Theory of Knowledge" 253.
7
For the development of the Muctazilites, see Watt, Formative Period, 209-252; A. J. Wensinck,
Muslim Creed, 83-7.
8
TabaqSt al-Muctazila. Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 59; Watt, Formative Period, 214.
9 The Hanabila are the followers of the school of theology, law and morality which grew up from the
teaching of Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855). For more see H. Laoust, "Hanabila", El\ iii, 158.
10 See Abu Yacla, al-Mu tamad, 19
"
For his biographical note, see H. Laoust, "Ahmad b. Hanbal", £/2 ,i, 272.
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instance, rejects the rational methods of the mutakallimun but derives religious
12doctrines and legal rules solely from the Qur'an and the Traditions.
The Ashcarites,13 although maintaining the superiority of revelation over reason, are
inclined toward reconciliation between the two previous methodologies by giving a
middle role to reason between the view of the Hanbalites and that of the Muctazilites.
The Ashcarites accept the use of reason for proving the existence of God and His
attributes.14 However, the knowledge of good and evil is only through revelation and
not through reason.15
In the early works of Muslim scholars before the fourth/tenth century,16 there is no
systematic appearance of epistemology.17 Most of the books in theology were
written directly on the foundation of belief and the principles of theology.18 We can
observe this type of methodology being used by Abu Hanifa (theologian and
religious lawyer d. 150/767)19 in his al-Fiqh al-akbar (the Greater Fiqh). He starts
his book by briefly mentioning the six pillars of belief (/man). On this, he writes:
The basics of unity (tawhid) and that which makes faith (iman)
valid, that one says 1 believe in God, His angels, His books, His
messengers, resurrection after death, and that the good and evil
of destiny are from God Most High. I believe too in the
12
Watt, The Formative Period, 292.
13 Ashcarites are the followers of Abu al-Hasan al-Ashcari sometimes it was called, Ashcariyya or
Ashacira. For more see, Watt, "Ashcariyya", El2, i, 696.
14 Cf. al-Ashcari, al-Lumac, 6-7.
15 Cf. al-Baghdadi, U?ul at-Din, 14.
16 Scholars of Islamic traditions such as al-Bukhari (d. 256/870), Muslim, and Abu Daud mention in
their sahih and sunnan a chapter on knowledge in which they report some of the traditions related to
knowledge. The discussion of their works in this respect is beyond the scope of this research. For
more information, see Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 70-96.
17
What 1 mean by systematic appearance here is the discussion which included the definition,
division, source and the value of knowledge.
18
For an overview explanation regarding the contents of major Muslim theological works, see Gardet
L., Introduction a La Theologie Musulmane, 136-186.
19
For his biographical note, see J. Schacht, "Abu Hanifa Nucman b. Thabit", El", i, 123.
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accounting (al-hisab), the scales (al-mizan), hell and paradise.
90
All the foregoing is reality.
In this book, Abu Hanifa elaborates these fundamental doctrines, especially the
doctrine of al-Tawh'id. There is no discussion of the theory of knowledge in this
book. Abu Hanifa mentions only the doctrines that one needs to believe without even
providing any proof to support these doctrines. This type of method can also be
observed in the work of Abu cUbayd al-Qasim b. Sallam (d. 224/839),21 Kitab oi¬
lman (the Book ofFaith). The discussion of the theory of knowledge is not included
in this book; rather, it focuses on the discussion of the faith.22
The discussion of knowledge among early Muslim scholars occurs only when they
discuss the attributes of God. The perfect (kamal) God is the one that has all the
positive attributes including knowledge film). To differentiate between God's
knowledge and a human's knowledge, Abu Hanifa says that God knows with
knowledge, but His knowledge is not like ours. But Abu Hanifa does not explain the
nature of human knowledge in his work.23
1.1.2. The Development of Epistemology in Islamic Theology
After the expansion of the Islamic world through the conquest of the Umayyad and
the cAbbasid empires, Muslims faced various kinds of people from different
intellectual and religious backgrounds. The people of the book (ahl al-Kitab), Jews
20
Abu Hanifa, al-Fiqh al-Akbar, 3.
21
For his biographical note, see H.L. Gottschalk, "Abu Ubayd al-Qasim b. Sallam", El, I, 157.
22
The full name of this book is K. at-iman \va mdalimihi wa sunanihi wa istikmalihi wa darajatihi,
edited by Nasir al-Din al-Albani. See Madclung, W., "Early Sunni Doctrine", 234.
23
See Abu Hanifa, Fiqh al-akbar, 23.
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and Christians have their own interpretation of religious concepts. The concept of
God, for instance, was interpreted differently from that in Islamic teaching.
In addition, the translations of philosophical works from Syriac and Greek into
Arabic during the reign of al-Rashid (r. 170/786-193/809)24 and al-Ma'mun (r.
198/813-218/833) had exposed Muslims to new ideas in theological studies. The
translation of Greek philosophy, especially the works of Aristotle, Plato, and the
Sophists, changed the Muslim intellectual landscape forever through the influence of
Greek philosophy on the latter's philosophy and theology.25
The influence of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world during the reign of al-
Ma'mun can be traced from the involvement of two well-known scholars in
theological and philosophical debates at the court of al-Ma'mun. The first figure is al-
Kindi,26 the first Arab philosopher who was influenced in some degree by the
Muctazilite theology.27 Al-Kindi worked as a translator or supervisor for translators
in Bayt al-Hikma, a well-known library established by al-Ma'mun. The second figure
is Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf,28 who systematized the theology of the Muctazilites and
sometimes worked at al-Ma'mun's court during al-Mihna,29 As for the scope of my
24 For his biographical note, see F. Omar, "Harun al-Rashid", EI, iii, 232.
25
Epistemology also becomes a concern of Muslim philosophers. Ibn Sina (d.428/1037), in this regard
reports that "a discussion of the theory of knowledge is a must to understanding a discussion of the
concept of divinity", cf. al-Najat, 23; al-Farabi (d. 339/950), Ihsa' al-'Ulum,\l\ lbn Rushd (d.
595/1 198), Fast al-Maqal, 4.
26
For his biographical note, see J. Jolivet & R. Rashed, "al-Kindi, Abu Yusuf Yacqub b. lshaq", EI2,
v, 122.
27
Netton, I., Allah Transcendent, 56.
28 For his biographical note, see H.S. Nyberg, "Abu al-l Iudhay 1 l-cAllaf\ EI2, i, 127.
29
Nyberg reports that he enjoyed the favour of al-Ma'mun, who often invited him to the court for
theological disputes, cf. Nyberg, "Abu al-Hudhayl l-cAII5P', 127; Flourani, "Islamic and Non-Islamic
Origin", 81.
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study, the focus will be on the influence of Greek philosophy on Abu al-Hudhayl's
theological epistemology.
According to Ibn al-Murtada, Abu al-Hudhayl investigated Aristotle's works.30
Therefore, probably due to that reason al-Ashcari (d. 324/935-6)31 accuses Abu al-
Hudhayl of taking his view on the attributes of God from Aristotle.32 However, this
accusation seems to be contradicted by another report from Ibn al-Rawandi. Based
on a report by al-Khayyat, Ibn al-Rawandi mentioned that nobody before Abu al-
Hudhayl held his view regarding the attribute of God.33 Based on these reports, we
can conclude that although there is disagreement among the Mutakallimun on the
extent of the influence of Aristotle or other Greek philosophers on Abu al-Hudhayl,
we can conclude that Abu al-Hudhayl is familiar with Greek philosophical terms and
works.
However, no extant works of Abu al-Hudhayl survive today. His view is mostly
based on reports from other scholars from the Muctazilites and the Ashcarites. Most
of the early Muctazilites' works were lost. The earliest kalam work that discusses the
theory of knowledge is non-Muctazi!ites. According to Rosenthal, Kitab al-Tawfi/d,
by Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 333/944),34 is the earliest extant kalam work that
discusses the theory of knowledge.35 In this book, before engaging in a discussion of
theological doctrines, al-Maturidi discusses a theory of knowledge. He opens the
30 Ibn al-Murtada. Tabaqat, 44.
31
For his biographical note, see Watt, "Al-Ashcari'\ in El2, i, 694.
32 Al-Ashcari, Maqalat, 485. Frank. "The Divine Attributes", 454.
33
Al-Khayyat, lnti?ar, 59; cf. Frank, " The Divine Attributes", 455.
34
For his biographical note, see W. Madelung, "Al-Maturidi" in El2, vi, 846.
35
Rosenthal, F. Knowledge Triumphant, 211; see also F. Kholeifs introduction to Kitab al-Tawhtd, 3-
11.
22
book with a chapter on the invalidation of uncritical imitation (taqlid), and insists on
the importance of knowledge and proof. He also highlights the high position of the
intellect in addition to revelation as the ways to acquire religious knowledge.36
Henceforth, most of the mulakallimun who come after al-Maturidi give a great
emphasis to epistemology. We find that most of them start their works with a
discussion of the theory of knowledge. They give great emphasis to the theory of
knowledge as a foundation for theological discussions in their works.37
In the Ashcarites school, at the beginning of its formation, the discussion of
reflection and knowledge is not very extensive. One can observe from the book of
al-Ibana can usul al-diyana by al-Ashcari that his arguments are mainly based on the
Qur'an and Sunna. However, in his later works, especially Risala fial-istihsan fial-
khawdfial-cilm al-Kalam, al-Ashcari defends the vindication of reflection in kalam,
which includes his defence of the use of reason in theology. His stand in Istihsan has
become a foundation for later Ashcarites to develop their kalam argument further.
This task has been taken up by some scholars, and the two most prominent are Abu
Bakr al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013)38 and Abu al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037).39 In
his book al-Tamhid, al-Baqillani provides an introduction to knowledge, its
divisions, and ways to obtain knowledge.40 Meanwhile, al-Baghdadi elaborates in his
book Usui al-Din the reality of knowledge and its division as well as the ways of
deriving knowledge.41
36 Al-Maturidi, Kitdb al-Tcrwhid, 3-27.
37 Al-cAmili, H., al-Madhkal Ha al- ilm wa al-falsafa, 11.
38 For his biographical note, see R.J. McCarthy, "al-Baqillani, in, EI2, i, 958.
39




Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-Din, 36.
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Both books al-Tamhid and Usui al-d/n present an excellent explanation of the theory
of knowledge. These scholars' works, then, became the foundation for the later
generation of Ashcarite scholars such as Abu al-Macali al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085),42
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/1 1 1 1),43 and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210),44 to
build their epistemological framework.
During the fifth/eleventh century, a systematic approach in epistemology influenced
not only the Muctazilite and Ashcarite mutakallimun but also some traditionalist
scholars from the Hanbalite, such as Abu Yacla al-Farra' (d. 458/1066). In his work,
al-Muctamadfiusul al-dm, he treats topics that are typical of mutakallimun, namely,
epistemology, the validity and value of sound reasoning, and the invalidity of taqlid.
He also argues about the proof of the existence of God based on the origination of
accidents and atoms.45 His approach to knowledge obviously differs from the typical
Hanbalites who are concerned with the scripture and prophetic traditions. Therefore,
Abu Yacla was probably the first Hanbalite to use the method of kalam in theological
argumentation. His methodology then was followed by later Hanbalites such as Ibn
al-Zaghuni (d. 527/1133) in his book al-ldahfi usul al-din.
42 He also the teacher of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali For his biographical note see, C. Brockelmann, "al-
Juwayni" in EI2 , ii, 605.
43
For his biographical note, see Watt, "al-Ghazali", in EI2, ii, 1038. From al-Ghazali's works the
influence of Greek philosophy become apparent. Al-Ghazali writes two influential works on
philosophy in his effort to refute the argument of Muslim philosophers; those two works are Maqafd
al-Falasifa (The Intentions of the Philosophers) and TahSfut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the
Philosophers). However, despite his rejection of the philosophical doctrine, al-Ghazali accepts logic
as an important tool of knowledge. The knowledge of a scholar who does not know logic, according to
al-Ghazali, is dubitable. His position in dealing with philosophy has become the foundation for Fakhr
al-Din al-Razi to reformulate the Ashcarites' arguments by using the philosophers' proof.
44
For his biographical note, see G.C. Anawati, "Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, in EI2, ii, 751.
45 See Abu Yacla, al-Muctamadfi usul al-din, 19-21.
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With the Muctazilites, as I mentioned earlier, the discussion of epistemology was
started by Abu al-Hudhayl al-Allaf (d. 226/841). When the translations of Greek
philosophy were made during the reign of Harun al-Rashid, Abu al-Hudhayl studied
some of the philosophers' books.46 The influence of philosophy on Abu al-Hudhayl's
theological proofs can be observed in his arguments on the attribute of God. He also
introduced to the Muctazilites the concept of immediate knowledge,47 the concept of
the accidents (arad) of bodies, and that of the atom, which he called jawhar,48
However, despite their acceptance of his role as the founder of the school of Basran
Muctazilite, Abu al-Hudhayl's successors seem to distance themselves from
philosophy. Al-Nazzam, for instance, wrote a book criticizing Aristotle's idea on the
atom49 while Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i wrote a book rejecting Aristotle's logic.50
Nevertheless, the discussion of knowledge continued among them. The pinnacle of
this development can be observed through the work of cAbd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025),
al-Mughnifi abwab al-tawhid wa al-cadl (Summa on [God's] unity and justice). In
one of the work's twenty volumes, cAbd al-Jabbar specifies a discussion of the
theory of knowledge entitled "al-Nazar wa al-macarif (Reflection and knowledge).51
After cAbd al-Jabbar, the influence of philosophy in Muctazilite's kalam re-emerged
in the hand of his student, Abu al-Husayn al-Basri (d. 436/1044).52 In his argument
46
Tabaqat at-Mif tazila, 44-50. Cf. I lourani, "Islamic and non-Islamic Origins", 81.
47 Abu al-Hudhayl's was reported to say that reason produces the immediate knowledge of the self
which leads to the knowledge of God. His ideas then become the foundation for the later Mu'tazilites
A.S. Tritton, "Theory of Knowledge", 254.
48
Nyberg, H. S. "Abu al-Hudhayl al-Allaf', El2 ,i. 127.
49 Frank, R. "The Divine Attributes", 455.
50 See Van Ess, "Logical Structure", 21.
51 The volume that was edited by Ibrahim Madkur and supervised by Taha Husayn.
52 For his biographical note, see Madelung, "Abu al-Husayn al-Basri", in El2, xii, 25.
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on knowing God, Abu al-Husayn employs some arguments from philosophers to
refute traditional Muctazilite proof. Abu al-Husayn's method in dealing with
theological arguments has been criticized by other followers of cAbd ai-Jabbar. Abu
al-Husayn was accused of pretending to agree with the Muctazilites but in fact was
hiding some other motive.53
Therefore, in this study 1 will examine cAbd al-Jabbar's concept of knowledge in
relation to his arguments on knowing God. 1 will also investigate Abu al-Husayn's
comment on his teacher's arguments. From this study, 1 hope to indicate that the
epistemological background plays a vital role in developing one's argument of
knowing God. Therefore, a different epistemological foundation will result in a
different set of theological doctrines. During the discussion, I will also indicate the
philosophical influence in the arguments of the mutakallimun.
1.2. The Biography of cAbd Al-Jabbar
1.2.1. His Early Life
The classical scholars of cAbd al-Jabbar are not unanimous in describing his early
life. The first disagreement already presents itself as soon as we try to reconstruct his
full name. Al-DhahabI (d. 748/1347)54 and Ibn al-clmad (d. 1079/1668),55 for
instance, do not mention cAbd al-Jabbar's ancestors except his father.56 However, the
most complete list of his name and ancestors is provided by al-Subki (d. 769/1368),57
53
Al-Jushami, Sharh, 387; Al-Basir, Y. Refutation, 37.
54
For his biographical note, see M. Bencheneb, "al-Dhahabi, Shams al-Din", in £/2,ii, 214.
55 For his biographical note, see F. Rosenthal, "Ibn al-cImad", in El2, iii, 807.
56 Cf. al-Dhahabi, Mizan al-ftidal, ii, 553; Ibn al-cImad, Shadharat al-Dhahab, iii, 202. See also Ibn
al-Athir, Kami/, ix, 334,; lbn Hajar, Lisan al-Mizan, ii, 386.
57
For his biographical note, see J. Schacht. "al-Subki", in EI2, ix, 743.
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when he reports cAbd al-Jabbar's full name as Abu al-Hasan cAbd al-Jabbar b.
Ahmad b. cAbd al-Jabbar58 b. Ahmad al-Khalil59 b. cAbdallah.60
cAbd al-Jabbar was born in the district of Asadabad in the province of Hamadhan,
Iran.61 The classical works, however, do not provide any exact date of his birth.
Therefore, there are disagreements among modern scholars about determining the
date of his birth. lsmacil Basha Baghdadi (d. 1338/1920) reports in his Hidayat al-
cArifin that cAbd al-Jabbar was born in 359/969. This date was also accepted by
Kahhala.62
However, other contemporary scholars disagree with this view. cAbd al-Karim
cUthman, for instance, believes that the date given (359/969) is not consistent with
two points of historical evidence.63 Firstly, the majority of classical historians and
biographers such as al-Hakim Abu Sacd al-Bayhaqi al-Jushami (d. 494/1100),64 al-
Khatib al-Baghdadi (d. 463/1070), and al-Dhahabi agreed that cAbd al-Jabbar died
between 414/1024 and 416/1026. Secondly, cAbd al-Jabbar reportedly died at a very
old age, possibly more than ninety years old.65 Hence, combining these two facts, it
is unlikely that he was born in 359/969.66 Instead, cUthman concludes that cAbd al-
Jabbar was born in the mid-320s/930s.
58 Cf. al-Jushami, Shard, al-K.hatib, Tartkh Baghdad, xi, 113; Brockelmann, GAL s i, 343; Anawati, G,
cAbd al-Jabbar, in ER, i, 3; Stern. S., cAbd al-Djabbar" in El2, i, 59.
59 al-Zirikli, al-ALlam,iv, 47; al-Dhahabi, Siyar, xvii, 244.
60 Al-Subki, Tabaqat al-Sha/Tiyya al-Kubra, v, 443; cf. al-Rafici, al-Tadwin, iii, 117; Kahhalah, U.R.,
Mu jam al-Mu 'allifin, v, 78.
61 Yaqut, Mujam al-Buldan, v, 224.
62 Kahhala, Mifjam al-Mu'allifin, 78. Cf. Baghdadi, Ismacil Basha, Hidayat al-cArifin, i, 498.
63 cUthman, A. K., Qadial-Qudat 70.
64 For his biographical note, see Madelung, "al-Hakim al-Djushami", in El2, xii, 343.
65 ibn al-Athir, Kami/, ix, 334.
66 cUthman, A. K.., Qadi al-Qudat, 72.
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Another indication that contradicts the date given by Baghdadi is a report from Yaqut
which indicates that cAbd al-Jabbar used to study with several teachers who lived in
the first half of the fourth/tenth century, such as Abu al-Hasan cAli b. Ibrahim al-
Qattan (d. 345/957) and Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Zi'baqi al-Basri (d. 333/945).67
Therefore, Baghdadi's date is inconceivable, since that implies that cAbd al-Jabbar
studied with teachers who were deceased.
Based on this evidence, the birth of cAbd al-Jabbar has to be earlier than his teachers'
deaths by several years.68 Therefore, in agreement with cUthman's conclusion, I
prefer the view that cAbd al-Jabbar was born around 325/935. This date is also
consistent with the dates given by modern scholars regarding cAbd al-Jabbar's
birth.69
Similar to his date of birth, scholars also disagree about cAbd al-Jabbar's date of
death. Ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1233) says that he died in 414/1024, when he was more
than ninety years old.70 Meanwhile, al-Jushami and Ibn al-Murtada (d. 840/1437)
state that cAbd al-Jabbar died between 415/1025 and 416/1026.71 However, the
majority of his biographers believe that he died in 415/1025.72
67
Yaqut, Mucjam al-Udaba', ii, 116. See also al-Khatib, Tarikh al-Baghdad, xi, 113.
68
Al-Jushami, Sharh, 366; al-Dhahabi, Siyar, xvii, 244; al-Khatib, Tarikh al-Baghdad, xi, 113; Ibn al-
cImad, Syadharat al-Dhahab, iii, 202.
69
Based on a similar argument with °Uthman, S.M. Stern concludes that cAbd al-Jabbar was born in
325/937, cf. Stern, EI2, i, 59.
70 Ibn al-Athir, KamiI, ix, 334.
71
Al-Jushami, Sharh, 366; Ibn al-Murtada, Munya, 95.
72
Al-Subki, Tabaqat, 443; Al-Dhahabi, Siyar, xvii, 244; Kahhala, Mifjam al-Mu'allifin, v, 78; al-
Zirikli, al-Aclam, 47; Brockelmann, C., GAL, s i, 343.
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cAbd al-Jabbar is referred to as al-Asadabadi,73 al-Hamadhani,74 al-Razi,75 and al-
Miftazili.1 His title (laqab) was Qadi al-Qudat, (chief judge), a post he held for
several years under the Buyid amirs in Rayy, the capital city of the province of Jibal.
He is also called cImad al-Din (the pillar of religion),77 but he was well-known
among the supporters of the Muctazilites by the title Qadi al-Qudat.78
1.2.2. Educational and Intellectual Environment
cAbd al-Jabbar started his quest for knowledge in his hometown of Asadabad. After
studying with the scholars there, he pursued his education in neighboring cities such
as Hamadhan, Isfahan, and Qazwin.79 In the beginning, cAbd al-Jabbar studied the
traditions (hadlth) and fiqh of the Shaficite school of law. In theology at that time, he
was a follower of the Ashcarite school.80
cAbd al-Jabbar studied hadlth and cilm al-rijal (the science of the men of hadlth)
under Abu Muhammad cAbd al-Rahman b. Hamdan al-Jallab (d. 342/954), cAbdallah
b. Jacfar b. Faris al-Isfahani (d. 346/958),81 and al-Zubayr b. cAbd al-Wahid al-
73
Al-Khatib, Tarikh at-Baghdad. xi, 113; al-Rafici, Akhbar Qazwin, iii. II7.
74 Ibn al-cImad, ShadharSt at-Dhahab, iii, 202; Kahhala, Mifjam al-Mu'allifm, v, 78.
75 Ibn al-Athir, KamiI, ix, 334.
76 Ibn al-clmad, Shadharat al-Dhahab, iii, 202; Ibn al-Athir, Kami!, ix, 333.
77 The attributions of those names to cAbd al-Jabbar occur for various reasons which are: al-Asadabadi
refers to his birth place, al-Hamadhani refers to where he studied religious sciences, al-Razi because
he was in his peak when in Rayy, and al-Muctazili because of his theology.
78
Al-Jushami, Sharh, 365. According to al-Khayyat, the Muctazilites are those who adhere to the five
principles: Unity (at-Tawhid), Justice (al-cAdi), the Promise and the Threat (al-lVacd \va al-wac/d), the
Intermediate Position (al-Manziia bayn al-manzilalayn) and Commanding the Right and Forbidding
the Wrong (al-Amr bi al-macrufwa al-nahy an al-munkar). See al-K.hayyat, Inti?ar, 13.
79A1-Jushami, Sharli,365; Anawati, "cAbd al-Jabbar" in ER, i, 3; Madelung, "cAbd al-Jabbar," in
Encyclopaedia Iranica, i, 116.
80
Madelung was in doubt with the statement that the original theology of cAbd al-Jabbar is Ashcarite,
therefore he inclines towards Shafici traditionalist but he did not provide any indication. See




Asadabadi (d. 347/959).82 In other fields of knowledge, such as Arabic grammar,
cAbd al-Jabbar learned from Abu al-Hassan cAli b. 'Ibrahim b. Salama al-Qattan (d.
345/956). According to Ibn al-cImad al-Hanbali (d. 1080/1670), al-Qattan was a very
pious person and had memorized more than 100 thousand hadithP
After completing his study in these areas, cAbd al-Jabbar traveled to Basra, one of
the important cultural centres of the Buyid Emirates and a centre of Muctazilite
learning.84 In Basra, cAbd al-Jabbar had the opportunity to study and debate with
many Muctazilite scholars, one of whom was Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. cAyyash (d.
386/996), a disciple of the prominent Muctazilite scholar, Abu Hashim cAbd al-
Salam b. Muhammad al-Jubba'i (d. 321/933).
During his study in Basra, cAbd al-Jabbar transformed his theological views from
Ashcarite to Muctazilite. After arguing and debating with several Muctazilite scholars,
especially Ibn cAyyash, cAbd al-Jabbar accepted Muctazilite doctrines and became
one of its most staunch and systematic advocates in Islamic theological history.85
However, in fiqh, he remained loyal as a follower of the Shaffite school of law.86
Without neglecting other sciences, cAbd al-Jabbar committed himself to the study of
kalam. On this issue, al-Jushami reports that cAbd al-Jabbar achieved a high position
in fiqh, but he filled his days with kalam. Al-Jushami reports that cAbd al-Jabbar
82 Al-Rafici, Akhbar Qa:win, iii, 125; al-Subki, Tabaqat, v. 443
83
Ibn al-cImad, Shadharat al-Dhahab, iii, 202. The number of hadith mentioned is probably out of
respect (adab) since there is no clear system for measuring the amount of hadith memorized by certain
scholar.
84 Heemskerk, M. T, Suffering, 38.
85
Tabaqat 328. Cf. al-Jushami, Sharh, 366; Ibn al-Murtada, Mtmya, 94.
86 Al-Yafici, Mir'at al-Jinan, iii, 29; al-Subki, Tabaqat, v, 443; Ibn Hajar, Lisan al-Mtan, 385.
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said, "Those who study fiqh seek the things of the world. But kalam has no goal other
than God the most high."87
To develop his theological knowledge, cAbd al-Jabbar moved from Basra to
Baghdad, to study with Abu cAbdallah Husayn al-Basri (d. 350/961), the leader
(.Shaykh) of the Basran Muctazilites88 at the time. He was a devoted Muctazilite and a
pupil of Abu Hashim and Abu Ishaq al-Nasibini.89 According to al-Jushami, cAbd al-
Jabbar had a very close relationship with Abu cAbdallah Husayn al-Basri. The latter
was one of the influential teachers in the development of cAbd al-Jabbar's
intellectual personality. The attachment of cAbd al-Jabbar to Abu cAbdallah was
strong enough that cAbd al-Jabbar wanted to read Hanafite jurisprudence (fiqh) with
Abu cAbdallah, but he refused. The latter argued that every scholar (mujtahid) is
correct in this knowledge (fiqh)\ therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar should remain as a
follower of the Shaficites in fiqh.90
From these two teachers, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. cAyyash and Abu cAbdallah Husayn
al-Basri, cAbd al-Jabbar was able to master the theology of the Basran Muctazilites,
especially that of Abu cAli Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab al-Jubba'i (d. 303/915)91
and his son Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i. Subsequently, after the death of Abu cAbdallah
87 Al-Jushami, Sharh, 367.
88 There are two major schools of thought amongst the Muctazilites: the first is the Ba$ran and second
is the Baghdad school. Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf is considered the founder of the first school, while
Bishr b. al-Muctamir is the founder of the latter. See Watt, Formative Period, 217.
89
Tabaqdi, 328; cf. Kraemer, J., Humanism, 73.
90
See al-Jushami, Sharh, 367; cf. lbn Murtada, Munya, 112. For cAbd al-Jabbar's view on Abu
"Abdallah IJusayn al-Basri, see cAbd al-Jabbar, Jabaqat al-Mutazila, 325-328.
91
For his biographical note, see Gardet, L., "Al-Djubba'i Abu cAli ", in EI2, ii, 569.
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al-Basri in 369/979, cAbd al-Jabbar became the undisputed head of the Basran
Muctazilites.92
The following generations of prominent Muctazilite scholars were mostly his
students.93 Thirty-four were mentioned by al-Jushami in his Sharh al-cuyun with
some biographical details.94 However, cAbd al-Jabbar's students were from not only
the Muctazilites but also other various theological backgrounds such as the Zaydites
and Imamites. His teaching also attracted thinkers from non-Islamic groups such as
the Karaites (Judaism). Interestingly, the survival of cAbd al-Jabbar's works until
today was through non-Muctazilite channels. The first is through the Yemenite
Zaydites, and the second is through the Karaites.95 We mention some of them,
mainly because their works have survived today, and some of cAbd al-Jabbar's
discussions that are missing in the lost parts of the Mughni were found in their
works.96
One of cAbd al-Jabbar's influential students was Mankdim Shashdiw (d. 425/1034),
a Zaydite Muctazilite.97 He is the author of a critical paraphrase (taliq) of cAbd al-
92 Al-Jushami, Sharh, 386.
93 For details information on cAbd al-Jabbar's students, see Ibn al-Murtada, Munya, 97-100. c.f.
Madelung, "cAbd al-Jabbar'', in Encyclopaedia Iranica, i, 117.
94 Cf. al-Jushami, Sharh, 382-93.
95 For more information on the Karaites, see K. Kohler & A. Harkavy, "Karaites and Karaism" in The
Jewish Encyclopedia, vii, 438-46.
961 mentioned three of his students due to their significant influence in understanding cAbd al-Jabbar's
theological epistemology. His other students whose works survived until today include Abu Rashid al-
Nisaburi (d. 445/1053) and Sharif al-Murtada (d. 436/1044). Abu Rashid originally is a follower of
the Baghdad school of Muctazilite then embraced Basran Muctazilism under cAbd al-Jabbar's
influence. After the death of his mentor, Abu Rashid became the leader of Ba§rian Muctazilites. Sharif
al-Murtada studies Islamic theology with cAbd al-Jabbar, however, in the concept of leadership
(Imama) he disagrees with his teacher. His book Kildb al-ShSfi fi ai-lmdmab is a defence of the
imamate of the Twelve Imams against cAbd al-Jabbar's concept of leadership in the Mughni. cf. al-
Jushami, Sharh, 382-90.
97
For his biography see Heemskerk, Suffering, 60-2.
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Jabbar's Sharh al-usul al-khamsa, which has survived until today. At the beginning,
this book was wrongly attributed as cAbd al-Jabbar's work. However, a later
discovery indicated that this book was the work of his student, Mandkim. This work
is a handy reference on the views of the Muctazilites in general.98
Another influential student was Abu Muhammad Hasan b. Muhammad b. Mattawayh
(d. 468/1075). In his al-Majmif fi al-muhit bi al-taklif Ibn Mattawayh presents the
doctrine of cAbd al-Jabbar by paraphrasing and criticizing a few points in the latter's
lost work, Kitab al-Muhlt bi al-taklff." In addition to the Mughni 11,1 refer to Ibn
Mattawayh's al-Majmif to observe cAbd al-Jabbar's views on religious obligation
(takljf)wo
cAbd al-Jabbar's third student who deserves our attention is Abu al-Husayn
Muhammad b. cAli al-Basri (d. 436/1044). He studied kalam and legal methodology
0usul al-fiqh) with cAbd al-Jabbar.101 In his doctrine, however, AbO al-Husayn was
influenced by the ideas of the philosophers and deviated from the teaching of his
teacher.102 Notable points on which he differed from the Bahshamiyya103 were his
98 Cf. Heemskerk, Suffering, 60-2.
99
Madelung, "Ibn Mattawayh, Abu Muhammad al-Hasan b. Ahmad" in El2, xii, 393.
100 The views of both Mandkim and Ibn Mattawayh has been studied by Heemkerk and she concludes
that these are in agreement with cAbd al-Jabbar's in most of their theological argument. Cf. al-
Jushami, Sharh, 368. Cf. Heemskerk, Suffering, 53-7.
101 In Islamic legal methodology his work "al-Mif tamadfi U?ul al-Fiqh" has become an influential
work in the field. Ibn Khallikan reports that Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, in his Kitab al-Mahful, and Sayf al-
Din al-Amidi, in his Kitab al-lhkam fi usul al-ahkam, relied extensively on it. See Ibn Khallikan,
IVafayat, iv, 271.
102 Heemskerk, Suffering, 57-9.
103 The followers of Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i. For more, see Heemkerk, Suffering, 14-21.
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rejection of their theory of modes (ahwal) and their thesis that the non-existent
(madum) is a thing.104
The extant part of his book Tasaffuh al-Adilla was recently published by Wilfred
Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke. In this book, Abu al-Husayn criticized traditional
Muctazilite's arguments that had been defended by cAbd al-Jabbar and the
Muctazilites in general. In this study, I will also examine Abu al-Husayn's view of the
theological epistemology based on the works of Ibn al-Malahimi, al-Muctamad fi
usul al-dm and al-Fa'iq fiusul al-din.105 The discovery of Ibn al-Malahimi's works
has shed light on the views of the school of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, the Husayniyya,
the last school of the Muctazilites.106
1.2.3. His Career
cAbd al-Jabbar's expertise in religious matters both in kalam and fiqh caught the
attention of the minister (vizier) of the Buyid emirate of Jibal at the time, Abu al-
Qasim lsmacil b. cAbbad (d. 385/995). Hence, in 367/977 he appointed cAbd al-
Jabbar as chief judge (Qadi al-Qudat) in Rayy, which was ruled by Mu'ayyid al-
Dawla (r. 366/977-373/983).107
Ibn cAbbad was a student of Abu cAbdallah Husayn al-Basri, cAbd al-Jabbar's
teacher in Baghdad. It is not clear which religious school Ibn cAbbad adhered to. His
104 See Madelung, "Abu 1-Husayn al- Basri", EI2, xii, 25.
105 Both works were edited by W. Madelung and M. McDermot.
106 Madelung, W., Introduction for al-Muctamad, 17. There is a report from al-Razi on this school
when he states that the only available Muctazilite school during his time is al-Bahshamiyya, the
follower of Abu Hashim and al-Husayniyya, the followers of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, see al-Razi,
ftiqadat, 42.
107 For his biographical note, see C.E. Bosworth, EI2, vii, 272.
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biographers, his friends, and his enemies disagree completely when it comes to
specifying to which school he belonged. Some Shicites such as Ibn Babuya
unhesitatingly claim him; others attach him to the Zaydites, to the Hanafites, to the
Shaficites, or to the Hashwiyya.108 But, in fact, he considered himself to be a pupil of
the Muctazilites.109
Ibn cAbbad favored Muctazilism, and probably for this reason appointed a Muctazilite
as a chief judge. Ibn cAbbad wanted to propagate Muctazilism, and cAbd al-Jabbar
supported Ibn cAbbad in his aspirations. Some of cAbd al-Jabbar's works such as al-
Mukhtasarfi usul al-dm, which was written at the request of Ibn cAbbad, may have
been intended to spread the theology of the Muctazilites."°
cAbd al-Jabbar became a chief judge in Rayy in 367/977. This appointment granted
him authority over several provinces, such as Rayy, Qazwin, Abhar-Zanjan, Qumm,
Suhraward, and Danbawand.111 cAbd al-Jabbar held the position of chief judge for a
period of eighteen years, when he was dismissed by the ruler of the Buyid
government at the time, Fakhr al-Dawla (r. 373/983-387/997). This dismissal
happened in 385/995, after the death of Ibn cAbbad."2 Fakhr al-Dawla dismissed
cAbd al-Jabbar and confiscated his possessions. According to some biographers, this
was punishment for his refusal to pray and to pronounce the mercy statement
(tarahhum) for Ibn cAbbad at his funeral. Some add that cAbd al-Jabbar had refused
108 Hashwiyya is used, in a narrower sense, of the A?hab al-hadlth who, uncritically and even
prompted by prejudice, recognize as genuine and interpret literally the crudely anthropomorphic
traditions. See "Hashwiyya" in EI2, iii, 269.
109 Cahen, CI. & Pellat, Ch., "Ibn cAbbad Abu al-Kasim Ismacil", in E!2, iii, 671.
'10 Heemskerk, Suffering, 41.
111 Heemskerk, Suffering, 42.
112 For more detailed information regarding the end of the judgeship of cAbd al-Jabbar, see
Heemskerk, Suffering, 48-50.
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to pray for God's remission of Ibn cAbbad's sins because he had not repented of these
before he died. Whatever the reason, Fakhr al-Dawla confiscated cAbd al-Jabbar's
possessions, just as Fakhr al-Dawla seized the property of several other high
officials, including what belong to Ibn cAbbad himself."3
There are other controversial remarks by some scholars regarding cAbd al-Jabbar at
the end of his judgeship. His contemporary Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi referred to cAbd
al-Jabbar as the servant (ghulam) of Ibn cAbbad. Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi also
showed overt disgust for cAbd al-Jabbar's vocation as a mutakallim. Ibn Shakir al-
Kutubi (d. 764/1463) claimed that cAbd al-Jabbar collected millions of dirhams while
he was in Rayy; therefore, Ibn Hajar (d. 852/1449) insisted that cAbd al-Jabbar
should not have been entrusted with the post of chief judge.114
cUthman made a reasonable observation when analyzing the case. He observes that
the main reasons for the appearance of that kind of statement were personal as well
as sectarian clashes. Ibn Shakir, for instance, was a follower of the Ashcarite school,
the main rival of the Muctazilites. Meanwhile, Ibn Hajar narrated this story from Abu
Hayyan al-Tawhidi (d. 414/1023), who was well-known for his enmity toward Ibn
cAbbad and his followers. This could be proved by his book Mathalib al-
Wazirayn."5
However, it is undeniable that after cAbd al-Jabbar's appointment as chief judge, his
life was better. According to al-Qalqashandi (d. 821/1418), the salary of a chief
113 For more on this controversy, see G. Reynolds, "The Rise and Fall", 3-18.
114 Ibn Hajar, LisSn al-Mi:an, iii, 386. c.f. cUthman, A.K... Qadial-qudat, 30.
115 Abu Hayyan. Mathalib al-Wazirayrt, 75.
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judge at that time was one hundred dinars, exclusive of other facilities.116 Therefore,
it is conceivable that when Fakhr al-Dawla confiscated cAbd al-Jabbar's belongings,
the amount was three million dirhams."7 cAbd al-Jabbar was replaced by Abu al-
Hasan cAli b. cAbd al-cAziz al-Jurjani (d. 392/1002).118
1.2.4. His Works
In spite of cAbd al-Jabbar's duties as chief judge, he found time to write and dictate
many books. He completed the twenty volumes of the Mughni in 380/990, which he
had started in 360/970 before he became chief judge.119 At the end of the Mughni,
cAbd al-Jabbar mentioned some other books that he wrote during the same period as
the Mughnii120 During his lifetime, cAbd al-Jabbar composed numerous works on
various subjects of Islamic sciences, including kalam, tafsrr (exegesis of the Qur'an),
hadith (tradition), and usul al-fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). More of cAbd al-Jabbar's
works have survived compared to other Muctazilite theologians.
After the discovery of a large numbers of the works of cAbd al-Jabbar and other
Muctazilites by Egyptian scholars during their research expedition in Yemen in
1951,121 for the first time modern scholars were supplied with ample references on
Muctazilite theology. Before this discovery, studies of Muctazilite theology were
limited to a small number of Muctazilite books that had survived. Some of the works
116 Al-Qalqashandi, Subh al-Acsha, iii, 212.
117 According to Abu Shujac, cAbd al-Jabbar raised this money by selling a thousand Egyptian
garments. See Abu Shujaj Dhayl lajarib al-umam, 264. For cUthman's view on this, see Qadi al-
Qudat, 32; Reynolds, "Rise and Fall." 8.
118 Yaqut, Mifjam al-Udaba', vi, 599.
119 Peter, God's Created Speech, 45.
120 Mughni, xx (2), 258.
121 For more on this expedition, see K. Nami, Bftha al-Misriyya, 25. See also below, 55.
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are al-Kashshafcan haqa'iq al-tanziV22 a Qur'anic commentary by al-Zamakhshari
(d. 538/1144), Kitab al-Intisar wa al-radd cala Ibn al-Rawandial-mulhid'23 by al-
Khayyat, and Masa'il al-khilaf bayn al-Basriyyin wa al-Baghdadiyy in,'24 by Abu
Rashid al-Nisaburi, a pupil of cAbd al-Jabbar.
The other sources of Muctazilite study before the publication of cAbd al-Jabbar's
works are the books by their adversaries. Some of the most important are Kitab
Maqalat al-lslamiyyin wa iktilafal-musallin by Abu Hasan al-Ashcari, al-Farq bayn
al-Firaq wa bayan al-firqa al-najiya minhum by Abu al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d.
429/1037, Ashcarite Shaficite), al-Fisal fi al-milal wa al-ahwa' wa al-nihal by Ibn
Hazm Abu Muhammad cAli b. Ahmad (d. 456/1064, Zahirite jurist),125 and al-Milal
wa al-nihal by Abu al-Fath Muhammad b. cAbd al-Karim al-Shahrastani (d.
548/1153, Ashcarite theologian).126
Based mostly on the manuscripts found in Yemen, cAbd al-Karim cUthman has made
a survey of the known titles of the works by cAbd al-Jabbar in thematic order. cAbd
al-Karim cUthman searched cAbd al-Jabbar's works and many other sources and
manuscripts to make a list of all his writings. In his first attempt, he mentioned only
fifty-nine titles in his introduction to the book Tacliq sharh al-usul al-khamsa, which
122 This work has been published in two volumes in 1272/1856 in Calcutta. See Peters, God's Created
Speech, 424.
123 This book has been edited and translated into French by A.N. Nader. It was published in 1957 in
Beirut. See J. Peters, God's Created Speech, 423.
124 This book has been translated to German by M.Horten, Die Philosophic des abu Raschid and
published in 1910 in Bonn. See Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 4.
125 For his biographical note, see Arnaldez, R., "Ibn Hazm, Abu Muhammad cAli b. Ahmad b. Sacid",
in El2, iii, 790.
126 For his biographical note, see Monnot G., "al-Shahrastani, Abu al-Fath Muhammad b. cAbd al-
Karim b. Ahmad, Tadj al-Din," in El2, ix, 214.
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he wrongly attributed to cAbd al-Jabbar. Later, in his other works,127 cUthman added
another ten titles and arrived at a total of sixty-nine titles.128 He does not to present
them in chronological order because the dates of some of cAbd al-Jabbar's works are
difficult to determine. Only some can be traced, since at the end of the Mughni cAbd
al-Jabbar mentions works he dictated before he started dictating that work and works
—129
he dictated during the twenty years it took him to dictate the Mughni.
Among the sixty-nine titles listed by cUthman, forty-five refer to Usui al-din, five
were on Qur'anic sciences, two on hadith, two on religious mission and guidance (al-
dacwa wa al-irshad), seven on Islamic law {fiqh), two on points of disagreement (al-
khilaj), one on biography, and five on other fields of Islamic studies.
According to eUthman, fourteen of cAbd al-Jabbar's works have been found, and
eight have been edited and published by various scholars. However, new research on
cAbd al-Jabbar's works indicates that two books attributed to him were actually not
his but were written by his disciples. These two books are (Taliq) sharh al-usul al-
khamsa by Mankdim Shashdiw130 and al-Majmif fi al-muhlt bi al-taklif by Ibn
Mattawayh.131
127 cUthman, Qafial-Qufal, 58-72.
128
Peters, God's Created Speech. 10. However, there are several works that have been attributed to
cAbd al-Jabbar which are not found in cUthman's list. Those works are al-Mukhta$ar ft usul al-din
which might be identical to Mukhta^ar al-husna, al-Mujibal wa al-mu 'aththirat, Tacl/q al-Bagdadiyyal
and al- 'U?ul al-khamsa. Cf. Heemskerk, Suffering, 86-7.
129 See Mughni\ xx (2), 258.
130 This work was edited by cUthman and published in Cairo in 1384/1965. Madelung includes this
work in the category, "works based on works of cAbd al-Jabbar" and states that the book has been
wrongly published as cAbd al-Jabbar's work. See Madelung, "cAbd al-Jabbar," E. Ir, i, 117.
131 For more detailed information on the issue, see Gimaret. Les Usui al-Hanisa. 45-7; cf. Heemskerk,
Suffering. 3-8.
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cUthman, Peters, and Hourani attribute both works to cAbd al-Jabbar and say they
were written down by his disciples Mankdim and Ibn Mattawayh, respectively.
However, when studying the text, it is clear that Mankdim's contribution to Sharh
and Ibn Mattawayh's contribution to al-Majmif must have been more than only
writing the text down. Gimaret has come up with evidence arguing that the text of
Sharh al-usul al-khamsa] 32and Majmu' fi al-muhit bi al-taklif33 is not the work of
cAbd al-Jabbar by himself but is a critical paraphrase of a work by him written by his
disciples.134
Consequently, one might wonder whether the Mughni\s an original work ofcAbd al-
Jabbar or another paraphrase of his work. The answer is that the Mughni has been
confirmed as being one of cAbd al-Jabbar's original works and not a paraphrase.
Gimaret, in his Les usul al-hamsa du Qadi cAbd al-Jabbar, argued extensively to
prove this fact. His arguments have been summarized by Heemskerk as follows.
The proof that the text was dictated by cAbd al-Jabbar is indicated by the sentence
imla' al-QadiAbu al-Hassan eAbd al-Jabbar on the title page of each volume. Unlike
the paraphrased works, no one apart from cAbd al-Jabbar himself is mentioned in the
title pages as being involved in any way in the production of the work.135 The person
who wrote down the Mughni from dictation is not even mentioned. Furthermore,
cAbd al-Jabbar himself at the end of the Mughni uses the word dictation {imla')
132 Edited by cUthman. 1 agree with Heemskerk when she suggests this book should be called: "Tdliq
sharh al-Usul al-khamsd\ See Heemskerk,, Suffering, 3-4. However, in this study 1 will use the
abbreviation as Sharh.
133 Edited by Fu'ad Sayyid and J.J Houben. To differentiate, for Sayyid's edition 1 use (1) and (2) for
Houben's edition.
134 For Gimaret's argumentation, see his "Les usul al-hamsa47-57.
135 See Heemskerk. Suffering, 8.
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several times in reference to his work.136 The other indication is that in the Mughni,
the voice of cAbd al-Jabbar is always given in the first person.137 As far as these
indications are concerned, it can be safely assumed that the text of the Mughni as it
was found in the Sanca' manuscript is not a paraphrase like Tcfliq sharh and al-
Majmif.138
In addition to the Mughni, another six titles of cAbd al-Jabbar's works have been
published. The seven titles are as follows:139
1. Mutashabih cil-Qur'an (The Ambiguous Qur'anic [verses]), an exegetical
work on the ambiguous passages of the Qur'an from the Muctazilite point of
view, composed between 360/970 and 380/990.140
2. Al-Mughni fi abwab al-tawhld wa aI-cadI (Summa on Issues of Unity and
Justice), a comprehensive exposition of Muctazilite kalam. cAbd al-Jabbar
began to dictate this magnum opus in Ramhurmuz, the important Muctazilite
centre, in 360/970-71 and completed this work in 379-80/989 when he was
the chief judge in Rayy.141 Of its twenty parts, sixteen have been recovered
and edited by various scholars. The sixteen volumes of the Mughni were
published between 1960 and 1969 under the supervision ofTaha Husayn.142
136 Mughni, xx (2), 258.
137 Mughni, xx (2), 259.
138 Heemskerk, Suffering, 8-9.
139 In his article Madelung mentions that six works of cAbd al-Jabbar have been published. He was
probably unaware of the publication of "Kit5b al-U?ul al-Khamsa edited by D. Gimaret several years
earlier. Madelung did mention the title of this work in his article but believed that it is still in
manuscript form at Vatican, 989. See Madelung, "cAbd al-Jabbar", E. Ir., i, 118.
140 This two volumes work was edited by cAdnan Muhammad Zarzur, and published in Cairo, 1969.
See also Ibn al-Murtada, Munya, 95. cf. Madelung, "cAbd al-Jabbar," in E. Ir, i, 117.
141 Al-Jushami, Sharh, 366.
142 For information on the editors of the Mughni, see Heemkerk, Suffering, 205.
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3. Al-Mukhtasar fi usul al-dm (The Abridgement of the Fundamentals of
Religion). This was written after he completed the Mughni in 385/995 at the
suggestion of Ibn cAbbad.143 This book is considered an abridgement of the
encyclopaedic Mughni. This work deals summarily with the same subjects as
the Mughni and is similarly arranged.144 This work was edited by Muhammad
cImara in Rasa'il al-cAdl wa al-Tawh'id,145
4. Tanzih al-Qur'an can al-matain (Purifying the Qur'an from Contestation),
written after 380/990. It deals with all aspects of language, grammar,
composition and meaning in the Qur'an that is subject to misunderstanding
and criticism. But though cAbd al-Jabbar in this work covers all the chapters
(,suwar) on the Qur'an, he deals with only a limited number of verses. Mostly,
he answers questions and reacts to opponents who make objections against
the text of the Qur'an or against his theology on the basis of the text of the
Qur'an. This book may be the earliest work of cAbd al-Jabbar published in
the 20th century.146
5. Tathbit dala'il al-nubuwwa, written in 385/995. The book deals with the
miraculous proof of the prophethood of Muhammad, especially the truth of
his prophecy, and contains polemical refutations of the claims of other
religions, philosophy, and Shi'ism. This work was edited by cAbd al-Karim
cUthman and published in two volumes in Beirut in 1966.147
143 The author clearly indicates this fact in the introduction of this book. See cAbd al-Jabbar,
Mukhtasarfiu?ul at-din, 197. This book however, is not included in "Uthman's list.
144 This can be observed by comparing the sub-titles of both the Mukhtasar and the Mughni.
145 The second edition of this book has been published by Dar al-Shuruq, Cairo, 1988 under the series
of "From the Heritage of Islamic Rationalism (Min Turiith at-cAqtaniyya at-Istdmiyya), 197-282.
146 It was published in Cairo by al-Matbaca al-Jamaliyya in 1329/1911.
147 The publication of this work has caused theological debate among Western scholars in Religious
studies regarding cAbd al-Jabbar's section on the origin of Christianity. It was about a long historical
account of a Judaeo-Christian sect alleged to be contained in it. S.M. Stern however, argues that the
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6. Fad al-ftizal wa tabaqat al-Muctazila, edited by Fu'ad Sayyid and printed in
Tunis in 1974. The first part is a short apology for Muctazilism and a
refutation of its critics. The second part contains a history of the Muctazilite
scholars in ten classes. This work then becomes a foundation for another two
Mu'tazilite works, Sharh al-uyurt of Hakim al-Jushami and al-Munya wa al-
amal of Ibn Murtada.148
7. Kitab al-usul al-khamsa, edited by Daniel Gimaret.149
cUthman also listed the unpublished manuscripts of cAbd al-Jabbar that are kept in
various libraries around the world.150 They are as follows:
1 • Nuzum al-fawa'id wa taqrib al-murad li al-ra'id. This work is likely to be on
hadith,151 Two copies of this are known to exist, one in the Vatican Library,
Rome (MS 1177) and one in the British Museum (MS 577 {I}).
2. Al-Ikhtilaffi usul al-fiqh. This work on Islamic law is in the Vatican Library
(MS 1100).
3. Al-Ikhtilaf bayn al-shaykhayn. This work explains the disputes between Abu
cAli (d. 303/915) and Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i (d. 321/933).152 It is also kept in
the Vatican Library (MS 1110).
4. Kitab fi al-qada' wa al-qadr. This work on Islamic theology is in the Najaf
Library in Iraq.
story of the Romanization of Christianity was invented by a Muslim, most likely an ex-Christian. For
more information see his two articles, "Quotation from Apocryphal Gospels", 34-57 and "cAbd al-
Jabbar's Account of How Christ's Religion was Falsified", 146-85. Cf. Reynolds G. S., A Muslim
Theologian in the Sectarian Milieu, 25.
148 Madelung, "cAbd al-Jabbar" in E. Ir, i, 117.
149 It was published in Annates lslamologiques,\5, 1979, 79-96.
150 cUthman, Qadial-Qudat, 61-62.
151 Brockelmann, GAL, 343.
152 Ibn al-Murtada, Munya, 96.
43
5. Mas 'ala fial-ghayba. This work is a critique of Shicite theology regarding the
occultation of the Imam and is in the Vatican Library (MS 1028).153
6. Risala fi cilm al-kimiya'. A work on chemistry, found in the Library of
Khazanah in Rampur.154
cAbd al-Jabbar's achievement in academic activities is not only acknowledged within
the Muctazilite or kalam circles but also beyond it. Muhammad b. cAbdallah al-
Zarkashi (d. 794/1392),155 in this case, states that "cAbd al-Jabbar is one of the
excellent scholars in Islamic jurisprudence after Imam al-Shafici (d. 204/820)."156
Meanwhile, in Islamic theology, Ibn al-Murtada (d. 840/1347) believes that cAbd al-
Jabbar's achievement is very distinguished and incomparable with others.157
The ability of cAbd al-Jabbar is widely attested in his works, most of which have
been accepted as major references in religious study. His al-Mughnifi Abwab al-
Tawhld wa al-cAdl is considered the biggest encyclopaedia in Islamic theology that
has been published. According to Ibn Khaldun (d. 784/1382), Kitab al-cUmd by cAbd
al-Jabbar, is one of the best four books on Islamic jurisprudence and law.158 In
defending the sacredness of Islam and its prophet, cAbd al-Jabbar wrote Tathblt
dala'il al-nubuwwa (Confirmation of the Proofs ofProphecy).159
153 Brockelmann, GAL, 343.
154 cUthman, Qadi al-Qudal, 26. Probably it is an epistle on chemistry. For more information on the
study of chemistry during the Buyids emirates, see Kraemer, Humanism, 121.
155 For biographical note, see Rippin, A., "al-Zarkashi" in El1, xii, 842.
156 Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr at-Muhit, i, 6.
is' |bn al-Murtada, Munya, 95.
158 [bn Khaldun, Muqaddima, 113.
is? [bn Hajar, Lisan al-Mizan, iii, 386. cf. al-Dhahabi, Siyar, xvii, 244
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Based on previous discussions of cAbd al-Jabbar's works, one might observe that
cAbd al-Jabbar is a prolific scholar and that his works are the longest extant among
the Muctazilites. Therefore, one might ask that how it was possible for cAbd al-
Jabbar to express his thoughts and write extensively in his own time; or why cAbd al-
Jabbar's works are relatively the most extant among the Muctazilites? To answer
these questions, one needs to understand the socio-political background of his time.
1.2.5. Socio-political Background
cAbd al-Jabbar lived in the fourth/tenth century, a significant period of Islamic
intellectual history, which some scholars consider the renaissance of Islam.'60 One of
the indications of this period is the emergence of several prominent scholars who
developed various schools of Islamic thought, scholars whose influence shaped the
structure of later Islamic intellectuals.
In terms of philosophy, the two most prominent Muslim philosophers, Abu Nasr al-
Farabi (d. 339/950)'6' and Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037),162 developed their philosophy
during this time. Also, the famous historian and philosopher Ahmad b. Miskawayh
(d. 421/1030) lived in Baghdad. In terms of Islamic theology, there was al-Qadi al-
Baqillani (d. 403/1013) and Abu al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037), the
rejuvenators of the Sunni school of Ashcarites. Also in Baghdad, al-Shaykh al-Mufid
(d. 413/1022) developed the theory of the Imamate of the Twelver Shicites.163
160 Kraemer, Humanism, 3-5.
161 For his biographical note, see R. Walzer, "al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, El2, ii, 778.
162 For his biographical note, see A. M., Goichon, "Ibn Sina", El2, iii, 941.
163 Kraemer, Humanism, 67-70.
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One of the factors observed by Kraemer as contributing to the renaissance of Islamic
intellectual life during the Buyid period is the decentralization of the cultural centres.
Before the Buyids, cultural activities were focused at the court of the caliph, where
scholars presented their works. However, during the Buyid period, this situation
changed. The courts of amirs in every province became new centres for scholars;
even the viziers also had their own court.164 The subjects presented at court also
changed. During the post mihna era until the coming of the Buyids, poets acquired a
prominent place in the court of the caliph. However, during the Buyid period, other
subjects such as kalam and philosophy also become important aspects of the
discussions.
We observe that Ibn Sina served as vizier to Shams al-Dawla (r. 387/997-412/1021)
in Jibal. Al-Baqillani worked under the patronage of cAdud al-Dawla in Baghdad. In
Rayy, there was cAbd al-Jabbar himself as one of the most prominent Muctazilite
scholars of his time, who worked under the patronage of al-Sahib b. cAbbad (d.
385/995), the vizier for both Mucayyid al-Dawla (r. 366/977-373/983) and his
brother Fakhr al-Dawla (r.373/983-387/997).165
Those scholars gained political and financial support from the amirs and the viziers.
The salary of a chief judge during the fourth/tenth century, for instance, is around
one hundred dinars.166 With financial support from the amirs and their social status
as an officer in their court, those scholars managed to secure enough support to
164 Ibn al-Amid and Sahib b. cAbbad are some examples, of. Kraemer, Humanism, 52-60.
165 Al-Suyuti, Tai-ikh al-Khulafa\ 416.
166 Al-Qalqashandi, Subh al-Acsha, iii, 212. A sum of this money probably is reserved for the
cost of publication.
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publish and copy their works. The role of their students in writing, editing and
preserving their teachers' works also contributes to the survival of the latter's work.
The decentralization of cultural centres, on the other hand, was possibly due to the
political situation during this period. In the early cAbbasid era, the caliph reigned
with total executive power, with advice from the vizier. Because of this power, they
interfered directly in religious disputes with scholars. What happened during the
reign of al-Ma'mun and al-Mutawakkil are some examples of this political
interference in religious disputes. However, during the Shicite Buyid period, this total
executive power of the caliph was absent. The Sunnite cAbbasid caliphs during this
time remained only as the living symbol of the unity of the Muslim empire but were
deprived of real executive power. They had no army to command; therefore, they
could not effectively impose any theological decree on people.
Presumably the last decree from the caliph before the change of the political structure
in the cAbbasid caliphate was by al-Radi in 323/935, when he promulgated an edict
warning the Hanbalis and condemning them for spreading anthropomorphic belief,
molesting a good Muslim, and accusing the Shicites of unbelief. This decree was
spread due to the riot by followers of al-Barbahari (d. 329/941), a Hanbali
traditionalist-jurisprudent preacher. They broke into homes, poured out the wine,
smashed musical instruments, and even interrogated couples on the street to ensure
that they were conducting themselves properly.167
167 lbn Miskawayh, Tajarib al-umam, i, 322-23; Ibn al-Athir, Kami/, viii, 229-231; Ibn Kathir, Bidaya,
xi, 181-2. See Kraemer, Humanism, 61-2.
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However, a year later, a significant event occurred in the cAbbasid caliphate when
the caliph's total executive power was lost. In 324/936, the Caliph al-Radi had to
accept the creation of a new post in the government, the amir al-umara' (commander
of commanders), due to his failure to secure financial support for his soldiers and
officers to implement executive power.168 The holder of the newly created post,
Muhammad b. al-Ra'iq (d. 326/937), took over the executive power of the caliph and
was in charge of both civil and military administration. He was the first amir al-
umara' and became the most powerful person in the cAbbasid caliphate.169 Since
then, the cAbbasid caliph had no troops to command and no land to call his own
beyond the gates of his palace.170
The establishment of the post of amir al-umara' created open rivalry among the
leaders. Ibn al-Ra'iq remained in power for only two years, and then he was
displaced by Abu al-Husayn Bajkam (r. 326-9/938-41), followed by Hasan Nasir al-
Dawla (r. 330-1/942-3) from the Hamdanids, and Tuzun (r. 331-4/943-5). Both
Bajkam and Tuzun were Ibn al-Ra'iq's generals of Turkish origin brought to
Baghdad by Ibn al-Ra'iq to become his military power.171
The constant changes in the holders of the post of amir al-umara' reveal both the
incompetence and the insignificance of the caliph during this period. After al-Radi's
death in 329/940, his brother Ibrahim al-Muttaqi (r. 329/940-333/944) was appointed
168 The tax revenue in Baghdad was inadequate to pay the salary of the soldiers. This economic
problem was due to the loss of Baghdad's control over al-Jazira, a rich grain growing area to the
Hamdanids. Later, this problem was exacerbated when al-Sawad, another agricultural area located in
the south of Baghdad was destroyed during the continuous military conflicts between Ibn al-Ra'iq and
Bajkam in their struggle for power. Cf. Kennedy, Prophet and the Age ofthe Caliphates, 199.
169
Kennedy, Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 205.
170
Kennedy, Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 243.
171
Kennedy, Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 230.
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caliph by Bajkam. Al-Muttaqi attempted to restore the power of caliph by restoring
the vizierate in the old way and abolishing the office of amir al-umara' entirely, but
the attempt failed. In 333/944, he was removed from power and blinded by the
Turkish amir al-umara' Tuzun.172
During this chaotic political period, the Buyids gained control over the caliph's
office in Baghdad. Ahmad b. Buya (d. 356/967), the third of Buya's sons from the
region of Daylam,173 occupied the city of Baghdad with his soldiers and was
accepted by the caliph at the time al-Mustakfi (r. 333-334/944-946) as a new amir al-
umara' in 334/945.174 Starting from this date, the Buyid emirates controlled the
cAbbasid caliphate for more than a century. The monopoly of the Buyid family
became apparent when Ahmad b. Buya discharged al-Mustakfi from the office of
caliph and appointed his nephew al-Mutic (r. 334-363/946-974), instead.175
The Buyids are said to have come from a Zaydite Shicites background. However, it is
unclear whether they continued to adhere to Zaydism. There is evidence that some
may have adopted Imamism. The famous Buyid ruler cAdud al-Dawla (d. 372/983),
who reigned in Shiraz and later in Baghdad, was buried near the graves of Imami
172 Kennedy, Prophet and the Age ofthe Caliphates, 198.
173 Daylam is the area covering the north-western part of Iran. It is a mountainous region and largely
inaccessible. The Zaydites and Twelver Shicites, who were persecuted from time to time by the rulers
of the day, had often taken refuge in the easily defendable region. They also seized the opportunity to
spread the Shicite version of Islam among the local population. Cf. Marcinkowski, M.,
"Rapprochement and Fealty", 273-6.
174 After Ahmad b. Buya's victory in Baghdad, all three Buyid brothers had bestowed on them
simultaneously by the Caliph honorific titles (laqab). Ahmad b. Buya (r.334/945-356/967) used the
title Mucizz al-Dawla (Glorifier of the State). His brothers cAli b. Buya (r. 332/934-338/949), used the
title cImad al-Dawla (Support of the State) and Hasan b. Buya (r. 335/947-373/983), used the title
Rukn al-Dawla (Pillar of the State). All of their names and titles were printed on the official currency
(sukuk) of the time. Cf. Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vii, 450.
175 See Kraemer, Humanism, 35.
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imams in Najaf. He appears to have been devoted to the twelve imams, as is attested
by an inscription of his in Persepolis, dated 363/974, which lists their names along
with a blessing.176
Despite the clashes between the leaders to control the post until it caused a
breakdown in the social life of the people, one might observe that the post of amir al-
umara' created a balance of power in the government. The caliph no longer had total
executive power in the government and, therefore, could not produce any effective
theological decree that could be imposed over the people. Meanwhile, the Buyids'
amir al-umara', although they were Shicites, neither made attempts to replace the
Sunnite caliph with a Shicite one nor imposed Shicism on the people. These decisions
were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the majority of the people, as well as
the Turkish troops on whom they relied, were Sunnites.177 Busse observed that this
policy gave their rule a more legitimate appearance in the eyes of the majority of
their subjects, who were Sunnite, and also increased the respect in which the Buyids
were held by foreign powers.178 This political environment becomes a suitable
ground for the theological schools to emerge and flourish. For scholars can express
their views and be involved in theological debates without fear of persecution. In
relation to the survival of cAbd al-Jabbar's works, I will briefly examine the
theological development during this era to see the relationship between certain sects
at that time.
176
Busse, H., "Iran Under the Buyids", 252; Kramer. Humanism, 43; Daou, T., Shaykh Muf/d, 19.
177
Kennedy, Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 218.
178
Busse,"Iran Under the Buyids", 251.
50
After struggling to justify their religious legitimacy following the post-mihna
policies of the cAbbasid caliphs, the Muctazilites managed to liberate themselves
from political pressure and became the dominant kalam school during the Buyid
emirates.179 The Muctazilites had transferred their base of operations from Basra to
Baghdad. Abu cAbdallah al-Basri was the leader of the Muctazilites in Baghdad. This
school maintained close ties with the Zaydites. Many Zaydites, including Imam al-
Mu'ayyad bi-llah (d. 424/1020) and Abu cAbdallah al-Daci, studied with him. With
the appointment of cAbd al-Jabbar as a chief judge in Rayy by Ibn cAbbad, the
Muctazilite Basra-Baghdad school opens a further branch in Rayy. This city in
western Persia became the flourishing centre of Muctazilites scholarship. cAbd al-
Jabbar also had the Zaydites among his pupils; one of them was Mankdim Shashdiw
(d. 425/1034). Mankdim was also a student of the Zaidite Imam al-Mu'ayyad bi-llah,
who had studied with Abu cAbdallah al-Basrl. Toward the end of the fourth/tenth
century, the Muctazilites influence on the Zaydites reached a high point.180
On the other hand, Muctazilites influence on Jewish theologians also reached a peak
during this century. Both Rabbanites and Karaites adopted the Muctazilite rational
approach at various levels.181 According to Madelung, with the rise of the
Bahshamiyya school to public prominence in Baghdad in the fourth/tenth century,
some Jewish scholars in Iraq were closely associated with its teaching. The
Rabbanite Sacid b. Yusuf al-Fayyumi (Sacadya Gaon) (d. 330/942) and the Karaites
179 On the post-mihna policies of the cAbbasid caliphs, see C. Melchert, "Religious Policies316-42.
180 The intellectual freedom was not only for Muslims; non-Muslim from religious minorities also
fared reasonably well under the relatively tolerant rule of the Buyids. Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi reports
the polite and restrained debate between Jews in the one side and Christians or Muslims on the other
appeared to have been conducted on a civil basis. Al-Tawhidi, Akhlaq al-Wazirayn, 299-301; cf.
Kraemer, Humanism, 71 & 82.
181 The reason is most likely due to the inclination of both schools towards the rational approach in
their theology.
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Abu Yusuf al-Qirqisani and Yapheth b. LAli were profoundly influenced by
Muctazilism.182 An obvious example of the influence of the Muctazilites on Jewish
scholars is Kitab al-Muhlawi, the work of Karaite Yusuf al-Basir (d. ca.
431/1040).183
Also, it was in Buyid Baghdad that the Imami Shicites developed both as a system of
belief and as a religious community. The most important development was the idea
of the Hidden Imam. They believed that the eleventh Imam al-cAskari (d. 260/873)
had left a son who had remained hidden and never died but would come again to
establish the rule of true Islam. This theory of the imamate was developed in
Baghdad by such scholars as al-Kulayni (d. 329/940-1) and Shaykh al-Mufid (d.
413/1022), who produced the view of imamate generally held by Twelvers down to
the present day.184
The last decade of Buyid rule in Baghdad, despite the political chaos, witnessed a
religious development that was to affect the whole subsequent history of Islam; the
Sunni revival. While Shi'ism was patronized by the Buyids in Baghdad, the lead in
the elaboration of Sunnism was taken by the cAbbasid caliph. Prominent Ashcarites
scholars such as al-Baqillani (d.403/1013) and al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037) developed
the school of Ashcarites. They were supported by the caliph in their effort to spread
Sunni Islam.185
182 Kraemer, Humanism, 80.
18:1 Madelung, Rational Theology, 3.
184 For the idea of the hidden Imam, see S. A. Arjomand, "Imam Absconditus", 1-12.
185 For the development of the Ash'arites, see G. Maqdisi, "Ashcari and the Ashcarites", 37-80.
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Near to the end of Buyid control, in 409/1018, the Caliph al-Qadir took a major step,
issuing a decree that condemned Muctazilism and Shicism and asserted that the
Companions of the Prophet and all the first caliphs should be respected by true
Muslims, which meant rejecting the claims of the Twelvers that cAli had been
unjustly deprived of the caliphate. These creeds, the so-called Risala al-Qadiriyya
that support the Hanbalite doctrines, were repeated and elaborated in 420/1029 when
the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an was explicitly condemned.186
Al-Qadir was able to adopt this position because he had more political independence.
The Buyid amirs of Baghdad had become so weak that they could no longer afford to
take action against the caliph. The main reason was the increasing conflict inside the
family resulting from questions regarding the distribution of power and land among
their members.187 He could also count on a large body of support in Baghdad itself;
the people might not fight to restore the political power of the cAbbasid caliph, but
many would support the Sunni cause against the pretensions of the Shicites.
In addition, al-Qadir was also encouraged in this by the rising power of MahmOd of
Ghazna (d. 421/1030) in Iran, who linked himself firmly with Sunnism. He was a
fierce opponent of the Buyids at the political level, but he also added a religious
dimension to the conflict by accusing them of being heretics and claiming that he
186 Kennedy, Prophet and the Age ofCaliphates, 241 -2.
187 Busse, "Iran under the Buyids", 260. For instance the clash between Sultan al-Dawla (r.403/1012-
412/1021) and his younger brother, Musharrif al-Dawla (r.412/1021-416/1025), after the death of their
father, Baha' al-Dawla (r. 379/989-403/1012).
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was the champion of Sunni Islam. This moral support from Mahmud of Ghazna
enabled al-Qadir to distance himself from the Buyids.188
In 420/1020, the army of Mahmud, led by his son Mascud (d. 432/1040), entered
Rayy, managed to crush the resurrection against Majd al-Dawla, and took over the
city. According to Ibn al-Athir, Mascud crucified the IsmacUlyya along the streets of
the city, removed the leader of the Muctazilites and Imamiyya, and burned all the
books of these groups to purify people from their disorder.189 Thus, within five years
after the death of cAbd al-Jabbar, the city of Rayy, where he had written, taught, and
served as the chief judge (Qadi a\-Qudat), was changed irrevocably.
However, the works of cAbd al-Jabbar and some of his students survived this
persecution. The survival of cAbd al-Jabbar's and his students' works is more likely
through two non-Muctazilite groups. The first group is the Zaydites, who had a good
relationship with cAbd al-Jabbar and the rulers of the Buyids. They brought those
works to Yemen. Later, it was Imam Ahmad b. Sulaiman al-Mutawakkil cala Allah
(d. 566/1170) who initiated the transfer of many Muctazilite works of the area of the
Caspian Sea to Yemen. These efforts continued and were intensified by his successor
al-Mansur Bi-llah cAbdallah b. Hamza (d. 613/1217).190
The second group is the Karaite Jews who followed the teaching of the Bahshamiyya
Muctazilites. Among the Rabbanites, Samuel b. Hofni Gaon (d. 404/1013), head of
the Yeshivah of Sura in Baghdad, was perhaps the first to openly adopt Bahshami
188 Kennedy, Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 242-3.
189 Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, viii. 170; Reynolds, A Muslim Theologian, 20.
190 Schwarb, G. "Un Projet international", 1.
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kalam in his writings."191 Then the Karaite Yusuf al-Basir (d. 431/1040) perhaps also
acquired his knowledge ofMuctazilite kalam in Iraq and brought that knowledge with
him to Jerusalem. Al-Basir was well-known as a vigorous supporter of the
theological teaching of cAbd al-Jabbar against the latter's own student Abu al-
Husayn al-Basri.192
In the modern world, the existence of these works was discovered by several
academic expeditions held by groups of scholars from various countries. The most
significant was in 1951, when a group of Egyptian scholars went to Sanca, Yemen, to
look for Islamic manuscripts. This expedition led by Sayyed cUmar al-Nami and
sponsored by the Ministry of Endowment of Egypt. They collected and copied more
than one hundred titles of manuscripts. The copies were taken to Cairo, where they
are kept in the National Library of Egypt {Dar al-kutub al-Misriyya).m
Yemen has been an important source of Muctazilite manuscripts due to the Zaydite
branch of Shicism, which established itself politically in Yemen. The Zaydites
adopted Muctazilism as the basis of their theology. These manuscripts contained
mostly works of various representatives of the Muctazilite school of Abu Hashim al-
Jubba'i, the Bahshamiyya. These included fourteen out of the original twenty
volumes of the encyclopaedic al-Mughni of cAbd al-Jabbar. Some works of cAbd al-
Jabbar's students were also found in the library of the Great Mosque. Among them
are Tacliq shark al-usul al-khamsa, a paraphrase of cAbd al-Jabbar's Shark usul al-
191 Madelung, Rational Theology, 2.
192 Madelung, Rational Theology. 5.
193 Another expedition was made in 1952, where they copied a number of manuscripts from the
Library of the Great Mosque of Sanca, Yemen. On the expedition and its results, see K. Nami, Bictha
al-Mi?riyya. See also, Geoffrey Roper, World Sun>ey, 645.
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khamsa by one of his followers, Mankdim, (d. 425/1034), and al-Majmuc flal-muhh
bi al-taklrf, a paraphrase of al-Muhit bi al-taklrf of cAbd al-Jabbar by another
follower of his, namely Ibn Mattawayh.194
Another significant effort that contributed to the survival of Muctazilite works is the
"Muctazilite Manuscripts Project Group" founded by Sabine Schmidtke and David
Sklare in 2003. The purpose of this project is to collect all the unpublished
Muctazilite manuscripts up till now, identify these materials, and prepare critical
editions in order to set the scientific research of the Muctazilite movement on a
broader basis. In addition to the public and private manuscript collection in Yemen,
project members also found a number of manuscripts in the Firkovitch Collection
housed in the Russian National Library in St. Petersburg.195
The manuscripts in the Firkovitch Collection were collected by the Polish Karaite
Abraham Firkovitch (d. 1290/1874) during his travels in the Crimea and Caucasus
and then later in the Middle East. Firkovitch also purchased manuscripts in Aleppo,
Damascus, and Jerusalem. His major source, however, was the manuscript storeroom
(,genizah) of the Karaite synagogue in Cairo.196 One of the most relevant findings





Adang C., A Common Rationality, 16.
196 For an overview on Fikovitch collections, see Tapani Harvianen, "The Cairo Genizot", 25-36;
David Sklare, "A Guide to Collections", 893-924.
197
Adang C., A Common Rationality, 16-7.
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From these explanations, one might observe that the survival of cAbd al-Jabbar's and
the late Muctazilites' works is linked with the efforts of two non-Muctazilite groups,
namely the Zaydites and the Karaites. The socio-political background that
encouraged the inter-sect and inter-religion dialogues provided a suitable ground for
the development of Islamic thought during this period. This background also
contributed to the survival of the works of some of the persecuted or even vanished
groups through the efforts of the surviving ones, such as the case of the Muctazilites
with the Zaydites and the Karaites. Most likely, through their efforts, those
manuscripts survived the persecution of the Muctazilites during the occupation of
Rayy by the army of Mahmud of Ghazna in 420/1030, several years after the death
of cAbd al-Jabbar. For that reason, some of cAbd al-Jabbar's works remain available
to us today.
Conclusion
From previous explanations we observe that, in the early works of Islamic theology,
the discussion of epistemology is limited, but, after the expansion of Islam and the
translation of Greek philosophy into Arabic, debates on the theory of knowledge
became widespread among the mutakallimun.
Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf was probably the first mutakallim involved in the discussion
of the theory of knowledge. He sometimes worked at the court of al-Ma'mOn during
the Mihna, and the translation project, therefore, was influenced by Greek
philosophy. However, his successors distanced themselves from philosophy and
57
wrote several works that rejected Aristotle's view of the atom and logic.
Nevertheless, none of his works have survived.
The earliest extant kalam work that deals with the theory of knowledge is Kitab al-
Tawhid by al-Maturidi. Al-Ashcari wrote an epistle on the vindication of kalam, the
Istihsan. This work became the foundation for the later Ashcarites to develop their
theological doctrines. Among the Muctazilites, interest in the theory of knowledge
developed after Abu al-Hudhayl, and the peak of this development can be observed in
the work of cAbd al-Jabbar, the Mughni. Most likely because of the socio-political
background of his time, cAbd al-Jabbar's works are the most extant among the
Muctazilites today.
cAbd al-Jabbar lived in the renaissance period of Islamic intellectuals and was the
contemporary of several prominent scholars, such as Ibn Sina, al-Baqillani, and al-
Mufid. The socio-political background of his time encouraged the development of the
theological debate due to the balance of power in the cAbbasid caliphate. The caliph
was no longer a total ruler and only a symbol of the caliphate, without any executive
power. The amir al-umara' held executive power but was limited in terms of religious
right, and therefore had no authority to make a theological decree. This socio-political
background provides suitable ground for inter-sect and inter-religious debate.
After the persecution of the non-Sunnite influence in Rayy at the hands of Mahmud
of Ghazna, the works of cAbd al-Jabbar and his students survived due to the efforts
of two non-Muctazilite groups, the Zaydite Shi'ites and the Karaite Jews. In the
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modern world, the Muctazilite manuscript collection of the Zaydites was found in
Yemen, while the collection of the Karaites was found in the Firkovitch Collection
housed in the Russian National Library in St. Petersburg.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge and
its relation to his other theological doctrines. To achieve this aim, firstly 1 will
investigate the theological background that shapes the epistemological discussion
among the Muctazilites. That will include the examination of the views of cAbd al-
Jabbar's predecessors on the definition of knowledge. Secondly, I will scrutinize
cAbd al-Jabbar's definitions of knowledge in his diverse works. Finally, I will
examine critical responses of the late Muctazilite scholars on cAbd al-Jabbar's
definitions of knowledge.
2.1. The Theological Foundation
In classical Islam, the discussion of the definition of knowledge is one of the main
concerns of Muslim theologians (mutakallimun). The definition of knowledge is
important for them as it is a foundation for their theological doctrines. They try to
explain what knowledge really meant and attempt to find an acceptable definition for
it that would apply to God and man, to revelation and to reason.'
As this study will indicate, there is significant disagreement between the Muctazilites
and the Ashcarites in defining knowledge. This contention is closely related to their
differences in interpreting theological doctrines. The root of it can be traced in the
second/eighth century when Wasil b. cAta' (d. 176/786), the founder of the
1
Rosenthal, F. M., Knowledge Triumphant, 46-7.
Muctazilites discusses the attributes of God. On this, he says that "one who confirms
the qualities (macani) or attributes that are eternal to God's essence (dhat), has
already believed in two gods, the first is God's essence and the second is His
attributes".2
According to H. Wolfson, Wash's rejection of qualities and attributes goes back to
the Christian terminology of the Trinity. Yahya b. cAdi describes the three members
of the Trinity by the Arabic word aqanim (hypostases), ashya' and macani, that is
"things". Meanwhile, Ibn Hazm refers to all three members as three things (ashya').
According to al-Ashcari, Ibn Kullab called the macani that exist in our bodies
accidents, things (ashya') and attributes (sifat). In fact, it would seem that the words
macna, shay' and sifa all became interchangeable terms, used as a description of
anything existing in a subject.3
Therefore, Wasil believes that the belief in the divine attributes indirectly guides one
to the belief in the Christian Trinity. He argues in this regard that God's eternity is
the most specific description of His essence. Hence, if the attributes share with God
in eternity, they also have a share in divinity (al-ilahiyya). So, in order to safeguard
that unity (tawhid), the Muctazilites denied all God's attributes, including knowledge
(cilm).4 For them the existence of the eternal attributes will imply polytheism (shirk)
since the only eternal being is God's essence. Thus, they believe that God has no
2
Al-Shahrastani, Milal, i, 46; al-Ashcari, Maqalat, i, 224. On early Muctazilites' discussion of the
theory of knowledge, see Bernand, "La Notion de 'Ilm", 23-45.
3 Wolfson, Harry. A., Philosophy of the Kalam, 117.
4
Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, 133.
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power, life and knowledge.5 Due to this theological background, their discussion on
the definition of knowledge will exclude God's knowledge.6
2.2. The Definition of Knowledge
Al-Tahanawi has divided the views of Muslim theologians regarding the definition of
knowledge into three major divisions, (i) The nature of knowledge is known
immediately (daruri), therefore there is no need for it to be defined or it is impossible
to define it. This view was introduced by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210);7 (ii)
the definition of knowledge is discursive (nazan) but difficult to define. This view
was supported by al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) and al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), and (iii)
the definition of knowledge is discursive and not difficult to define. The majority of
Muslim theologians, including the Muctazilites and the Ashcarites, incline towards
this view.8
Our concern here is the third view, since it is the view of the majority of the
mutakallimun. Every school of thought offers different definitions regarding
5 The Muctazilites in general agree to deny the existence of any additional attributes to God. However,
they are divided on the interpretation of the relation between God's essence and His attributes, falling
into three main views: (i) The theory of unity (al-wihda) of Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf; (ii) the theory
of representation (al-niyaba), of Abu cAli al-Jubba'i; and (iii) the theory of states ( al-ahwai) of Abu
Hashim al-Jubba'i. However, after the discovery of the late Muctazilite works, the fourth theory, the
rules (al-ahkam), developed by the late Muctazilite, Abu al-Husayn al-Ba?ri, was introduced. Cf.
Mankdim, Sharh, 18; Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, 134. For our discussion on these
theories, see below, 242-62.
6 Ibn al-Murtada, Mimya, 13; al-Zamakhshari, Kashshqf ii, 329.
7 Al-Razi argues in two ways; (i) "one knows his own existence by immediate knowledge film
daruri), which does not need proof or reflection (na?ar). Since one's knowledge of oneself is
immediate, and it is specific knowledge film al-khass), hence knowledge in general terms (macna al-
camm) must have been also immediately known. So, if a general meaning of knowledge is daruri, it
does not need a proof or a definition; (ii) if knowledge is acquired and needs definition; either it is
defined by itself or by others." Al-Razi argues that, in both cases, they are false. For other than
knowledge is defined/known (yu raj) by knowledge and if knowledge is defined by another it will
imply a circle (dawr), since each of them depends on one another. This implication is implausible. Cf.
al-Razi, Tafsir al-Kabir, ii, 186-187.
8 Cf. al-Tahanawi, Kashshaf, ii, 1056.
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knowledge. More interestingly, disputes on the definition of knowledge also
occurred between scholars within the same school, as we will indicate, particularly in
the case of the Muctazilites. Before proceeding, it is important to discuss their
concept of definition.
Explaining the nature of the differences in definition, cAbd al-Jabbar reports the view
of Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i (d. 321/933). On this, the latter states:
There are a lot of things that we would like to define, yet, we are
unable to find a suitable and concise terminology for that meaning.
Therefore, we need to mention the rules or guidelines (ahkam) that are
related to it and the states that refer to it...for the aim of a definition is
to clarify its aims (aghrad). As it is permissible for an interpreter
(mufassir) to deal conclusively with his interpretation based on what
he thinks suitable either to add or to reduce, to prolong or to
summarize, similarly it is also permissible in the context of
definition.9
From this passage, one might observe that the concept of definition by Abu Hashim
is less sophisticated. He only outlines general rules about it. The rule is that the
definition interprets the meaning of the thing defined and will not lead one to become
ignorant (jahl) of it. The definition must also omit anything that is outside the thing
defined. The other significant rule is the freedom for a definer to interpret what he
thinks suitable in his definition. When these rules are fulfilled, the definition of a
thing is acceptable.10
This phenomenon is also observed by Ibn al-Malahimi (d. 536/1141), when he
reports that the majority of the Muctazilites consider that 'definition' is the
9
Mughni, xii, 14-15.
10 For more information regarding cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments on the differences of the definition of
knowledge among the Muctazilites see Mughni, xii, 14-6.
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interpretation ('tafsir) of the word defined (al-lafz al-mahdud). What is important in
their definition is that the words used in the definition must be clearer from the word
defined. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, however, disagrees with this method of definition.
He believes that the definition must explain the reality of the thing defined.
Therefore, definition for him is a revealer (kashif) of the meaning and the reality of
the thing defined. Preferring the view of Abu al-Husayn over the majority of the
Muctazilites, Ibn al-Malahimi argues that if there is no definition of knowledge and
we were asked about its reality, it is appropriate for us to use some words that reveal
its reality and become a definition of knowledge."
There is also a debate among them regarding defining something by changing (ibdat)
it with another word. cAbd al-Jabbar clearly accepts this form of definition when he
defines reflection (nazar) with thinking ifikr).12 Ibn al-Malahimi, however, disagrees
with cAbd al-Jabbar. He argues that changing the word will not explain the attribute
that distinguishes the thing defined from others. For instance, if you define
knowledge as clarification (tabayyun), then one will ask you what clarification is.13
He argues further that the aim of defining something is to explain the characteristic
and judgments (ahkam) that reveal its reality and distinguish it from others.
Therefore, defining something by changing it for another word will not suffice, since
it does not reveal the reality of the thing defined. Therefore, it is an inappropriate
method of definition. Ibn al-Malahimi also reports a similar view from Abu al-




According to Ibn al-Malahimi, Abu al-Husayn accepts this form of definition in his Tasaffuh and
Ghurar but rejects it in Sharhal-umad.Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Mittamad, 17-8.
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Husayn in the latter's Sharh al-cumad; therefore, both of them reject cAbd al-Jabbar's
definition of reflection as thinking.14
2.3. Early Muctaziiites' Definitions
The Muctazilites prior to cAbd al-Jabbar mostly agreed that knowledge is from the
genus of belief or conviction (ftiqad).15 Therefore, they use the word ftiqad to
define knowledge. Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhi (d. 317/931), a Baghdadi Muctazilite, for
instance, defines knowledge as "believing the thing (to be) as it is".16 His definition,
however, has been criticized by many theologians from the Ashcarites, Hanbalites
and Muctazilites.17
cAbd al-Jabbar rejects this definition with the argument that defining knowledge as
"believing the thing (to be) as it is", implies a similarity between knowledge and
belief. This similarity is implausible since it will include belief by uncritical imitation
(taqlid) and mere chance (.siidfah) in knowledge, for a merely lucky person (mubkhit)
and uncritical imitator (muqallid) could believe the thing as it is, without knowing it.
Also, it will include one who has presumption (zcmn) and doubt (shakk). This
implication clearly contradicts what has been agreed among grammarians (ahl al-
lugha) that a knowing person (calim) is certain of what he knows without any doubt
or disbelief.18
14 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 13.
15
Mughni, xii, 16 & 60.
16
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 5. Marie Bernand, based on Vajda's report, mistakenly attributes this
definition to cAbd al-Jabbar cf. Bernand, Le Probleme, 265.
17 Cf. al-Baghdadi, Uful al-din, 5; Abu Yacla, Mutamad, 32; Mughni, xii, 17. This definition was also
rejected by Plato, see his Theaetelus, 338; Conford, F., Plato's Theory ofKnowledge, 142.
18
Mughni, xii. 17-18; cf. cUthman, Nazariyya al-taklif 46.
65
Consequently, Abu cAli al-Jubba'i (d. 303/915), a Basrian Muctazilite, comes up with
another definition of knowledge. He bases it on a similar foundation with al-Balkhi's
definition but with some adjustments. Abu cAli defines knowledge as "believing a
thing (to be) as it is, when it happens immediately or by proof'.19 With this
definition, he was able to avoid some of the criticism of Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhi's
definition of knowledge, especially regarding the inclusion of uncritical imitation and
mere chance in the definition; for the second part of his definition will exclude both
uncritical imitation and mere chance from knowledge.
One might observe that Abu cAli's definition has a considerable similarity with the
definition of knowledge attributed to Plato as "justified true belief'.20 For justified
true belief is based on proof. While the relation between Abu al-Hudhayl with Greek
philosophy is proven, Abu cAli's direct connection with philosophy is unclear.
However, there are various reports that indicate that philosophy is not unfamiliar
during his time. J. van Ess reports that Abu cAli's son, Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i, wrote
a book rejecting the logic of Aristotle, called Kitab al-tasaffuh.2] The translations of
the Sophist of Plato and the Metaphysics of Aristotle were completed during Abu
cAli's lifetime.22 Also during his lifetime, the small remnants of the school of
Alexandria emigrated to Baghdad from Harran.23 Therefore, based on these reports,
it is probable that Abu cAli was also familiar with philosophical debates of his time,
19
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din,5; Rosenthal, Know/edge Triumphant, 64. Interestingly, al-Tahanawi
reports that al-Razi defines knowledge with a definition that almost identical with that of Abu cAli's.
Cf. al-Tahanawi, Kashshqf ii, 1058
20
Plato seems to be considering some such definition in Theaetetus 201, and perhaps accepting one in
Meno 98. cf. Gettier, E. "Is Justified true belief knowledge?", 121.
21 Van Ess, J. "Logical Structure, 21.
22
Wolfson, "Mu'ammar's Theory ofMacnd\ 673-4.
23
According to Hourani, those philosophers emigrated from Alexandria to Antioch in the reign of
cUmar II (r. 717-20), from Antioch to Harran under al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-61), and finally to Baghdad
under al-Muctadid (r. 892-902). see. I lourani, "Islamic and Non-Islamic Origin", 81.
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although whether he adopts Plato's definition of knowledge is uncertain; for unlike
the Sophist and Metaphysics, the specific date of the translation of the Theaetetus and
Meno into Arabic is lost.24
Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i (d. 321/933) in this regard modifies his father's definition of
knowledge by relating it to man's psychological reaction. He defines knowledge as
"believing a thing (to be) as it is to one's own satisfaction (maca sukun al-nafs
ilayh)".25 It is likely that Abu Hashim is the first Muctazilite to define knowledge
based on the tranquillity of the soul. This definition, later, becomes a foundation for
cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge.26
From these last two definitions, one might observe that they manage to exclude
taqlid and mere chance from knowledge, yet they do not satisfy all of the critics. The
problem arises from the first part of their definitions, "believing a thing" (ftiqad al-
shay'). This part of the definition is problematic because of the words ftiqad and
shay'. Criticizing these definitions, AbO al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037), an
Ashcarite theologian, writes:
These three definitions invalidate the knowledge of impossibilities (al-
muhalat). Indeed the knowledge of them is not the knowledge of
something (shay') because impossibility is not something. However, it
is agreeable that the knowledge of impossibility as impossible is
acceptable although they are not something (la shay'); and tell them
[the Muctazilites] if knowledge is belief, the consequence is that every
knower (calim) is a believer (mutaqid). Indeed, God is a knower but
He is not a believer. Therefore, defining knowledge with belief
(ftiqad) is implausible.27
24 See Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist, 230-45.
25
Mughni, xii, 14; Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 63.
26
According to Bernand, Abu Hashim's formulation of the definition of knowledge was adopted not
only by his followers but also by some Ashcarites, See, Bernand. Le Probteme, 291-300.
27
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 5-6.
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Al-Baghdadi's criticism of the definitions of knowledge by three of cAbd al-Jabbar's
predecessors are based on their use of the words (a) ftiqad; and (b) shay'. The
consequence of defining knowledge with the word ftiqad, he argues, is that God will
become a believer (mutaqid). For, when knowledge is belief, then a knower (''alim)
will be a believer. The employment of such a term for God is inappropriate, since
there is no evidence supporting that view. Neither the Qur'an nor the Sunna indicates
that "miftaqid" is one ofGod's names.28
In defending his predecessors' method of defining knowledge with belief {ftiqad),
cAbd al-Jabbar argues that there is no problem with using the word ftiqad in defining
knowledge. He explains that one is called a believer {mutaqid) when the knowledge
one obtains becomes a belief. So, whenever one accepts the validity of certain
knowledge, it becomes his belief and he will become a believer. However, cAbd al-
Jabbar explains that the nature of knowing is different in the case of God, because
God knows with His essence {bi dhatihi) rather than with his knowledge {al-cilm).
Therefore, God cannot be called a believer {mutaqid). In addition, cAbd al-Jabbar
says that the believer ties his belief in his heart, but God is not similar to human
29
nature because He has neither bodily existence nor a heart like human beings.
This argument is also mentioned by Abu al-Husayn.30 He presents a similar argument
to cAbd al-Jabbar in defending the use of ftiqad in defining knowledge at the
28




Abu al-Husayn as reported by Ibn al-Malahimi, inclines toward Abu Hashim's definition of
knowledge. Therefore, he agrees with cAbd al-Jabbar in defending the use of belief to define
knowledge, cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miitamad.W.
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beginning of his work.31 Abu al-Husayn argues that "mutaqid is the one who has
ftiqad. God has no ftiqad because He has no knowledge, so, it is inconceivable to
call Him al-muctaqid\ The word muctaqid, he argues, "if it is applied to a knower,
indicates that he ties his heart to something [belief] (caqada qalbah cala shay'); this
indication cannot be applied to God. Therefore, the use of ftiqad will not imply that
God should become a muctaqidHowever, later, Ibn al-Malahimi rejects this
argument and comes up with another definition of knowledge.32
Thus, when the Muctazilites use the word belief (ftiqad) in defining knowledge,
God's knowledge is not included in their consideration. Therefore, it should not be a
problem to say that knowledge is belief and a knower (calim) is a believer (miftaqid),
since that only applies to human beings or other creations but not to God. However,
Ibn al-Malahimi considers that this argument is implausible since it is inconsistent
with the common usage in the Arabic language. I will leave the discussion of the
Muctazilites' solution to the problem of the attributes of God until later, in Chapter
Five.
The Ashcarites, by contrast, believe in a different view regarding the relationship
between God's attributes and His essence. They maintain that God has an additional
attribute. Therefore, when we say "God knows", that means that God has the
31 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 15.
32 For our discussion on Ibn al-Malahimi's definition of knowledge, see below. 82-3.
33 One might observe that in this argument they are not using a single standard in applying the theory
of knowledge in God and human beings.
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attribute of knowledge. This attribute of knowledge is something additional to His
essence (za'idcala al-dhat).34
They base their arguments on the Qur'anic verses that confirm the existence ofGod's
attributes such as: "He has sent from His (own) knowledge (bi cilmihi)". 5 Al-Ashcari
argues that the meaning of the verse clearly indicates that God has knowledge. The
Ashcarites in turn apply analogical reasoning that is based on this Qur'anic verse.
This type of reasoning in kalam is known as the proof of the seen [world] on the
unobservable [world] (istidlal bi al-shahid ala al-gha'ib).36 Al-Baqillani argues that,
in the seen world (al-shahid), a knower (al-calim) is referred to as someone who has
knowledge. Then he applies this principle to the unseen world {al-gha'ib). Therefore,
when we say "God knows", that means that God has knowledge. Al-Baqillani (d.
403/1013) even goes further to say that the attributes of cilm is the cause for God to
know, which, without it, God will not know. Hence, the attributes of God according
T7
to him are eternal as well as His essence (dhat).
Based on this theological background, the Ashcarites, in their discussion on the
definition of knowledge, will always consider that their definitions need to include
God's knowledge. Thus, it is no surprise when al-Baghdadi reveals two definitions of
knowledge offered by his fellow school-members (ashabuna) based on the word
attribute (sifa): The first definition is "knowledge is an attribute through which he
34 Al-Ashcari, Lumcf, 26; al-Baghdadi. Usui al-din, 90; al-Shahrastani, Milal, i, 92.
35
Qur. 4: 166. Qur. 35: 11; Qur. 54: 58.
36
Al-Baqillani, Tamhid, 152; Van Ess, "Logical Structure", 34. For our discussion on this type of
argument see below, 226.
37 Cf. al-Baqillani, Tamhid, 152.
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who is alive becomes knowing", and the second is "knowledge is an attribute
TO
through which one who is alive and capable can produce an act and good at it".
cAbd al-Jabbar also criticizes the definition of knowledge as "the perception of the
object known".39 The use of the word "idrak" in the definition of knowledge is
ascribed to Abu al-Hasan al-Ashcari.40 cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the use of the word
idrak in relation to knowledge is possible only in certain circumstances, such as
adraktu macna kalamika (I know the meaning of your speech), but it could not be
used in defining knowledge in general, for both words cover different aspects which
are not covered by the other.41
There are certain cases where idrak can be used but not the word cilm and vice versa.
The examples of the first situation are that we know God but we do not perceive
(<adraka) Him, or we know non-existences (mcfdumat) but we cannot perceive them.
Meanwhile, for the second situation, the example is that a sleeping person perceives
or feels the bite of a bug or flea but he does not know it.42
From these definitions, we can observe that the Aslfarites' definitions of knowledge
establish no relationship between belief and knowledge. Instead, they introduce the
word sifa rather than itiqad. Thus, the use of the word attribute (sifa) to define
38
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 5; cf. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 53.
39 Idrak al-MaLlum, Mughni, 18. According to Rosenthal this definition is primarily credited to al-
Ashcari. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 56.
40 See al-Amidi, Abknr al-afkar, 74.
41
To see more on cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments against other definitions of knowledge see, Mughni, xii,
16-22.
42 Mankdim, Sharh, 169.
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knowledge according to the Ashcarites will comply with both humans and God's
knowledge.
Meanwhile, the use of the word shay' in defining knowledge, according to the
Ashcarites, is problematic since it will exclude the non-existent (macdum) from the
object of knowledge.43 Al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013) argues that "if we use the word
shay' in the definition of knowledge, the object which is not a thing (laysa bi shay')
will be excluded from known objects Therefore, he maintains that the
use of the word "known" (macluni) is more plausible in defining knowledge than the
word "thing" (shay'), since the former will not exclude the non-existent {al-macdum).
As a result, al-Baqillani defines knowledge as "cognition (macrifa) of the object
known as it is".45
cAbd al-Jabbar however, disagrees with al-Baqillani's definition of knowledge. He
argues that the use of the word macrifa in defining knowledge will not clarify
anything. Instead, it will only add to the confusion, for cAbd al-Jabbar believes that
there is no difference between knowledge {'ilm) and cognition (macrifa).Ab On this,
43 For cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments on Shay'iyya al-Mddum, see Bernand, Le Probleme, 266-71.
44
Al-Baqillani considers non-existent (mcfdum) is nothing (ISshay'). Cf. al-Baqillani, Tamh/d, 35.
45Cf. Tamhid al-AwS'il, 25. cf. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 53. Abu Yacla al-Hanbali (d.
458/1066) offers similar definition with al-Baqillani. See Abu Yacla, al-MiTtamad, 32.
46 The discussion on "whether knowledge is similar with cognition or not", is not an issue among
major theologians in the fourth/tenth century. Al-Baghdadi for instance in his Usui al-din did not
differentiates between knowledge and cognition. Similar expressions can be seen in the writing of
Abu Yacla al-Hanbali. In addition, al-Ashcari himself and his early followers considered and used cilm
and mdrifa as synonyms.
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he argues that "to define something one must mention the clear rules to the addressee
(mukhatab)" ,47
The idea of shay'iyya al-ma duni in Muctazilite can be traced back to cAbbad b.
Sulayman (d. 250/864) a Basrian Muctazilite.48 On this, he argues that "the known
objects (mcflumat) are known to God before they exist, the produced things
(,maqdurat) are under the power of God before they exist, thing (shay '/ashya') is
[called] a thing before its existence, an atom (jawhar) is [called] atom before its
existence, similarly an accident (carad) is [called] accident before its existence".49
His main argument is that the non-existence is considered a thing shay'iyya because
it is similar to other objects, such as known [object] (malumat), substance (jawhar),
and accidents (jarad) in the case that they were described with their respective names
even before their existence. For instance, a person tells his friend that he wants to
draw a picture tomorrow. Although the picture does not exist yet, one already calls it
a "picture". Therefore, based on this formula, the Muctazilites conclude that non¬
existence (macduni) is something (shayj, since there is no difference in naming
something that either potentially exists (wujud bi al-quwwa) or actually exists (witjud
47
Mughni, xii, 19. Al-Baqillani's definition also has been rejected by his fellow Ashcarite, a!-Amidi
(d. 631/1233). Al-Amidi's argument is based on two reasons: Firstly, it was a consensus among the
Ashcarites that God has knowledge and His knowledge cannot be called mdrifa. Therefore, the use of
mcfrifa in defining knowledge will exclude God's knowledge in this definition. Secondly, al-Baqi 1 lani
defines cilm with the word mcflum which is taken from the root cilm, al-Amidi argues that the word
taken from a root must have been less obvious from the root itself. To define something more clearer
(.azhar) with something that is less obvious (akhfS) is forbidden (mumtanf). Therefore, the definition
of knowledge by al-Baqillani is invalid since it is inappropriate to define knowledge with the words
mcfrifa and mdlum. Cf. al-Amidi, Abkar al-Afkar, 74-5.
48 For biographical note on him see Watt, "cAbbad b. Sulayman al-Saymari (or al-Daymari)" in EI2, i,
4.
49 Al-Ashcari, Maqaiat, i, 159.
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bi al-ffl). Therefore, they believe that it will not be a problem to use the word shay'
in defining knowledge.50
Yet, Abu al-Qahir al-Baghdadi was able to detect the vagueness of this formula. He
observes that the Muctazilites probably can apply this method for a possible thing
(,mumkinat), which has a potential and an actual existence, but this formula could not
be applied to an impossible thing (mustahRai), which does not have an actual
existence, such as the associate (sharik) ofGod.51
The associate of God, he argues, does not exist now and will not exist in the future.
Therefore, based on cAbbad b. Sulayman's formula, which required both the actual
and potential existence, God's associate could not be considered shay' since it is
lacking the potential existence, and is, thus, incompatible with the formula.
Furthermore, al-Baghdadi argues that to deny any relationship between the
impossible things (mustahRat) and knowledge is inconceivable, since we know that
the mustahRat is something that is not presently existing and will not also in the
future. This proposition, according to al-Baghdadi, is enough to include the
mustahRat as an object of knowledge, and, hence, proved that the Muctazilites' view
of the shay'iyya al-macdum is false.52 Furthermore, the Ashcarites argue that the
implication of saying that macdum is something will imply that there are beings that
are eternal alongside and independently of God. This is problematic since it implies
the existence ofmore than one God.53
50 Cf. Frank, "al-Macdum wa al-Mawjud", 198.
51
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-dm, 5.
52
Al-Baghdadi, U?ut at-din, 5.
53 Cf. Frank "al-Macdum wa al-Mawjud", 186.
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Responsive to the contention between his predecessors and the Ashcarites, cAbd al-
Jabbar develops his definition of knowledge. Throughout his diverse works, I
observe that cAbd al-Jabbar develops and changes his definition of knowledge. The
reports from his students also provide a significant contribution towards developing
cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge.
2.4. cAbd al-Jabbar's Definition54
cAbd al-Jabbar defines knowledge in at least four of his works, the Mughni, al-
cUmad, Sharh, and al-Muhit.55 In the early stage56 of his prolific academic life, cAbd
al-Jabbar preserves the traditional Muctaziltes' method of defining knowledge by
using the word belief (ftiqad).57 In al-Umad, he defines knowledge as: "the belief
that satisfies the soul that its object (mutaqad) is as one believes it to be".58 At this
stage, cAbd al-Jabbar is still strongly connected with the definition of the founder of
Bahshamiyya, Abu Hashim al-Jubbai.59 Therefore, he defends the method of defining
knowledge with belief. cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that the Ashcarites' argument, that
if knowledge (cilm) is belief (ftiqad), therefore, a knower (calim) is a believer
54 F. Rosenthal mentions the significance of cAbd al-Jabbar's analysis on the definition of knowledge
in the Mughni, but he does not elaborate it since he only receives the Mughni twelfth after the
completion of his knowledge triumphant. He considers that cAbd al-Jabbar's Mughni is one of the
most complete references by classical Muslim theologians in dealing with the definition of knowledge.
See Knowledge Triumphant, 51 & 63.
55
Mughni, xii, 13; Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 46; lbn al-Malahimi, MiTlamad, 14. M. Bernand has analyzed
two definitions of knowledge mentions by cAbd al-Jabbar in the Mughni. She concludes that both
definitions facing a difficulty regarding the use of the word al-shay', see her Le Probleme, 265.
56 The chronological order of cAbd al-Jabbar's works is based on his own report. He writes that al-
cUmad was written before he dictates the Mughni. While Sharh al-usul al-khamsa was dictated before
the completion of the Mughni. Cf. Mughni, xx (2), 258. 1 suggest that al-Muhit was dictated (maybe
before or after Sharh but) after al-Umad and before the Mughni. For his definition of knowledge in it
is similar with that in the Sharh, which 1 believe indicates the same way of thinking.
57 For more on this see Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 63. Also see above, 55-7.
58 See Mankdim, Sharh, 45; cf. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 211.
59 See above, 67.
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(,mutaqid), will not imply that God has become a believer since the nature of
knowing is different between humans and God. While the former knows with
knowledge, the latter knows with His essence (bi dhatih) and not with knowledge
(ial-cilm). Therefore, God could not be called a believer (miftaqid).60
Hence, due to the intellectual development among the mutakallimun or most likely
due to the critics from the Ashcarites on his predecessors' definitions of knowledge,
cAbd al-Jabbar comes up with another definition of knowledge as a foundation of his
theology. He needs a precise as well as concise definition that will cover all aspects
of knowledge, and exclude everything that was not included in it, and of course
escape some criticism from the opponent.61 Therefore, one might observe that, in the
Muhit and Sharh, cAbd al-Jabbar omits all of the controversial words that he used in
the al-Umad definition, such as ftiqad, shay'. He minimizes the words and focuses
only on the tranquillity of the soul (sukun al-nafs). Hence he defines knowledge as
"what necessitates tranquillity of the soul".62
However, this definition is again not secure from critics. This time he does not
quarrel against the Ashcarites but his own student, Abu al-Husayn al-Basri. The latter
disagrees with cAbd al-Jabbar's newly created definition of knowledge. He argues
that cAbd al-Jabbar's definition lacks what he calls the correspondence with the






"Al-Muqladd li sukun al-nafs" or "mayaqlac/isukun al-nafs" Cf. al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 14;
Mankdim, Sharh, 46
63 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miitamad, 14.
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Hence, we find in the later stage of his academic life, that cAbd al-Jabbar defines
knowledge in the Mughni with a different definition from that in his previous works.
Here, he defines knowledge as "the mana which produces tranquillity of the knower
soul with respect to what he obtained".64 cAbd al-Jabbar believes that true knowledge
can be known when the soul of the knower becomes tranquil (sukun) towards what
he knows without any doubt (shakk), assumption (zann) and mere chance (sudfa).
However, he states that the mana must only come from the genus of belief in order
to be considered knowledge.65
In the Mughni, cAbd al-Jabbar omits two words that have been targeted by the critics,
which are ftiqad and shay'. As a replacement, he uses the word "macn3\ one of the
most ambiguous words in kalam terminology. Defining knowledge with the term
macna is not a popular trend among the Muctazilites; instead they prefer to define
knowledge as belief, as we mentioned earlier. Thus, in order to understand cAbd al-
Jabbar's methodology for defining knowledge, it is both necessary and worthwhile to
dwell on the meaning of the terms used.
First of all, when cAbd al-Jabbar defined knowledge as the macna which preserves
the tranquillity of the learner's soul for what he obtained, what kind ofmacna was he
referring to, and how did he relate this macna to knowledge? Secondly, how is the
tranquillity of one's soul capable of determining true knowledge? Does this imply
64 "Al-ilm huwa al-mann al-ladhi yaqtadisukun al-nafs al- Slim Ha ma tanawalahu", Mughni, xii, 13.
According to Peters, Vajda Georges in his "La Connaissance chez Saadia", is the first Western scholar
to translate the word sukun al-nafs with the meaning of the tranquillity of the soul. This was followed
by Marrie Bernand in her "Le 'ilm che: les premiers MufazMtes. She translates it as "tranquilite de
lame". Cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 49.
65
For more information on the meaning ofmacnasee below, 78.
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subjectivism? To answer these questions, we must first take account of the meaning
ofmcfna in his usage.
2.5. The Concept of Macna
The Basrian Muctazilites believe that every being is composed of atoms (jawhar) and
accidents (carad). Mana is one of the terms used to describe an accident. Others are
cause (cilla), attribute {sifa) and assessment (hukm). A particular accident is named
differently depending on the perspective from which it is described.66
K. Reinhart brilliantly describes the position of these four terms in the example of an
apple. He explains that Mcfna is used to describe the ontological nature of a quality,
insofar as it can be imagined to be apart from the thing in which it resides. Thus,
"redness" is the "redness" of the apple's being red, and is said to be, as "redness," its
mana; but, when the redness is considered causative (of the apple's being red), it is
called cilla. The quality that it causes, namely the apple's redness, is called sifa', the
sifa is the attribute, or adjective, in the phrase "the red apple". Declaring the apple to
be red, or assessing it to be red, or predicating the redness of the apple, is an
"assessment" {hukm). In the phrase "this apple is red", "red" is the hukm of the
apple.67
According to Wolfson, the word macna is an Arabic translation of the Greek word
pragma (thing), which is also translated as shay '.68 He states that, in Christianity, the
word macani (plural macna) is used by Yahya b. cAdi to describe the three members
66
Reinhart, Kevin, Before Revelation. 147.
67
Reinhart, Before Revelation, 147. cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 155-8.
68
Wolfson, Philosophy of the KalSm, 1 1.
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of the Trinity beside other terms, such as aqanim (hypostases) and ashya' (things).
Because of this understanding of macna, the Muctazilites, since Wasil b. cAta', reject
the Sifatiyya's view that God's attributes are the eternal macanj.69
In classical Islamic theology, the theory of macna was introduced by Mucammar (d.
215/830). Al-Khayyat explains Mucammar's theory of macna as follows: having
observed that of two contiguous bodies at rest one began to move, while the other did
not, Mucammar inferred that a macna must inevitably abide in the one and not in the
other, and it is on account of that macna that the former is moved, for, were it not so,
then the one would not be more capable of motion than the other.70 Hence, macna in
Mucammar's theology is something that is distinct from something else.
In contemporary Islamic studies, the concept of macna in the theology of Mucammar
received considerable attention from certain western scholars.71 Frank considers that
the macna'm Mucammar's theology means an accident. After examining Mucammar's
views from several sources,72 Frank suggests that Mucammar was troubled by the
question of why things differ from each other. The answer given by him is that things
and accidents both differ and are the same because of what he calls macna. This
macna is described by him as abiding in bodies, from within which it acts as the
cause of motion (haraka) and rest (sukun) and all the other accidents of the bodies in
Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kaldtn, I 17.
70
Al-Khayyat, Inti?3r, 46. Cf. Wolfson, "Mucammar's Theory ofMdn3\ 675.
71 The contention of western scholars on the concept ofmdnahas been summarized by H. Wolfson in
his article, "Mucammar's Theory ofMdn3\ 673-88.
72
Al-Khayyat, lnti?ar, 46; al-Ashcari, Maqalat, 372; al-Shahrastani, Milal, 46; Ibn Hazm, Fi?al, v, 56;
Wolfson, "Mucammar's Theory ofMdn3\ 674-9.
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which it abides.73 In the Muhassal of al-Razi, Mucammar is reported to have said that
the metani are also called ashya' (things),74 and, evidently, because they exist in
bodies as their subject, they are also called "accidents".75
Later, R. Frank studied the term mana as it is used by several mutakallimun in order
to clarify its technical meaning in kalam in general.76 He concludes that mcfna in its
technical sense refers to an entity that determines something or, in his more technical
term, "an immediate, intrinsic causal determinant". Explaining his understanding of
the theory ofmcfna, he states that the actuality of the accident of motion (haraka) in
the subject, for instance, is the immediate causal determinant of its being in motion,
and so also the other accidents are the immediate intrinsic causes of its being
(perceiver) mudrik, desirous (mushtahi), omniscient (calim) and so on. In this sense,
the term is an equivalent of the term "cause" (cilla).77 In other words, Frank explains
that macna is used to describe the ontological nature of a quality, to the extent that it
cannot be imagined to be apart from the thing in which it resides.78
73 Frank, "Al-Mcfna: Some Reflection," 248-9.
74
Al-Razi, Muhassal, 104.
75 Wolfson, "Mucammar's Theory ofMacn3\ 679.
70 He reports that the use of the word macna in Islamic theology represents accident farad), perception
(idrak), motion {haraka), the modes of being in space {aksvan), desire {shahwa), pain (alam), power
(iqudra), knowing film) and cause filla). Cf. Frank, "Al-Mcfna: Some Reflection," 249.
77 Frank explains that the differences between sabab and cilla is that the first use to detonate the
element in a chain of causes or factors in a causal sequence leading from some initial end or event to a
resulting event in another subject. The relation between sabab and its result (musabbab) need not be
necessary. Meanwhile, cilla on the other hand, is used in a strict sense, most commonly as the direct or
primary determinant cause that produces its effect (macluf) immediately and necessarily. In short, cilla
is a direct and primary cause and sabab is a chain of causes which is not direct. See Frank, Al-Macna:
Some Reflection," 250.
78
Reinhart, Before Revelation, 147. See Peters, God's Created Speech, 157.
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cAbd al-Jabbar accepts the theory of mcfna in his theology and uses it on several
occasions in his works, such as for pain (a/aw),79 desire (shahwa)80 capacity
{qudra) 1 and speech (kalam).82 He is one of the Muammar's successors who
developed his theory ofmcfna further in a technical meaning. Mucammar's theory of
macna, however, is not widely accepted among other cAbd al-Jabbar's predecessors.
Abu cAli al-Jubba'i, for instance, as reported by cAbd al-Jabbar considers that mcfna
has a non-technical "meaning".83 Meanwhile, Abu Ishaq b. cAyyash denied that pain
is a mcfna. Instead, he maintains that we suffer a pain because of the absence of
soundness (sihha) as a result of injury.84
In the modern works most of the writers translate mcfna in cAbd al-Jabbar's theology
based on the context of their discussion. Hourani, in his work on cAbd al-Jabbar's
ethics, translates mcfna as "ground". When explaining cAbd al-Jabbar's statement,
"Know that, although a single definition embrace evils as we have explained, the
RS
respects (wujuh) in which they are evil differ", Hourani maintains that respect
(wajh) is similar to ground which is "maW or cilla. He posits that these terms are
familiar in Islamic jurisprudence in the sense of 'ground for a prohibition or
command of the sharfa'.86 Peters in this regard accepts Wolfson's translation of
mcfna as accident, yet he also translates it as "qualifier". He explains that mcfna is a
79
Mughni, xiii, 3-9. cf. Heemskerk, Suffering, 81.
80




Mughni, vii, 82; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 158.
83
Therefore, he maintains that we cannot call God as mcfna, since its meaning is the intention of heart
(qasd al-qalb) to speaking of what he means. However, he considered that it was permissible to say
that God is macniyy in the sense that God is meant, when God is spoken of in speech (kalam) and
tradition (akhbai-) cAbd al-Jabbar, Mughni, v, 253.
84
Mughni, ix, 59. cf. Heemskerk, Suffering, 79-80.
85
Mughni, vi (i), 61.
86
Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 63.
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"qualifier" or accident which causes something to be entitled to a quality. Therefore,
he argues that a living being is qualified as "speaking" (mutakallim) because of a
qualifier (macna; here kalam) which inheres in another substrate.87
The translation of mcfna as a "qualifier" has been accepted by Bernand88 and
Heemskerk.89 However, in the context of knowledge, Bernand translates it as a
'specific accident'. That can be observed through her translation of cAbd al-Jabbar
statement90 as follows:
La science est l'accident specifique (mcfna) qui implique,
chez le sachant, la tranquillite de fame a l'egard de l'objet
auquel la science s'applique. En cela, la science se
distingue de tout autre genre de connaissance. Et ce mana
n'a en propre une telle qualification (hukm) que lorsqu'il
consiste en une conviction (ftiqad) qui concerne l'objet tel
qu'il est ; cette conviction est alors une croyance (ftiqad)
produite selon un mode particulier (waqaa cala wctghi
mahsusi).9]
However, for the meaning of mana in this context, I prefer K. Ghaneabassiri's
translation as "entitative ground". He states that "according to cAbd al-Jabbar, the
macna of our knowledge of a thing, tough not equivalent to the reality of the thing
[body], corresponds to it as it really is". 2 He also explains that cAbd al-Jabbar's
definition of knowledge, through the notion of macna, ontologically relates the world
87 He considers that Hourani's translation ofmcfna as "ground" is vague, therefore need to be defined,
cf. Peters, God's CreatedSpeech, 157-8.
88 Bernand also gives other translation ofmdna such as synonym of ground Cilia), which is based on
Hourani's translation; causal entity; incorporeal reality; and direction. For her usage on these
meanings see her Le Probleme, 77-8, 138, & 321.
89
For her interpretation in mdna as "pain" see, Heemskerk, Suffering, 78-9.
90 cf. Mughni, xii, 13.
91
Bernand, Le Probleme, 273.
92 Ghaneabassiri, Kambiz., "Epistemological Foundation", 81. Ghaneabassiri bases his understanding
of macna on Hourani's translation when he states, "In short as suggested by George Hourani, ma'na
could be rendered into English as a 'ground' or, as 1 prefer, an 'entitative ground' for the attributes and
characteristics of a thing".
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outside of humans to the internal experiences of'conviction' and the 'tranquillity of
the self.93
This sense of macna will serve our purpose to indicate its significance in cAbd al-
Jabbar's theological epistemology, for our concern here is the ontological aspect of
the mcfna. Thus, Ghaneabissiri's interpretation of macna prepared a considerable
ground for us to demonstrate the relation between cAbd al-Jabbar's theology and his
definition of knowledge. cAbd al-Jabbar's text that concerned my study is in the
Mughnififth, when he discusses whether it is permissible to describe God as being a
mana. He says that:
the mutakallimun use the term mcfna in reference to cause
(cilla) of qualification, as they say: "a moving being
(imutaharrik) is moving by virtue of a mana, and compares
this with saying: "it is moving by virtue of a cause (cilla).
Macna in this sense is not used with reference to God [i.e.
He does not move or moving thing with macna].94
However, he mentions that macna was sometimes also used with something whose
existence has been established (thabit). He gives an example of "combination"
(ta 'lif) as a macna. In this sense, it cannot be denied that God is a macna.95 I suggest
that Macna in this sense is similar to shay'. cAbd al-Jabbar consider that it is
permissible to used shay' for God.96 He argues with two verses of the Qur'an; first,
"Say (O Muhammad): what thing (shay') is of most weight in testimony? Say: Allah
93








is witness between you and me";97 and second, "Everything (kullu shay') will perish
except His own Face".9
From the previous explanation, we can see that cAbd al-Jabbar acknowledges that
macna can have the sense of i) "cause of a qualification"; and ii) it can also mean
"something whose existence has been established". Macna in the context of his
definition of knowledge, I suggest, is from both senses. cAbd al-Jabbar believes that
macna is a cause for us to know and also it is a real existence.
Therefore, one might observe that, by choosing the word macna in his definition of
knowledge, cAbd al-Jabbar excludes the application of this definition to God. For, if
this definition is applied to God, that implies that He knows with an "entitative
being" (macna\ here knowledge), which is a real existence. If so, he needs to answer
another question that, if this macna is real existence, it is pre-eternal or temporal?
This question is considered as problematic for most of the Muctazilites.99
Therefore, based on a theological background that was established earlier by Wasil b.
cAta' who denies the existence of God's attributes, cAbd al-Jabbar and other
Muctazilites developed their definition of knowledge that concerns only human
knowledge. From here, one might observe the influence of theological doctrine in the





99 A similar used of the word mdna is observed when he describes that an agent who has body is
omnipotent (qadir) with mdna. Without this mdna he will not be considered as able. The point here is
that there is distinction between God, who is qadir by the virtue of his essence (bi dhatih) and other
able agents who become capable with a mdna, which is capacity, cf. Mughni, v, 49.
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The word mana used in cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge refers to the
actuality of knowing in one self which becomes the cause for his state of knowing.
The existence of this mana can be identified through the existence of the tranquillity
in the knower's soul (fi nafs al-alim). The entitative ground can be identified
through certain states (Ml) of the human soul. The existence of this state in the
human soul, in turn, will indicate the existence of knowledge. This can be observed
through cAbd al-Jabbar's elucidation of the genus of belief. He considers that the
state that exists in the knower's soul is the reason that differentiates knowledge from
other meanings in the genus of belief, such as ignorance (jahl) and assumption
(.zann). On this, cAbd al-Jabbar reports:
It is unacceptable that what distinguishes knowledge from others
in the genus of belief is its existence and temporality (li wujudihi
wa huduthihi), since that also occurs in the genus other than
knowledge. Also it is inconceivable that it (what distinguish
knowledge from others) is because of a macna that is separated
from it, nor because of the way of its existence (kaifiyya
wujudihi). Therefore, it must be due to certain state (Ml) that
exists in one's self.100
cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the first three reasons are unacceptable because they
might also occur in other realities (macan 'i). Therefore, he believes that the only
reason for differentiating knowledge from other realities in the genus of belief is
through a certain state (Ml) that exists within the knower. Therefore, we can
conclude that the word macna in cAbd al-Jabbar's definition is an entitative ground
that relates to the state (Ml) of the knower. This state is the tranquillity of the soul
(sukun al-nafs) of the knower towards what he knows.101
100 cAbd al-Jabbar, Mtighni, xii, 30.
101
See also Frank, "Abu Hashim Theory of states," 85-8.
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2.6. The Tranquillity of the Soul
cAbd al-Jabbar bases his definition of knowledge on the tranquillity of the knower's
soul. The concept of the tranquillity of the soul (sukun al-nafs) plays an important
role in cAbd al-Jabbar's views on knowledge and in the distinction he makes between
real knowledge and belief based upon uncritical imitation (taqlid) or traditionalism.
He maintains that the tranquillity of the soul is self-evident and every subject
immediately finds in himself this state (of the tranquillity of the soul). In describing
this state, cAbd al-Jabbar reports:
The distinction one of us finds in him, when observing himself,
between his was convinced that Zayd is in the house because he sees
him, and his being convinced that he [Zayd] is there because an
unknown person informed him; he finds in one of the two situations
an additional state he does not find in another situation. It is this
additional state we point to by saying 'tranquillity of the soul'.102
According to M. Bernand, the discussion on the tranquillity of the soul among the
Mutazilites, is started by Abu cUthman al-Jahiz (d. 254/868)103 as a response to the
first Arab Philosopher al-Kindi,104 who defines certainty (yaqhi) as the tranquillity of
understanding with the correctness of a proposition (qadiyya) with evidence
(,burhan).ws However, the first Muctazilite who employs sukun al-nafs in the
definition of knowledge is Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i.
102 Mankdim, Sharh, 46-7; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 48.
103 Bernand, "La Notion de ilm", 23-4.
104 Al-Kindi inclines towards the Muctazilite theology. He was a friend of al-Ma'mun and al-
Mu'tasim. His association with these two sovereigns, plus the fact that he fell into disfavour during
the reign of al-Mutawakkil (and was even deprived temporarily of his extensive library), lead one to
suspect at least a tendency towards Mu'tazilism on his part. However, the Muctazilite scholars after
him do not consider him one of them. Perhaps his inclination toward philosophy is obvious therefore;
he was included in the rank of philosophers. For more on this, see, P. Adamson, "al-Kindi and the
Mu'tazila", 45-77.
105 Cf. Husni Zayneh, al-cAql QIrtd al-Kfutazila, 36.
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cAbd al-Jabbar and his predecessors have been criticized for using the word sukun,
which literally means 'unmoved' in his definition of knowledge. The critic says that
neither knowledge nor any rules resulting from it are from the genus of sukun. Also,
the word sukun is normally used as the opposite of movement (Jiaraka). Thus,
defining knowledge with the word sukun is inconceivable.106
In reply to this critic, cAbd al-Jabbar responds by saying that the word sukun in his
definition of knowledge is metaphorical (majaz). He argues that it is permissible to
use metaphorical words in the definition as long as they illuminate the reality of the
defined thing. cAbd al-Jabbar agrees that the literal meaning of sukun is opposed to
(movement) haraka, but, when combined with nafs, it means 'tranquillity of the
soul'.107
Explaining this issue further, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
It is certain that the knower (':alim) realizes the difference between
what he knows and what he assumes and believes...We describe this
as tranquillity of the soul {sukun al-nafs). For human will not find any
confusion {idtirab al-nafs) in his belief that is based on knowledge
compared to belief based on assumption {zann). Therefore, it is
plausible to use this word {sukun) in defining knowledge...for that
reason we refer the tranquillity of the soul to the knower (calim) and
not to knowledge film)} 8
This passage indicates that cAbd al-Jabbar, in his definition, emphasizes the role of
the knower falim). The knower decides whether what he believes is knowledge or
something else. Thus, the existence of knowledge here becomes personal, because it
is no longer determined by the outsider but by one's own psychological state. Here,
106 Mankdim, Sharh, 47.
107 Mankdim, Sharh, 48.
108 Mughni, xii, 20.
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one might observe the role given by cAbd al-Jabbar to the human self. I suggest that
this inclination at a certain level indicates the influence of the doctrine of human free
will in cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge.109
However, although he considers that the existence of knowledge is determined by
one's personal psychological state i.e. through the tranquillity of the soul, yet cAbd al-
Jabbar rejects the definition of knowledge that is based on the production of a precise
act by the knower."0 In this regard, he argues against those who accept this
definition:
Say to him, when it is possible to define something with the rules
that refer to it [the thing defined], it is necessary to do so and it is
inconceivable to define it with the rules referring to something else,
although it is related to it. We know that what we have mentioned
about the tranquillity of the soul is referring to knowledge; whereas
the occurrence (wuqif) of action orderly is referring to the knower.
These actions probably will occur or will not, because the knower
sometimes knows something that is never occurring, let alone in an
orderly fashion."1
cAbd al-Jabbar also argues that the existence of tranquillity of the soul is known
immediately by every man, but that was not the case for the production of precise
acts; for the latter needs proof (dilala) to be confirmed. Therefore, he insists that his
definition that is based on the tranquillity of the soul is preferable."2 However, since
every human has a different soul, that implies the existence of many kinds of
109Maha Freimuth considers that the sukun al-nafs in cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge is a
divine assistance (al-lutf) which assures them of the correctness of their conviction. See Freimuth,
God and Human, 59.
110 A similar definition was ascribed Abu Bakr Ibn Furak (d. 406/1016). Cf. al-Amidi, Abkar al-Afkar,
74. However, when 1 refer to Ibn Furak's KitSb al-Hudud he apparently defines knowledge with a
different definition. Therefore, 1 suggest that perhaps Ibn Furak mentions this definition in his other
work; this seem to be possible for he lives during the period where the mutaka/limun are more loose in
their concept of definition. We may observe this pattern among other mutakallimun such as al-Ashcari
and cAbd al-Jabbar who define knowledge with more than one definition.
Mughni, xii, 21.
112 Mughni, xii, 21
88
knowledge based on everyone's own justification. Therefore, one might ask whether
cAbd al-Jabbar believes in the subjectivism of knowledge.113
Based on cAbd al-Jabbar's statement, the answer is 'no'. In the Mughni\ cAbd al-
Jabbar indicates that those who believe that the truth is based on one's view are
mistaken (akhta'a). His main argument is that the subjectivists reject the immediate
knowledge (cilm darun) of human beings such as sensory (mushahadat) and direct
(badhiyyat) knowledge. Hence, he argues, based on this view, it is possible for one
to believe that a black thing is white or vice versa; the universe is eternal (qadim) and
temporal (hadith) at the same time. Since the falsity of these examples is
immediately recognized by every compos mentis person; hence, the fallacy of this
view is obvious.114
In contrast, cAbd al-Jabbar emphasizes the objectivity of knowledge. He clearly
indicates in the Mughni that knowledge must correspond to reality. cAbd al-Jabbar
supports his view based on the legacy of his predecessors. In this regard, he writes:
What our shuyukh [Abu cAli, Abu Hashim and Abu al-Hudhayl]"5
(may Allah have mercy on them) say about knowledge is that it is
of the genus of belief. When the belief is related to the object as it
is, and occurs in a way that necessitates tranquillity of the soul
(.sukun al-nafs), it is knowledge (cilm). When it is related to the
object as it is not, it is ignorance (jahl). When it is related to it in a
way that confirms it (yuqawwihi) but does not necessitate
tranquillity of the mind, it is neither knowledge nor ignorance.116
This passage indicates that, in order to become knowledge, certain belief must relate
to the object as it is, and occurs in a way that necessitates the tranquillity of the soul.
113 For Peters' brief comment on this question, see his God's Created Speech, 48.
114 Mughni, xii, 47-9.
113 Cf. Mughni, xii, 25.
116 Mughni, xii, 25.
89
Otherwise, it is ignorance or something else. Thus, I agree with G. Hourani that
knowledge, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, has both objective and subjective specific
differences: (a) an intellectual content corresponding to reality in the manner of truth,
and (b) an emotional state of satisfaction and tranquillity. Both characteristics are
necessary to constitute knowledge."7 However, one might ask why it is necessary to
add (b)\ for (a) seems sufficient?
The answer to this question can be observed from cAbd al-Jabbar's refutation of Abu
al-Qasim al-Balkhi's definition of knowledge."8 He argues that (b) is necessary,
since without tranquillity of the soul in the definition of knowledge, a blind imitator
(imuqallid) or a merely fortunate person who knows by chance (mabkhut) will also be
included since they may believe something (to be) as it is, and they assume that they
feel the tranquillity of the soul yet they are not a knower (calim).u9
Ibn al-Malahimi explains that the meaning of the tranquillity of the soul is that the
confidence (tama'nma) of the soul lies in the way that, if a doubt is raised about his
belief, as one might say "you cannot guarantee that your belief is not false; he will not
in doubt (lam yatashakkak)". He explains that a muqallid may assume that he has the
tranquillity of the soul but, in reality, he is not. If one says to the muqallid that "you
take your belief (madhhabuka) from someone with the possibility that he is wrong.
Therefore, you cannot guarantee that your belief is true since it was based on the
117 Hourani, G., Islamic Rationalism, 17.
118 See above, 55.
119 Mughni, xii, 20.
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foundation (asl) that is not secure that it was not wrong". in this situation, the
muqallid must be confused (idtirab) about his belief after that.120
Another question that one might ask on this issue is that, if the tranquillity of the soul
is the only measurement of knowledge, is it plausible for an ignorant person to claim
that he has knowledge based on the tranquillity of his soul? This question was asked
earlier by Abu cUthman al-Jahiz a Basrian Muctazilite (d. 254/868) regarding the
tranquillity of an ignorant soul.121
In responding to this question, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that an ignorant person only
assumes that he has tranquillity of the soul. He was like somebody who saw the
mirage (sarab) and thought that it was water. Then, after the investigation, he will
realize that he was wrong. Although he imagines that he has the tranquillity of the
soul, because his belief does not correspond with the reality, it is not knowledge.122
This situation is similar to those who are ignorant in religious belief. When they find
out that their belief is untrue, then they will leave it and embrace the new one which
123
they consider to be the truth.
The abovementioned explanations indicate that cAbd al-Jabbar's understanding of the
reality of knowledge consists of two parts, subjective and objective. The subjective
part, which is the state of tranquillity in the soul, is clearly mentioned in his Mughni
definition. Yet, he did not mention the objective part of it, which corresponds with the
120 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 15-6.
121 Mughni, xii, 37.
122 Mughni, xii, 13-25; Freimuth, God and Human, 55-59; Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 17
123 Mughni, xii, 37.
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reality of the outside world (al-mutabiq li al-waqi'). Therefore, a new question that
arises is why cAbd al-Jabbar does not include this objective part in his definition of
knowledge in the Mughni.
After a careful examination, 1 posit that cAbd al-Jabbar does not include this fact in
his Mughni definition of knowledge, because he believes that the correspondence
with reality is well known and well accepted among the Muctazilites. Therefore, he
considers it as a preliminary element (muqaddimat) of the definition of knowledge.
What he seems to indicate here is that, either you mention it in your definition or not,
and it has been well known among the Muctazilites that knowledge must correspond
with the reality. On this matter, he writes:
It is not far (la yubcad) from what has been mentioned by our
teachers, Abu cAli and Abu Hashim (May Allah have mercy on
them) that "knowledge is believing the thing (to be) as it is", when
it is derived from certain aspects, although they are differed
regarding the terms used....The definition must cover something
that differentiates the defined thing (mahdud) from others.
However, since they know that the aim of definition is unveiling
(kashf) the objective, it is possible for them in many of their
definitions (hudud) to mention some premises for it (muqaddimat
lahu). Also, it is possible sometimes to include in the definition
something which is possible without it, if it was deleted. [For
instance] we saw that they define a living being (al-hayy) as he
whom actualizes iyasihhu) knowing (calim) and powerful (qadir).
If they only confine themselves to one of them [either knowing or
powerful], it is correct, but they mention both of them; for it
[meaning] will be clearer (akshcif)}24,
cAbd al-Jabbar, in fact, realizes the importance of the first part of his teachers'
definition of knowledge as "believing the thing (to be) as it is". This can be observed




the tranquillity °f the soul] is considered knowledge; otherwise it was not
knowledge.125 Additionally, we can also detect this fact in his al-cUmad definition.126
However, in the Mughni, he omits this element in his definition of knowledge.
Instead, he focuses on the second (subjective) part of the definition [the tranquillity of
the soul]. His argument is that the first part of his teachers' definition is only a
premise; so it is possible not to mention this fact in his definition of knowledge.127 By
this, cAbd al-Jabbar wants to establish that correspondence with the reality (mutabiq
lil-waqf) is a consensus among the Muctazilites albeit their differences on the use of
words in defining knowledge, or, even if he does not mention it in his definition, that
fact remains.128
However, we arguably believe that there is another factor that leads cAbd al-Jabbar to
exclude the first part of the definition of knowledge by his predecessors that indicates
the correspondence with reality (mutabiq lil-waqi) in the Mughni. This, we believe,
was closely related to the intellectual background of his time.129 cAbd al-Jabbar lived
in the period considered by some scholars as the renaissance of Islam.130 Intellectual
freedom was at its peak in the Islamic world during the fourth/tenth to sixth/twelfth
centuries.131
125 Mughni, xii, 13.
126 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 45; cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miitamad, 14.
127 Mughni, xii, 14.
128 Mughni, xii, 15.
129 For socio-political background of his time, see above, 45.
130 Cf. Kreamer, Humanism , 1-3.
131 Cf. Gibb, H., "An Interpretation of Islamic History," 17-18; cf. Kraemer, Humanism, 4.
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One of the main features of this era is the revitalization of the Ashcarite theology by
two of their prominent theologians, Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013) and Abu
Mansur al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037). Both al-Baqillani and al-Baghdadi have
rigorously criticized the use of the words belief (ftiqad) and thing (.shay') in the
definition of knowledge by the Muctazilites.132 They argue that (i) the use of the word
ftiqad will imply that God is a believer (mutaqid) and (ii) the use of word shay'
implies that some non-object known (maclum) such as an associate (shank) to God
will be excluded from knowledge.133
Without undermining other factors, 1 suggest that this is one of the reasons that
encourage cAbd al-Jabbar to neglect his definition of knowledge in al-cUmad, which
included both words, ftiqad and shay'. Even according to Ibn al-Malahimi, cAbd al-
Jabbar defines knowledge in his other work, al-Muhk, only as "what necessitate
tranquillity of the soul".134 However, in the Mughn/, his latest work of the three, cAbd
al-Jabbar develops a new definition of knowledge that excludes both words, ' ftiqad
and shay', but replaces it with the word macna, which is not popular among his
predecessors.
2.7. Some Responses from the Late Muctazilites
cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge in the Mughn/, however, has been rejected
by later Muctazilite scholars, including his immediate student, Abu al-Husayn al-
Basri. In this regard Abu al-Husayn prefers the definition of knowledge by Abu
132 Al-Baqillani, Tarnhid, 25; al-Baghdadi, U?ul at-din, 5-6.
133 For more on this, see above, 57-60.
134 Ibn al-Malahimi, MuLtamad, 14. This definition also preferred by Mankdim from at-Umad
definition. Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 46.
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Hashim that preserves the correspondence to reality as the first part of the definition.
He notices that cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge lacks this meaning, which is
vital in order to differentiate knowledge from other genus of belief. On this, he
argues that, if we suppose that certain beliefs are not as it is (lacala ma huwa bihi)
and we assume that it will necessitate the tranquillity of the soul, it is not knowledge.
However, if knowledge is only "what necessitates tranquillity of the soul", as claimed
by cAbd al-Jabbar, inevitably, we must accept the previous assumption as
knowledge.135
Nevertheless, cAbd al-Jabbar's method in defining knowledge differently from his
predecessors has been pursued by Ibn al-Malahimi (d. 536/1141), a follower of Abu
al-Husin al-Basri. In his work, al-Mu tamad fi usul al-din, al-Malahimi rigorously
criticizes the definitions of knowledge by his predecessors. Firstly, he agrees with
Abu al-Husayn in rejecting cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge;136 and,
secondly, he argues against Abu Hashim's definition, which was accepted by Abu al-
Husayn. As a result, Ibn al-Malahimi suggests a new definition of knowledge as "the
appearance of a thing for the living being that abstains with it in his self the
possibility of its opposite".137
Ibn al-Malahimi commences his contention by arguing that the proposition that
knowledge is from the genus of belief is not a consensus among the Muctazilites.
Although Abu cAli, Abu Hashim and cAbd al-Jabbar consider that knowledge is from
135 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 14.
136 cAbd al-Jabbar's definition in Muhit, SharhanA Mughnibut not in LUmad. Cf. Mughni, xii, Ibn al-
Malahimi, Mihamad, 14; Mandkim, Sharh, 53.
137 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 18.
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the genus of belief,138 there are other scholars who disagree with them. Abu al-Qasim
al-Balkhi (d. 317/931), for instance, reports the view that knowledge is not from the
genus of belief but knowledge itself is a separate genus. Meanwhile, Abu al-Hudhayl
al-cAllaf (d. 235/849), as reported by cAbd al-Jabbar, believes in two different views.
The first one is that knowledge and belief are from the same genus but his second
view however is similar to that reported by Abu al-Qasim.139
Ibn al-Malahimi's main argument against Abu Hashim's140 definition is that the use
of the words fitiqad and sukun al-nafs is problematic since it will exclude God's
knowledge. He argues that God's knowledge is neither belief nor necessitates the
tranquillity of the soul. Albeit he realizes cAbd al-Jabbar's argument in defending
Abu Hashim's definition by claiming that God has no knowledge because God knows
via His essence, yet Ibn al-Malahimi is not convinced by that argument. Instead, he
believes that cAbd al-Jabbar's argument is inappropriate in terms of its linguistic
regulation.141
cAbd al-Jabbar's position on this issue is that, as we discussed earlier, he believes that
God is a knowing being ('cAlim), yet God does not know through knowledge. Instead,
God knows through His essence (bi dhatih). Therefore, since God has no knowledge,
it is inconceivable to include God in the discussion of the definition of knowledge.
Nevertheless, the other question one might ask is, how does cAbd al-Jabbar prove that
God is a knowing being if he maintains that God has no knowledge?
138 Mughni, xii, 25.
139 Mughni, xii, 25; Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 18.
140 This definition is also accepted by cAbd al-Jabbar in al-Umad and Abu al-Husayn al-Ba?ri.
141 For his arguments in detail see Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 18.
96
To answer this question, we need to clarify cAbd al-Jabbar's concept on how to
confirm the existence of knowledge (ithbat al-cilm). According to cAbd al-Jabbar,
there are two ways to establish the existence of knowledge in a subject. The first is
based on introspection, and the result is the existence of the tranquillity in one's soul,
as we mentioned earlier.142 The second is based on the external perception that is
based on the precise act (ffl al-muhkam). In this way, we can confirm the presence of
knowledge in someone else.143
He argues that the precise act is an indication that the subject for whom it is possible
differs from the subject for whom it is not possible, and the (first) subject is
characterized by it in a way which supposes that this quality is due to him by a cause
(c///<a).144 This cause, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is the state of knowing. Hence, this
precise act requires more than the pure ability (qudra) to act; it requires knowledge in
order to produce mostly a certain composition or order in this act.145
Therefore, based on this concept of confirming knowledge, LAbd al-Jabbar argues that
God produces precise acts; the existence of this precise act is a proof that God is a
knowing subject. As examples, he mentions the creation of living beings (hayawanat),
God's administration of the orbits (falak) and their composition, His subjugation
(taskhir) of the wind, and His control {taqdir) ofwinter and summer. All of these acts
142 See above, 86.
143 Cf. cAbd al-Jabbar, Mughni, xii, 23.
144 Mankdim, Sharh, 156; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 51.
145 As examples cAbd al-Jabbar mentioned speaking and writing. A subject who can do these acts in a
way which is really precise must be characterized by the corresponding knowledge. See, Mankdim,
Sharh, 157; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 51-2.
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provide clearer proof and are more precise than human writing. It is also a great
explanation (bayan al- azim) that God is a knowing subject.
Thus, he explains that the way to know God as a knowing subject is through a precise
act. Therefore, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, it was not a problem if the definition of
knowledge does not include God's knowledge in it, since God has no knowledge and
does not even need any.146
Conclusion
From the abovementioned discussion, we can see that, in defining knowledge, cAbd
al-Jabbar considers his theological doctrines as a foundation. His belief that God has
no knowledge has resulted in defining knowledge based on human beings. This
method can also be observed among other Muctazilite theologians. On the contrary,
the Ashcarites reject this method. Therefore, they develop the definition of
knowledge that is applicable to both man and God.
However, this general tendency among the Muctazilites does not prevent cAbd al-
Jabbar from criticizing his predecessors' definition of knowledge. He does not
hesitate to state his ideas that sometimes contradict His predecessors' opinions. His
method in dealing with definition of knowledge has been well adopted by the
Muslim theologians after him. We can observe this analytical approach among the
theologians from both schools of thought, the Ashcarites and the Muctazilites.
According to cAbd al-Jabbar, the tranquillity of the soul is the foundation for one to
146
For our discussion on knowing God, see below, 217.
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know the existence of knowledge in oneself. However, to know the existence of
knowledge in others, one knows it through the production of the precise actions of
the doer.
cAbd al-Jabbar develops at least four definitions of knowledge throughout his works.
The first is in al-Umad and the last in the Mughni. The reason for this development
is probably due to his intellectual maturity in response to his contemporary's
criticism. However, his last definition has been rejected by the late Muctazilites. Abu
al-Husayn al-Basri, for instance prefers the definition of knowledge presented by
Abu Hashim. Al-Basri rejects cAbd al-Jabbar's definition on the grounds that it lacks
the essential part of the definition, which is 'the correspondence to reality' (mutabiq
li al-waqf). Ibn al-Malahimi, in turn, disagrees with all of the definitions of





In the previous chapter, I discussed how cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge
was influenced by his theological doctrine; in this chapter, 1 will examine how his
theory of knowledge became the foundation of his theological doctrines. I will study
cAbd al-Jabbar's view of the type of knowledge and its role in the development of his
theology. Discussion of the type of knowledge is important in order to identify cAbd
al-Jabbar's epistemological foundation in his argument on knowing God. The
differences in interpreting the type of knowledge will result in different sets of
theological doctrines or theological arguments.
This chapter is divided into two major divisions; the first is on immediate
knowledge, and the second is on acquired knowledge. I will start the discussion by
outlining the historical background of the discussion of the types of knowledge
among the mutakallimun and follow with a brief survey on the sources of my
discussion of cAbd al-Jabbar's type of knowledge. Then I will examine the reality of
immediate knowledge followed by acquired knowledge according to cAbd al-Jabbar
and its relationship to his theological doctrines. 1 will also compare his view with
other mutakallimun, especially the school of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri. This
comparison aims at identifying the effect of their differences on the type of
knowledge in their theological doctrines or arguments.
3.1. The Background
From the fourth/tenth century, the type of knowledge appeared to be one of the main
topics discussed in kalam epistemology. Views of the type of knowledge in kalam
have been divided based on the theological line. The Sifatiyya,' who believed in the
existence of God's attributes including knowledge (cilm), accept that knowledge is
divided into divine and human knowledge.2 However, the Muctazilites, who deny the
attributes of God, reject the type of knowledge by the Sifatiyya.3 Instead, the
Muctazilites exclude divine knowledge from the type of knowledge, and their
discussion starts only with human knowledge.4
Apart from the disagreement on divine knowledge, the mutakallimun in general
agree that human knowledge is temporal and divided into two divisions; the first is
daruri (immediate), and the second is iktisabi (acquired or discursive knowledge).
The main difference between immediate and acquired knowledge refers to the ability
of the knower (al-calim) toward his knowledge. Immediate knowledge occurs
without proof and without the knower's ability to prove it." Meanwhile, acquired
knowledge must be supported by proof, and the knower has the ability to prove it.
Thus, one has the ability to control one's acquired knowledge, but in immediate
knowledge, one loses that ability since it occurs without proof (min ghayr istidlal).5
'
According to al-Shahrastani (d. 548/1153), there are three main groups considered at-Sifatiyya-, the
Ash'arites, the Hanbalites and the Mujassima. This group is an opposite of the Muctazilites or
Mucattila who deny the existence of God's attributes, cf. al-Shahrastani, Milal, i, 92. Cf. al-Baghdadi,
U?ul al-din, 90; al-Ghazali, Iqtipad, I2l.
2 See for instance al-Baghdadi, U?uI al-din, 8-9; al-Baqillani, Tamhid, 26-7.
3
They believe that any relation between God's essence and His attribute as a separate entity will
imply polytheism (shirk). Instead, they believe that God knows via His essence (dhatihi) and not
through knowledge. For more, see below, 241.
4 Cf. Mankdlm, Sharh, 95-128.
5
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 8.
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The mutakallimun also agree that it is a duty for every Muslim to obtain acquired
knowledge. Meanwhile, immediate knowledge is beyond their control. Therefore, it
is excluded from the obligation (takljf). However, the mutakallimun disagree on the
limit or the scope of both immediate and acquired knowledge. This dispute becomes
part of the significant factors that shaped the background of different theological
schools in Islamic intellectual history. For we see that scholars from different schools
of theology have divided knowledge into different divisions based on their
theological backgrounds.
The extant works of cAbd al-Jabbar do not provide us with a specific discussion of
the types of knowledge.6 However, we can trace his view of the types of knowledge
in his discussions on other topics. For, instance in the twelfth Mughni, he discusses
the type of knowledge in the discussion of the ways of knowledge (.turuq al-ilm).
Here, he elaborates the ways of knowledge for both immediate and acquired
knowledge.7 In al-Usul al-Khamsa, cAbd al-Jabbar talks about immediate (darun)
knowledge in the discussion of the ways to know God (.tariq macrifat Allah)} He
considers that knowledge of God cannot be obtained via immediate knowledge (cilm
daruri)', for cilm daruri \s created directly by God to the human soul. Therefore, cilm
daruri was not considered to come from human effort.9
6 This probably the reason why G. Hourani states that cAbd al-Jabbar's presentation on the type of
knowledge is unsystematic, see Islamic Rationalism, 20. However, based on the arrangement of his
other work Mukhta^ar and Peters' reconstruction of the composition of the Mughni, I suggest that the
discussion on the types of knowledge is in the part one of the Mughni. Cf. Mukhta$ar, 194-9; Peters,
God's Created Speech, 30-5
7
Mughni, xii, 42. The discussions therefore, focus on the perception (idrak), the way for immediate
knowledge and the reflection (nazar), the way of acquired knowledge. Meanwhile on knowledge that
occurs from the beginning (mubtadi') without the ways he does not discuss it here.
8
U?ul al-khamsa, 78-81; see also Mankdim, Sharh, 43-74.
9 cAbd al-Jabbar also rejects the view that knowing God could be obtained by sense perception
(mushdhada).
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A clearer structure of cAbd al-Jabbar's types of knowledge, however, can be
observed through the reports of his student Mankdim (d.425/1034) in Tcfliq sharh, a
paraphrase of cAbd al-Jabbar's idea in Sharh al-usul al-khamsa. In this work,
Mankdim divides knowledge into immediate and acquired. However, although his
explanation of the type of immediate knowledge is systematic, there is a slight
disagreement among modern scholars. An example is the types of immediate
knowledge.10
Another important work on cAbd al-Jabbar's types of knowledge is Majmif al-muhit
bi al-taklrf by Ibn Mattawayh, where he elaborates cAbd al-Jabbar's view of the
concept of obligation {taklif). Ibn Mattawayh differentiates between knowledge that
is known immediately by human beings and knowledge that one needs to acquire
through proof. Whereas every mukallaf is obligated to acquire the latter, the former is
<
not considered part of human obligation. The publication of Ibn al-Malahimi's al-
Miftamadfi usul al-din from the school of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri in 1991 has also
contributed to improving our understanding ofcAbd al-Jabbar's types of knowledge.
This work provides us with more precise and critical information on the reality of
immediate and acquired knowledge according to cAbd al-Jabbar."
10 See Mankdim, Sharh, 50-2.
" Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 20-1.
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3.2. The Immediate Knowledge
The discussion of immediate knowledge is important in Islamic theology and is
considered the foundation of the theological doctrines.12 In cAbd al-Jabbar's extant
works, he does not discuss the definition of immediate knowledge by his Muctazilite
predecessors. cAbd al-Jabbar considers that immediate knowledge is the foundation
for human obligation (taklif). It is something that precedes human obligation, without
which the obligation will not be complete. On this, he reports:
The one that God has created (in us) is called [cilm] daruri. It
must precede the obligation of other knowledge and actions. It
resembles to enabling (tamkin), empower (iqdar) and divine
assistance (lutf); for the obligation will not complete except with
those things, likewise it will not complete except preceded by
this [immediate] knowledge.13
cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of immediate knowledge (cilm daruri) is closely related
to the literal meaning of the word daruri, which is 'to force' (alja'a). In conventional
usage, the word 'daruri' indicates something that occurs in us but not from us (ma
yahsulu fina la min qibalina). Therefore, he defines immediate knowledge in al-
Shar/i]4 as "knowledge which occurs in us not from ourselves and we cannot banish
it from our souls."15
Mankdim, however, considers that there is unnecessary repetition in this definition.
He argues that knowledge that occurs in us not from ourselves is also knowledge
12
For the views of other mulakallimun on immediate knowledge see, B. Abrahamov, "Necessary
knowledge", 20-32.
13 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmrf, (2), 6.
14
Based on Mankdim's report in his Tcfh'q sharh, 48.
15 Cf. cAbd al-Jabbar, Mughni, xii, 42; Mankdim, Sharh, 48; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 54.
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whose existence we cannot deny. Therefore, it is enough to define immediate
knowledge with one part of it, either the first or the second.16
Ibn al-Malahimi, on the other hand, disagrees with Mankdim. He maintains that cAbd
al-Jabbar was right when he mentions both parts of the definition. Ibn al-Malahimi
argues that defining immediate knowledge as "knowledge which occurs in us not
from ourselves" indicates that it occurs by necessity (mudtarr); hence, knowledge
was called daruri. However, if it is possible for one to deny the existence of
knowledge from one's soul, it cannot be considered immediate knowledge.
Therefore, in this regard, both parts of the definition are necessary to reveal the
reality of immediate knowledge. Hence, defining it with only one of the two as
Mankdim suggests is unsound.17
Another definition of immediate knowledge was reported by Ibn al-Malahimi from
cAbd al-Jabbar's book al-Umad,18 In this book, cAbd al-Jabbar defines immediate
knowledge as "knowledge that is not possible for the knower to deny from his soul
with doubt (shakk) or vagueness (shubha), if it is isolated (idha infarada)."19 The
inclusion of the sentence "idha infarada" excludes acquired knowledge that is joined
by immediate knowledge. For instance, one knows that Zayd is in the house from the
report of a prophet, and then one sees Zayd in the house. The first is acquired, and
the second is immediate knowledge. The knowledge from the first cannot be denied
16 Mankdim, Sharh, 49. Peters in this regards is unable to differentiate between the view of cAbd al-
Jabbar and that of Mankdim. Therefore, he mistakenly considers that it is cAbd al-Jabbar who says
that "for a correct definition one has to restrict oneself to one of the two''. In fact that was a statement
from Mankdim. Cf. God's Created Speech, 54.
17 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 21.
18 Mankdim also mentions this definition. Cf. Sharh, 48.
19 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 48; Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 20. A similar definition adopted by al-
Mutawalli but without the inclusion of "idha infarada", cf. al-Mutawalli, al-Mughni, 2.
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since it was joined by the second. However, if the first is isolated (infarada) it can be
20
denied, but that was not the case for immediate knowledge.
Abu al-Husayn al-Basri was reported to define immediate knowledge as "knowledge
that is not possible for a knower to remove himself from the situation of knowing of
a known object on certain aspect ('"ala wajh)."2] This definition is also accepted by
Mankdim, but with a slight alteration when he reports that it is "knowledge that is
not possible for a knower to deny from the soul in any aspect (bi wajh min al-
wujuh)."22
Ibn al-Malahimi, however, rejects these definitions. His argument is that they all
become unsound when they are examined with the proposition that God knows by
His essence (calim li dhatih). Ibn al-Malahimi argues that cAbd al-Jabbar's definitions
of immediate knowledge may include the nature of God as a knowing subject.
Therefore, this definition is implausible.23 Ibn al-Malahimi's argument can be
developed as follows: the definitions of immediate knowledge by cAbd al-Jabbar
imply that (i) a knower knows it by his own and (ii) he knows it without any effort to
acquire it. This type of knowledge, he believes, is similar to the nature of God as a
knowing subject since God knows through His essence (li dhatih) and He does not
acquire knowledge. Ibn al-Malahimi argues that if we define immediate knowledge
20 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Mu tamad, 20. Abrahamov translates this definition without the inclusion of
the words "idha infarada". This I believe does not precisely describe the meaning of cilm daruri
according to cAbd al-Jabbar since it will include acquired knowledge that joined by immediate
knowledge. Cf. Abrahamov, "Necessary knowledge", 21.
21 The inclusion of "on certain aspect" in the definition is similar with "if it is isolated" in the previous
definition. Abu al-Husayn probably reports this definition from cAbd al-Jabbar in one of the latter's
lecture. Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 20-21.
22. Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 49
23 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 20-1.
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as cAbd al-Jabbar did, it implies that God's knowledge will be included. However,
since we do not consider the state of knowing in God as immediate knowledge, cAbd
al-Jabbar's definitions of immediate knowledge, therefore, are invalid.24
Alternatively, Ibn al-Malahimi defines immediate knowledge as "knowledge that
does not depend on the inference (istidlal) by the knower whenever it is applicable to
use the proof."25 He maintains that his definition is the most appropriate for
immediate knowledge since the sentence 'whenever it is applicable to use the proof
excludes God's knowledge of the things; for God does not use the proof since He
does not need it. Ibn al-Malahimi also believes that his definition is consistent with
the different views of the mutakallimun on immediate knowledge.26
One might observe that Ibn al-Malahimi considers God's knowledge in developing
his definition of immediate knowledge.27 So, one might ask why Ibn al-Malahimi
takes this position in his definition of immediate knowledge; does he omit the view
of the Muctazilites that God has no knowledge and adopt the Sifatiyya's view that
God has knowledge, instead?
24 Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 20-1.
25 "cIlm la yaqif cala istidlal al- alim bih idha kana yasihh fih al-istidlal.'', Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi,
Mutamad, 22.
26 On this he writes "this definition consistent with the view of one who says that: immediate
knowledge is created (maf ul) in a compos mentis person (al-caqil), or it is obligated (mujiba) in him.
This definition is also consistent with those who say that it [immediate knowledge] is initially created
in him, and others who say that it is compulsory from the senses or similar to it. [It is also consistence]
with the view that some immediate knowledge can be denied with doubt (shubha), it is knowledge
that is excluded from its immediate nature." Ibn al-Malahimi, Mu'tamad, 22.
27 This method is similar with his system in the definition of knowledge, as we discussed in previous
chapter, see above, 94.
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I suggest that Ibn al-Malahimi's method of definition is related to the development of
the concept of definition that was initiated by Abu al-Husayn al-Basri. When the
latter, as reported by Ibn al-Malahimi, considers that a definition must reveal the
• 28
reality of the thing defined, he actually changes the concept of the definition from
interpreting the meaning of the word to revealing the reality of the thing defined. In
contrast to his predecessors, who give freedom to the definer to interpret the thing
defined based on his thinking,29 Abu al-Husayn limits that freedom; instead, he
emphasizes the reality of the thing defined. Hence, any definition that does not reveal
the reality of the thing defined is considered invalid.30
This concept of definition is accepted by Ibn al-Malahimi when he considers that
Abu al-Husayn's concept of definition is more appropriate than that of his other
teachers.31 Therefore, it is conceivable for him to apply that concept to his
predecessors' definitions. Hence, any definition will be scrutinized, and if it does not
reveal the reality of the thing defined, the definition can be rejected.
Therefore, God's knowledge is included in Ibn al-Malahimi's discussion of
immediate knowledge not because he abandons the doctrine of the Muctazilites and
adopts the Sifatiyya's view of the attribute of God. Instead, it is because of the
• • i 32
application of new concept of definition that was revolutionized by Abu al-Husayn.
Thus, since cAbd al-Jabbar's definitions of immediate knowledge include God's
28 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 12.
29
Mughn/, xii, 14-5.
30 See above, 94.
31 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 12.
32
The concept of definition among the mutakallimun however achieves its peak in the hand of al-
Ghazali when he manages to assimilate Greek logic into Islamic kaldm. Cf. Abu Sway, al-Ghazali, 70-
80; Shihadeh, "From al-Ghazali to al-Razi", 141-8.
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knowledge (and God's knowledge is not immediate knowledge), therefore, it must be
rejected.
This suggestion is also supported by the terms used by Ibn al-Malahimi in describing
this contention. He carefully chooses words to avoid the use of "cilm Allah (God's
knowledge)"; instead, he uses "Allah calim (God as a knowing subject)."33 This
statement indicates that Ibn al-Malahimi is maintaining his Muctazilite identity but
remains critical toward his predecessors' definition of immediate knowledge. Also, in
his definition Ibn al-Malahimi appears to be more precise than his predecessors when
he specifically mentions the word "istidlaT' (inference). His predecessors only
verified immediate knowledge based on one's ability to confirm and to deny it.
However, Ibn al-Malahimi goes further to specify that the ability is for doing the
inference.34
There is disagreement among modern scholars regarding the correct translation of
tCilm daruri.'' A. Tritton translates darurias 'necessary' but indicates that this term as
applied to knowledge has no equivalent in Western thought.35 "It is wider than a
priori or intuitive and came to include knowledge of facts of history and geography."
Tritton thought that Jacd b. Dirham (d. 125/742) was the first to use this term.36
33 He writes, "vra hadha al-haddyatanaqqad bi kaunihicaliman li dhalih" and "rra hadha al-khabar
aydan yatanaddbima qaddamna min kaunih tacalacaliman li dhatih". Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad,
20-1.
34 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 22.
35 On the theory of knowledge from western perspective see D. W. Hamlyn, Theory ofKnowledge,
12.
36 Tritton, A., "Theory of Knowledge", 253.
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Presumably, one of the reasons for this dispute is that classical kalam epistemology
was not influenced by Aristotelian logic as it is in the late kalam. Therefore, the
terms used are independent from Aristotelian justification. Instead, the mutakallimun
based their epistemology mostly on Qur'anic teaching. The mutakallimun used
logical methods, of course, but they did not like mantiq (Aristotelian logic). On this
matter, Van Ess reports that the Christian philosopher and logician Yahya b. cAdi (d.
364/974) refused to enter into discussion with the followers of Abu Hashim (d.
321/933) because the way they treated their problems and the terminology they used
turned out to be too different from those Aristotelian notions to which he was
accustomed.37
In the context of cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge, Hourani considers that
'necessary knowledge' can be accepted as the non-technical meaning for cilm darun\
but as a philosophical term, the word 'immediate knowledge' is more appropriate.
He argues that in philosophical English "necessary" means logically implied, and
this is characteristic only of knowledge resulting from discursive reasoning, which is
o o
classified by Muslim theologians as muktasab. Hourani supports his arguments
with the nature that defines daruriknowledge according to Muslim theologians such
as al-Baghdadi and al-Baqillani: that we have no choice but to accept it when it is
presented to our minds.39 This is, according to Hourani, best translated as 'immediate
knowledge.'40
37 Van Ess, "Logical Structure", 21-2.
38 l lourani, Islamic Rationalism, 20.
39
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 8; al-Baqillani, Tamhid, 26.
40
Itourani, Islamic Rationalism, 20.
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However, Peters disagrees with Hourani. Peters considers that the correct translation
for cilm daruri is 'necessary knowledge.'41 He argues that cAbd al-Jabbar
distinguishes inside the category of daruri knowledge between direct42 and indirect
knowledge. He considers that direct knowledge is also immediate knowledge;
therefore, it is plausible to use the words 'necessary knowledge' here rather than
immediate knowledge.43 From the disagreement between Hourani and Peters, one
may observe the validity of what was mentioned by Tritton earlier, that there is no
concept in Western thought that is similar to cilm darurii44 This fact was supported
by the other reality that there is no entry for 'necessary knowledge' or 'immediate
knowledge' in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy45 and the Encyclopedia of
Theology.46
Based on this disagreement, I believe that it is beneficial to examine their dispute
from a Western epistemological perspective. Hourani argues that necessary
knowledge is not a proper translation of cilm daruri since it means logically implied.
In the West, what is logically necessary is what follows the laws of logic. Thus, a
statement such as 'Either it will or it will not rain' indicates logically necessary truth.
Also, another example, "if men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is
mortal," expresses a logically necessary truth. Both examples are considered
necessary since they follow the laws of logic.47 Indeed, this type of reasoning is not
41 This translation also has been used by Abrahamov in "Necessary Knowledge", 20.
42
Peters, God's Created Speech, 54.
43
Peters, God's Created Speech, 53-5.
44 Bernand uses both translations 'immediat' and 'necessaire' knowledge, however, she does not
present any argument on that, see her Le Probleme, 85; 137-41.
45 See for instance Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (An), 8 vols., New York, 1972.
46 See for instance Encyclopaedia of Theology, 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1884-1885.
47
Lowe, E. J. "Necessity, Logical", 609.
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considered from cilm daruri in Islamic theology. Instead, this type of reasoning is
part of acquired knowledge (cilm iktisabi).
Meanwhile, Peters' argument is based on the fact that cAbd al-Jabbar divides
immediate knowledge into direct and indirect knowledge. Peters suggests that cAbd
al-Jabbar's direct knowledge is immediate. Therefore, Peters rejects Hourani's
translation of cilm daruri as immediate knowledge. For that translation will be
redundant with direct knowledge. Hence, Peters prefers translating cilm daruri as
necessary knowledge. However, in this disagreement, I prefer Hourani's view since
Peters' translation of iCilm daruri as necessary knowledge, as I indicated earlier, is
far from the meaning intended by cAbd al-Jabbar.
Similar to the majority of the mutakallimun, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that immediate
knowledge does not need any proof to stand. Otherwise, it will be ad infinitum, every
proof will need another proof without ending. Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that
when one disputes something that is immediately known such as perceptible
knowledge, one's deception is exposed. Therefore, it is useless to argue with a
Sophist by presenting rational proof; but it is better to hit him and see whether he
48feels the pain or not.
48 There are four groups of people who reject the immediate knowledge:
a) The Sophist, who believes that we do not know the existence of reality (al-la adriyya).
b) A group who believes that the only reality is rational intuition. They consider that sensual
knowledge is non-existent because it never stays on one state and always changing.
c) The Relativist, who believe that the reality is different and based on one's own perspective
(al-unud/al-indiyya).
d) A group who only believe on sensual knowledge and reject the unobservable knowledge such
as knowledge of unseen country (al-Sumniyya). On the refutation of these views see, Mughni,
xii, 42; Mankdim, Sharh, 48; Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 28-29; Peters, God's Created
Speech, 54.
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3.2.2 The Type of Immediate Knowledge
There are several types of immediate knowledge classified by the mutakllimun. They
agree that human beings have a limited role in this type of knowledge; for God is
considered the creator of this knowledge in them. However, the mutakallimun
disagree on the scope of this knowledge. This difference, as I will indicate, plays an
important role in determining the epistemological background ofMuslim theology.
cAbd al-Jabbar mentions in the twelfth part of the Mughni that one knows one's
existence, state of believing and perceiving immediately from the beginning
(mubtadf").49 However, cAbd al-Jabbar does not elaborate this type here, probably
because he already did so in an earlier part of the Mughni.50 Fortunately, we manage
to comprehend his type of immediate knowledge based on a systematic discussion
from the Taliq al-sharh of Mankdim. He reports the type of immediate knowledge
according to cAbd al-Jabbar as follows:
The immediate knowledge is divided into; (i) what exist in us at
the beginning (mubtadi *"), such as our knowledge of our state of
willing (murid), hating (karih), yearning (mushtahi), fleeing
(nafir) presuming (zann), believing (muctaqid) and so forth; (ii)
what available in us through a means (tariq) or what resembles a
means (ma yajri majra al-tariq).51
49
Mughni, xii, 66.
501 arguably believe that he already discussed this type of immediate knowledge in the first part of the
Mughni.
51 Mankdim, Sharh, 50. There is a disagreement among modern scholars on cAbd al-Jabbar's type of
immediate knowledge. The confusion is possibly due to one's interpretation on the text in the sharh.
Hourani in this issue divides cAbd al-Jabbar's type of immediate knowledge into two types,
meanwhile cUthman, divides it into three types. Cf. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 20-2; cUthman,
Nazariyya al-takllf, 60.
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According to cAbd al-Jabbar, there are two types of immediate knowledge, direct and
indirect knowledge. First, 1 will examine his view of the direct knowledge, and then
follow it by a discussion of indirect knowledge.
3.2.2.1. Direct Knowledge
Direct knowledge (mubtadi') according to cAbd al-Jabbar is knowledge that exists in
us from the beginning. It is similar to a priori knowledge in Western epistemological
system. Yet, the scope of this knowledge is wider than a priori. Similar to a priori
knowledge, immediate knowledge, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is a set of
knowledge that is known by every compos mentis person (caqil).52 The objective of
this set of knowledge is to achieve the maturity of the intellect (kamal al- aql).
However, although this knowledge is available in all men of reason, it is conceivable
that they disagree on it.
Therefore, we observe that cAbd al-Jabbar divides direct knowledge into two types:
(i) what is considered (to belong) to the maturity of the intellect and (ii) what is not
considered to belong to the maturity. The first type of direct knowledge is
undisputable and indubitable; for if one obtained this knowledge, one is considered a
compos mentis person. Meanwhile, the second type is a kind of knowledge some
persons have and others have not without this having any influence on the maturity
of their intellect and their being compos mentis (caqil). By way of example, he
mentions recognizing Zayd. Although this knowledge is from the beginning
52
For more on this set of knowledge, see our discussion on the maturity of intellect below, 131.
114
(.mubtadi') from God, yet it did not contribute to the maturity of the intellect;
therefore, people disagree about it.53
Knowledge concerning the maturity of the intellect again is composed of two kinds:
(a) what is based upon experience and (b) what is not. The latter concerns the
knowledge of general rules of argumentation and its basic axiomatic. As an example,
he mentions the axiom of non-contradiction (cadam al-tanaqud); either of the two
alternatives is possible such as an essence (dhat) whether it exists (maujud) or is
nonexistent (macdum).54 The other comprises general rules concerning act and basic
ethical rules.55
Some of cAbd al-Jabbar's statements in his works on the types of knowledge cause
confusion among contemporary scholars. For instance, in the Mughni, he writes that
"if they mean with this saying that, without the knowledge perceived by the senses it
is inconceivable that one can know everything; this is valid but it is unconceivable to
indicate that sensual knowledge evaluates the rational knowledge."5 In this passage,
cAbd al-Jabbar indicates that it is acceptable to say that all sources of knowledge
must be from the senses but to say that the senses can evaluate rational knowledge is
unacceptable.
53








cUthman considers that this passage indicates destruction of the foundation of
rationalism since the passage says that all knowledge is based on the senses.57 The
same result was obtained by Hourani when he considers that based on cAbd al-
Jabbar's view of the knowledge of the basic ethical rules, all rational intuition in his
epistemology is preceded by experience.58 On this, Hourani quotes cAbd al-Jabbar's
statement as follows: "And we only say about these two [lying and wrongdoing are
evil] and similar pieces of knowledge that they are things that occur originally
(iibtida'an) in rational persons: not that they exist originally before knowledge of the
perceptible, but because preceding knowledge is not a means to them, as we have
shown with respect to perception and other things...this knowledge [e.g. that harmful
pain is evil] is not dependent on perception, even though perception must precede it
in a special sense."59
Because of this confusion, I believe it is important to analyze cAbd al-Jabbar's
immediate knowledge in order to reveal his view of this matter. I will endeavor to do
so base on E. Kant's categorization of knowledge as a priori and a posteriori,60 Kant
indicates that the distinction between a posteriori and a priori comes to be a
distinction between what is derived from experience and what is not.61 A priori
57 cUthman, Nagariyya al-taklf, 53.
58 Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 21-2.
59
Mughni, xii, 66.
60 Literal meaning of a priori is '"from what is prior" and a posteriori is "from what is posterior".
Aristotle explains that A is prior to B in nature if and only if B could not exist without A; A is prior to
B in knowledge if and only if we cannot know B without knowing A. Hamlyn D. W., "A Priori and A
Posteriori", i, 140.
61
For Kant's distinction between a priori and a posteriori, see his Critique, 25-7; cf. Hamlyn, D. W.,
Theory ofKnowledge, 249-80.
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knowledge is derived from the mind and is not based on experience (al-khibr).
Meanwhile, a posteriori is based on experience.62
In general, cAbd al-Jabbar's immediate knowledge consists of the following:
i) One's knowledge of oneself and its state that is not based on any external
factor, such as willing, hating etc.;63
ii) Knowledge of logical axiomatic principles, such as the principle of non¬
contradiction (c'adam al-tanaqud);
iii) Knowledge of basic ethical rules, such as injustice (zulm) is evil;
iv) Perceptible knowledge that is based on sense perception;
v) Recognizing someone.64
Hence, we can observe that in cAbd al-Jabbar's type of immediate knowledge there is
a priori and a posteriori knowledge. One's knowledge of oneself is a priori since it
does not need any experience. This knowledge occurs in us before the occurring of
any other knowledge and without a means (bi la wasita). As examples, cAbd al-
Jabbar identifies some principles that are known immediately to human beings, such
as knowledge that one will believe what one perceives. Similarly, one's knowledge
of the tranquillity of one's soul is also immediately known. But one's knowledge to
prove the existence of knowledge (ithbat al-ilni) and its situation differs from what
is not knowledge; the way to it is via proof. 65
62
Hamlyn, "A Priori and A Posteriori" , 140; cf. Gotshalk, D. W., "The A Priori", 253.
63 In later Islamic philosophy this knowledge is called knowledge by presence (ci/m huduri), which
was formulated by Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191). See Mehdi H. Yazdi, The Principle of
Epistemology, 15.




Meanwhile, knowledge of the perceptibles (mudrakat) is a posteriori knowledge
since they are based on the senses and perception. Also, knowledge of the basic
ethical rules as Hourani rightly observes are a posteriori since it is based on
perception (idrak).66 cAbd al-Jabbar explains that although basic ethical knowledge is
preceded by perception, but sense cannot perceive knowledge directly like a
perceptible thing. Therefore, he does not consider basic ethical principles as
perceptible knowledge. It is not perceptible knowledge, and perception is not a
means to it.67 The knowledge of it is drawn out from particular experiences in which
it is learned by a direct apprehension.68 On this, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
After a knower knows the reality of lying and what differentiate
it from others; he will know that if lying occurs not for rejecting
harm (madarra), it must be necessarily bad {qabh hi idtirar).
[Similarly] he also knows immediately after his knowledge of
pain and sorrow that wrongdoing (zulm) is bad.69
However, there is uncertainty regarding the knowledge of basic logical axiomatic
such as the principle of non-contradiction (cadam al-tanaqud): is it a priori or a
posteriori? According to Mankdim's report, it is a priori since it is not based on
experience (khibr), but fAbd al-Jabbar reports in the Mughni that although logical
axiomatic is immediately known, it must be preceded by other knowledge. On this,
cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
As one knows through his knowledge of the existence of bodies
and others, that it is impossible for a body to be existence and
non existence [at the same time], or eternal and temporal [at the
same time]. For one knows that a thing is on certain attribute and
66
Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 22.
67
Mughni, xii, 61.




not on it [at the same time] is impossible...Therefore, one
immediately knows of its impossibility (istihalatih) although it
must be preceded by the knowledge of body and existence, also
this knowledge comes to his mind. Hence, it is inconceivable for
him to doubt on that.70
Therefore, based on Kant's distinction, 1 posit that knowledge of logical axiomatic is
also a priori, since there is no experience involved. This judgment is true if one
derives logical axiomatic from one's knowledge of oneself. Yet, if it was derived
from the knowledge of something other than oneself, it is a posteriori knowledge
since senses are involved.71
3.2.2.2. Indirect Knowledge
Having studied cAbd al-Jabbar's view of direct knowledge, now I will examine his
view of indirect knowledge. Indirect knowledge, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is
knowledge that occurs through a means (tariq). This indirect knowledge again has
two sub-categories: (i) what takes place by the means (tariq) and (ii) what resembles
the means (mayuhsalu camma yajrimajra al-tariq). I will start my investigation into
knowledge that occurs by a means, and then follow by what resembles a means.
1. Knowledge by a means
What cAbd al-Jabbar suggests by means (tariq) in immediate knowledge is the
perception (idrak) through the five senses. Therefore, all perceptible knowledge is
included in this first subsection of immediate knowledge, because one knows
perceptible knowledge only through the means of perception. cAbd al-Jabbar
explains that whenever the perceiving subject is rational (caqiF) and there is no
70
Mughni, xii, 61
71 One knows the existence of others through senses.
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ambiguity in the perceived object, the perception certainly will occur. The
knowledge gained from the perception must be initially (ibtida'a) from the act of
God, but occurs only when the perceiver is doing the perception. Thus, perception is
an act of human beings, whereas knowledge is an act ofGod. This implies that if the
perceiving subject is closing his eye he will not be able to perceive a thing from his
sight and God will not create perceptible knowledge in him.72
As far as perception is concerned, one might ask that, how does the process of human
beings obtain immediate knowledge? To answer this question, first, 1 will discuss the
process of how human beings obtain immediate knowledge. On this, cAbd al-Jabbar
reports:
Indeed the knower knows from his observation of the body and
his examination of its states that it is inconceivable for the body
to exist in two places [at the same time]. Likewise he realizes
that when he knows the existence of body, it is impossible for it
to be existence and nonexistence, eternal and temporal; for he
knows that it is inconceivable for a thing to be in one state and
the opposite state at one time. This is because that will lead to
the combination of two contradictions. Hence, he immediately
will know its impossibility.73
cAbd al-Jabbar elucidates that the perceiver will perceive a thing in detail (tafsil). He
will perceive the most specific attributes (akhass awsafih) of the thing exist,74 for
instance, its color or other accidents that differentiate the thing from others. In other
words, perception will obtain only what could be perceived by the senses and not
beyond it. Senses could not perceive the ethical value of a thing; for the value of a
72




Mughni, xii, 61. See also, Dhanani, Physical Theoiy, 22-5.
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thing (good or evil) is an additional attribute (awsafza'ida).75 Perceptive knowledge
is free from any judgment or value. Senses are unable to perceive the value of what
they perceive. Therefore, rational evaluation is needed to understand the value of a
thing.76
Thus, cAbd al-Jabbar concludes that the role of the senses is to perceive the existence
of a thing. However, one cannot know the truth or falsehood of a thing through the
senses. Instead, the truth or falsehood must be known via the intellect. Therefore, the
intellect is the evaluator (iqadi) of the validity of perceptive knowledge or what has
been perceived by the senses.77
Furthermore, cAbd al-Jabbar believes that through perception one not only knows
perceptible things but also other thing such as the intention of the speaker (qasd al-
mukhatib). Although one could not perceive the intention directly or naturally (bi al-
tabc), one knows it through the speaker's speech or sign.78 Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar
also includes knowledge of the intention of a speaker in immediate knowledge.
However, for the knowledge ofGod's intention, one could not know immediately but
only via proof. For knowledge of God's intention is based on knowledge of His
essence. Since knowledge of His essence is based on proof, knowledge of God's












Based on the previous explanation, one might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar considers
that perception is a vital means of knowledge. A human's connection with the
outside world is established through perception. However, what if someone argues
that the senses are not reliable since they sometimes make wrong judgments, such as
one perceives a distant object as small, and, therefore, consider it so, yet, in reality
that object is big?
Responding to this question, cAbd al-Jabbar clarifies that the senses cannot be
blamed if there is any mistake in judgment related to the senses. He believes that it is
necessary to differentiate between knowledge perceived by the senses and what the
perceiver believes, which is his interpretation of the data given by the senses. The
mistakes always occur when the perceiver interprets the data wrongly. Besides, cAbd
al-Jabbar argues that the role of the senses is to perceive a thing as what it is (cala ma
huwa calayhi li dhatihi). Whereas to know whether a thing is valid or invalid is the
duty of the perceiver (mudrik). Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar concludes that the mistakes
in the judgment of the perceiver have nothing to do with the reliability of the senses.
OQ
Rather, the mistake occurs because of obscurity (shubha) that appears with it.
cAbd al-Jabbar even goes further to state that "without knowledge of what is
perceived by the senses it will be unfounded for human beings to know all
knowledge."81 Thus, it is correct to say that sensory knowledge is the precedent (asl)
for rational knowledge.82 However, he disagreed that sensory knowledge is the





82 This view is equivalent with that of al-Ashcari, cf. al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 10.
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way to know the validity of all knowledge is the tranquillity of the soul (sukun al-
nafs). When it is confirmed that the tranquillity of the soul has occurred in all
knowledge, it must be said that the knowledge is valid, irrespective of whether it is
sensory knowledge or rational knowledge.83
cAbd al-Jabbar responds to the question raised by some Atheists (al-Dahriyya)
regarding whether the senses or the intellect is superior to the other, or which judges
(<qadij the other, by commenting that:
As for the discussions on whether the senses judge the intellect
or the intellect evaluates the senses, or neither evaluate the
other, I believe that most of those who speak about it do not
know the objective (ghard) of their discussion. This is because
the senses have no role in this discussion.84 Instead what matters
(imutabar) is knowledge of the perceptible (mudrakat), and
knowledge that is available from the intellect via reflection
(nazctr).8
cAbd al-Jabbar argues that perception is not the condition for belief to become
knowledge, but it is the tranquillity of the soul. If it occurs, then it is knowledge;
otherwise, it is not knowledge. Explaining the relationship between the tranquillity of
the soul and perception, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
We have already explained that the tranquillity of the soul that
follows a belief is knowledge irrespective of from where it
comes. Indeed, what occurs via reflection (naznr) is at the same
level of what occurs through perception (idrak). The only
difference is that the knowledge one perceived could not be




84 He means that what is important is the knowledge obtained through the senses (perceptible






From this passage, one might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar is not concerned with the
means one gets the knowledge from, as long as it caused the tranquillity of the soul.
Therefore, knowledge from perception is at the same level as knowledge from
reflection. There is no difference between immediate knowledge and acquired
knowledge in terms of its reliability. The only difference according to cAbd al-Jabbar
is that immediate knowledge cannot be denied from one's soul, whereas acquired
knowledge can be denied.
2. Knowledge Resembles a Means
The second sub-category of indirect knowledge is what takes place through
knowledge that resembles the means (,tariq) of something. The meaning of this type
of knowledge is that the validity of certain knowledge is based on the other. Before
one knows (b), one must know (a). It is knowledge that needs other knowledge to
exist or to be validated. An example is one only knows the state (Ml) of a thing after
knowledge of its essence (dhat). Without knowledge of the essence, one cannot
know the state of that essence. Therefore, the knowledge of the essence resembles a
means for one to know the state of a thing. The former is precedent (asl), and the
latter is antecedent (farc).sl
Explaining the differences between these types of indirect knowledge with the
former , Mandkim reports that:
The difference between what occurs in us through a means and
what resembles a means is that, it is possible for the former to
exist without a means; yet, this is not the case in the latter.
Therefore, it is plausible for God to create in us a knowledge of
87
Mughni, xii, 61; Mankdim, Sharh, 50; Peters, God's Created Speech, 54; Abrahamov, "Necessary
knowledge", 23.
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perceptible things without perception, but it is implausible for
Him to create a knowledge of the state (hal) without a
knowledge of the essence (dhat); for the essence is a precedent
(.asl) for the state and it resembles a means to the knowledge of
the state.88
One might observe that, by stating this point cAbd al-Jabbar established the principle
of hierarchy in his argument. What I mean is that this subsection of indirect
knowledge will become the ground for his theological argument that needs to be
observed when one is dealing with the issue of knowledge. This principle is the
hierarchical order of knowledge that means that knowledge must be arranged
systematically based on its logical consequence.
However, the establishment of this principle is not free from critics. A.K.. Uthman
has questioned the significance of mentioning it as a separate sub-division. He argues
that if that knowledge (what resembles a means) is related to our state, it could
possibly be included in the first division of immediate knowledge, i.e., direct
knowledge. And if it is related to the state of others, it is not immediate knowledge
OQ
but is acquired.
In this regard, 1 agree with cUthman's observation and prefer this knowledge be
included in direct knowledge since it can be considered as part of the axiomatic
principles. However, probably due to the complexity of this principle, it is
implausible to include it in direct knowledge. However, 1 suggest that cAbd al-Jabbar
has another reason for specifying a sub-division for this principle. Most likely, the
88 Mankdim, Sharh, 50.
89 cUthman, Na?ariyya al-takljf.\ 60.
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significant role played by this principle in his theology has led cAbd al-Jabbar to
consider it as a separate sub-division of indirect knowledge.
The importance of this principle can be observed in his discussion of the types of
proof. On this, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
Say to him: there are four [types of proof]: rational argument
(hujjat al-caql), the Book (al-Kitab), the prophetic tradition (al-
Sunna) and the consensus [of community] (ijma). Knowledge
ofGod can only be obtained through rational argument; because
if we do not know that He is truthful we will not know the
authenticity of the Book, the Sunna and the consensus.90
cAbd al-Jabbar depends on this principle when arguing against the Hanbalites who
depend merely on the Qur'an and the Sunna in their theological arguments. Based on
his second sub-division of indirect knowledge, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that one cannot
use the Qur'an to prove the existence of God, because the former is antecedent (far )
and the latter is precedent (asP). That he believes will not comply with the previous
principle. Hence, cAbd al-Jabbar insists that the intellect (caql) is the only way to
prove the existence of God.91 Furthermore, he elucidates that in order to accept the
validity of the Qur'an, which is the word of God, one must prove His existence. The
only way to prove God's existence is via intellectual reasoning. Therefore, cAbd al-
Jabbar maintains that those who are using the Qur'an to prove the existence of God
are not following the right way in their argumentation.
Elaborating on this matter, cAbd al-Jabbar states:
Probably some of them will be surprised at this arrangement.






consensus (ijmf) only, or, if indeed reason can be included it
must be the last. But that is not the case. This is because God the
highest is not communicating except with a compos mentis
person (ahl al-caql). Since with reason one can prove the
validity of the kitab, tradition and consensus, reason is
considered the precedent (asl). Through reason, we distinguish
between the rules of action and the rules of the actor. With it we
shall be able to know who is responsible for what he omits or
what he performs, who will be praised and who will be blamed.
Because of that someone who has no reason (la caql lahu) is
exempted from obligation (taklrf). And when we know via
reason that there is only one God and we know that He is wise,
hence His book is a proof. And when we know that He sends the
prophet and distinguishes him from liars (kadhdhab) through a
miracle, we know that the word of the prophet is a proof. And
when the prophet says that "My nation will not consent to an
error" and "You have to be with the majority (/'affl/a)", then we
know that consensus is a proof.92
One might observe from previous arguments that cAbd al-Jabbar is concerned with
orderly presentation in his theological epistemology. Therefore, he endeavors to
rationalize every aspect of theology, including the way to use the Qur'an and other
sources of knowledge. The principle that the antecedent (farc) cannot prove the
precedent (as/)' played a major role in developing his arguments. To establish this
principle, cAbd al-Jabbar specified a sub-section in immediate knowledge for it. He
does not include this principle in direct knowledge or perceptible knowledge,
probably because of the significance of this principle in his theological argument.
The principle that the Qur'an can be a valid proof only after its validity has been
proved through reason, in fact, is a standard kalam position. The Ashcarites also
accept this principle in their theological arguments. Al-Baghdadi, for instance,




of God, the validity of the prophet, and his message.93 However, the point of
difference between cAbd al-Jabbar and al-Baghdadi is that the latter does not mention
specifically this principle in his type of knowledge while the former emphasizes this
principle in his epistemology and relies on it in his theological argument.94
Another significant difference between the views of cAbd al-Jabbar and the
Ashcarites in this disagreement is on the content of immediate knowledge. cAbd al-
Jabbar's considers that basic ethical rules knowledge is included in immediate
knowledge. His inclusion of this knowledge in immediate knowledge implies man's
ability to know good and evil with reason alone. However, this inclusion is rejected
by the Ashcarites. They exclude ethical rules from immediate knowledge. In this
regard, al-Baghdadi writes:
cIlm daruri is two divisions; first, is the direct knowledge (cilm
badihi) and second is the sensory knowledge (cilm hissi). cilm
badihi is divided into two sections; (i) confirmation (ithbat) such
as knowledge of one of us about his own existence and what he
find in his self from pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, hot, cold,
sadness and happiness and what is similar to it; (ii) rejection
(.nafij, such as our knowledge of the impossibility of the
impossibilities, also knowledge that one thing cannot be eternal
and temporal, that a person could not live and die in one state,
also the knower of something could not be ignorant of it in the
same respect of what he knows in one state. Meanwhile cilm al-
hissi is perceptible knowledge that is obtained via five senses.95
From this passage, we observe that in general there is an agreement between cAbd al-
Jabbar and al-Baghdadi on the division of immediate knowledge. However, al-
Baghdadi does not mention any ethical principle to be included in immediate
93 Al-Baghdadi, U?u! al-din, 24-5.
94
Another Ashcarite theologian, al-Juwayni, considers that the obligation of knowing God is based on
the consensus of the muslims on it. See al-Juwayni, Shamil, 120.
95
Al-Baghdadi, U?u! al-din, 8-9.
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knowledge. Al-Baghdadi and the Ashcarites in general do not include ethical
judgment in immediate knowledge. Although they agree with cAbd al-Jabbar that
ethical judgment is created by God but not the way cAbd al-Jabbar comprehends it,
which is through direct creation in the human self; instead, the Ashcarites believe that
God reveals ethical judgment to human beings through the prophets. Therefore,
ethical knowledge, according to the Ashcarites, must be acquired through revelation
and is not immediate knowledge.96
Thus, basic ethical rules become one of the main differences that distinguish cAbd al-
Jabbar's view of the type of immediate knowledge from the view of the Ashcarites.97
cAbd al-Jabbar considers that reason alone is capable of distinguishing between good
(hasan) and evil (qubh) without depending on revelation (woiy).98 The Ashcarites
reject this view. They maintain that knowledge of good and evil could only be
determined by God's command (amr) and prohibition (nahy)." Had no command or
prohibition come from God, human beings would have been liable to no obligation
whatsoever.100
Therefore, the Ashcarites consider that obligation will occur only after one knows
revelation through the prophet. For only revelation can determine what is good and
what is bad. Before revelation, there will be no such thing as lawful (halat) or
96 Cf. al-Baghdadi, U?ul al-din, 25.
97
An important characteristic of this intuitive ethical knowledge as described by Fakhry, is that "it is
autonomous and self-validating. It requires neither 'acquired' nor 'deductive' evidence to support it,
not even the warrant of divine revelation (sanf). Rather the contrary, for unless the grounds of
religious or revealed truth, such as the wisdom of God and the truthfulness of the Prophet who bears
His message to mankind, are rationally known, the truth of revelation, identified by cAbd al-Jabbar
with the Qur'an and Traditions, would remain forever questionable." Cf. Fakhry, Ethical Theories, 33.
98 Fakhry, Ethical Theories, 49.
99 Al-Baghdadi, U?ul al-din, 26.
100 For further discussion on the concept of Taklif according to cAbd al-Jabbar see below, 167.
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unlawful (haram).m Before revelation, all the actions of a compos mentis person
(aqil) are neither rewarded nor punished. For the Ashcarites, reward and punishment
will occur only when there is obedience or disobedience toward the law or al-sharc,
which comes with revelation.102
However, the disagreement on the content of immediate knowledge not only occurs
between cAbd al-Jabbar and the Ashcarites as we previously observed. The dispute
also occurs between cAbd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf. The latter
considers that knowing God is included in immediate knowledge. cAbd al-Jabbar,
however, disagrees with him.103 The disagreement between cAbd al-Jabbar and Abu
al-Hudhayl regarding the content of immediate knowledge leads them to adopt a
different approach in their arguments about knowing God. However, Abu al-Hudhayl
maintains that this knowledge exists in the human mind in a general sense.
Therefore, one needs to reflect (nazar) in order to understand detailed information
about God. Negligence in knowing God will result in an eternal punishment in the
hereafter. This knowledge is the foundation of taklif caqlj, according to Abu al-
Hudhayl.104
101
Al-Baghdadi, Usui at-din, 24. For later Ashcarites' arguments against Muctazilites ethics, see
Hourani, "Juwayni's Criticism of Muctazilites Ethics", 161-173; Shihadeh, A., Teleological Ethics,
83-107; Jackson S., "The Alchemy of Domination?" 185-201.
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Al-Baghdadi, U?ul al-din, 25.
103 See Mughni, xii, 342; Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 73.
104 1 suggest that Abu al-Hudhayl's view on the foundation of knowing God is similar with that of R.
Descartes. After cogitating on his own innate ideas, Descartes concludes that all those ideas come
from him except one. He states that "Flence there only remains, therefore, the idea of God, concerning
which we must consider whether it is something which cannot have proceeded from me myself. By
the name God I understand a substance that is infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by
which 1 myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, have been created. Now all of these
characteristics are such that the more diligently 1 attend to them, the less do they appear capable of
proceeding from me alone; hence, from what has been already said, we must conclude that God
necessarily exist." R. Descartes, Meditation, 156. Cf. J. Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 67;
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3.4 The Maturity of the Intellect
The main objective of immediate knowledge according to cAbd al-Jabbar is to
prepare the ground for the person to be ready for his obligations. cAbd al-Jabbar calls
this state kamal al-aql (the maturity of the intellect). When one arrives at this stage,
one will be considered ready for rational obligation. cAbd al-Jabbar believes that man
has an innate capacity to know the divine command that develops in him."105
The maturity of the intellect according to cAbd al-Jabbar is the starting point for the
obligation (taklif). In Islam, arriving at the age of puberty (bulugh) is considered one
of the signs of the maturity of one's intellect. When one reaches this age of puberty,
one will be considered baligh and ready for the obligation, with the exception of the
insane (majnun). Before that period, a person will not be considered an obligated
person (mukallqf).
In the Majmif al-muhlt, Ibn Mattawayh reports that in order for one to become ready
and capable of implementing the obligation (taklrf), it is incumbent upon God to
establish a foundation for man to achieve this goal. This foundation according to
cAbd al-Jabbar is based on two parts: (i) knowledge that develops the maturity of the
intellect (kamal al-aql) and (ii) the foundation of proof (usul al-adilla).W6
The maturity of the intellect and the foundation of proof generally develop
simultaneously, for example, the knowledge that man is the agent of his own act
105
Al-Faruqi, Ismacil, R., "The Self in Muctazilah Thought", 366.
106 cAbd al-Jabbar also considers that u$ul al- adilla is immediate knowledge. Cf. Ibn Mattawayh,,
Majmif (2), 6.
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because that act occurs following his will (irada), intention, (qasd) and action. This
according to cAbd al-Jabbar is the maturity of the intellect and also the foundation of
the proof. After all immediate knowledge occurs in a person, that person will be
ready for the obligation (taklrf). The process of obtaining this knowledge needs no
effort from human beings; it will be created by God. Therefore, the maturity of the
intellect (kamal al-aql) will definitely occur in every human being.
From the previous explanation, one might observe that the intellect according to
cAbd al-Jabbar is something special. He considers that intellect ('aql) is a group of
specific knowledge that, if present in the mukallaf, will be adequate for a mukallaf to
reflect for acquiring proof and to perform the obligatory.107 Therefore, in his
definition of the intellect (''aql), cAbd al-Jabbar does not follow the method of
Muslim philosophers (faylasuf) who define it as substance (jawhar)}08 He argues
that it is inconceivable to consider the intellect as substance, for substance is
included in the universe (kawn). It is possible for substance to exist without the
existence of every genus that it related to.109 Therefore, substance can exist with the
universe and its opposite. If that is applied to the intellect and knowledge, the
implication is that it is possible for the intellect to exist with knowledge and its
opposite (which is ignorance). This implication, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is
inconceivable."0
107 Mughni, xi, 375.
108 Mughni., xi, 375. Forfaylasuf's discussions on the intellect, see Davidson H., Al-Farabi, Avicenna
and Averroes on Intellect. This work discusses the link between Greek and Arabic understanding of
intellect and the various transformations the concept of intellect underwent in Islamic philosophy.
109 1 suggest that what cAbd al-Jabbar means here is that the substance (jawhar) or essence is available
even before the existence of the quiddity (mdhiya) of a thing.
110 Flowever, cAbd al-Jabbar accepts the use of substance for the intellect in the sense of the
foundation of knowledge (a$l li al-ulum). Mughni, xi, 376-7.
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Therefore, when cAbd al-Jabbar speaks about the kamal al-caql, what he means is the
completion of the creation of immediate knowledge by God in the mukallaf.
Supporting his argument, cAbd al-Jabbar states that if this certain knowledge is
available in man he will become a rational (caqit) person even without others. And if
he has other things but not this knowledge he will not become rational."1 Hence, 1
posit that it is important to bring up this knowledge in order to understand what cAbd
al-Jabbar means by the maturity of the intellect. This knowledge is:
First, one's knowledge of one own situation (Ml), such as willing (murid), dislike
(karih), and believing (mutaqid). Someone who does not know his own situation
must have been lacking (muntaqis) in knowledge. So, it is inconceivable for him to
obtain any other knowledge without having knowledge of his own situation. This
knowledge is considered the foundation (asl) for knowledge of the relationship
between the action and the actor. For if one who does not know that a person is
willing and believing, one will certainly not know that an action performed by him is
based on his intention and will."2 Therefore, this knowledge is considered the first
113foundation in immediate knowledge.
Second, knowledge of the situation of perceptible objects (mudrakat) is based on the
principle of non-contradiction. It is impossible for a body to be in two different
places at the same time. cAbd al-Jabbar argues that if this knowledge is unknown to
111 Mughni, xi, 376.
112 Mughni, xi, 382.
113 This type of knowledge is similar with a foundation of knowledge meditate by Descartes, Rene in
his philosophy cogito ergo sum, (I think therefore I exist). Cf. Descartes, R., Meditation on First
Philosophy, 136.
133
the mukallaf it is implausible for him to confirm (ithbat) the existence of accidents
(.a'rad) and their temporality. Similarly, without this knowledge the temporality of
the bodies and the relationship between the action and the agent will not be possible.
Knowledge of the situation of perceptible objects is considered the foundation (asl)
for all knowledge. As a result, a rational person will know that it is impossible for a
body to become eternal (qadim) and temporal (muhdath) at the same time; or a thing
(shay') exists and does not exist at the same time.114
Also, understanding of the reality of perceptible objects is important, primarily to
reject the view of those who believe in the bodily existence of God (mujassima). On
this, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that this knowledge is needed to prove that the body and
the accident are created. Hence, we cannot say that God has a body since this implies
that God is created {muhdath). This implication is impossible since God is an eternal
being.
Third is knowledge of ethical principles. Examples of this knowledge are the evilness
ofwrongdoing (zidm), ungratefulness {kufr al-nfma) and lying that has no benefit in
it and not to avoid danger, the goodness of charity {ihsan), and courteousness
(.tafaddul).u5 One also knows certain obligations such as thanking a benefactor
{shukr al-munim), rejecting harm from oneself {daf al-darar can al-nafs), returning
trust {wadFa) when asked, and to be just {insaf). Similarly, one also knows the
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the goodness of censuring failure to perform (ikhlal) the obligation when the obstacle
is absent (irtif£).u6
This basic ethical knowledge according to cAbd al-Jabbar must be obtained by the
mukallaf.; otherwise, fear (khawf) of not doing reflection (nazar) will not appear. For
this fear is the basis that leads human beings to reflect. Hence, the beginning of
obligation (takl'if) is based on fear. Also, knowledge of the justice Cadi) of God is
impossible without knowledge of ethical judgment. For when the difference between
good and evil is unclear, there is no ground to purify (yunazzah) God from evilness
(muqabbahat) and to attach to Him something good (muhsanat). Therefore,
knowledge of basic ethical judgment is one of the essential foundations for all
acquired knowledge either from the intellect or revelation."7
Fourth, the knowledge of some motives (dawa'ij. Knowledge of divine assistances
(altaf) is invalid without it. When the basic principles of harm (darar) and benefit
(naf) such as pure harm (darar al-mahd) must be avoided and pure benefit (naf al-
mahd) must be performed, are unknown, it is inappropriate for a person to be
obligated.118 However, motive for cAbd al-Jabbar is not a necessary condition of the
act. The acts of a sleeper and of an unaware person (sain), for instance, occur without
a motive. Thus, cAbd al-Jabbar uses the notion ofmotive and intention (qasd) only to
demonstrate that human beings are the agents of the acts they produce. On this, he
116 Hourani, "The Rationalist Ethics ofcAbd al-Jabbar," 107-13.
117
Mughni, xi, 384.
118 Mughni\ xi, 384-5.
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argues that man's acts are his own since they occur in accordance with his own
motives and intention."9
After one has already obtained all this knowledge, one achieves the maturity of
intellect. At this level, one is ready and capable of receiving and implementing the
obligation. For cAbd al-Jabbar, this maturity of the intellect is the starting point when
a person becomes obligated. However, there is another important requirement for one
to become an actual obligated person; this requirement is fear (khawf). This fear
generally will appear in human beings during the process of obtaining the maturity of
the intellect. But if this fear does not occur during that process, God would certainly
create this fear at the time ofmaturity by sending a divine idea (khatir) to the human
mind either directly or through the mediation of the angel. Hence, everyone who has
obtained maturity of his intellect will immediately experience the fear of not doing
reflection.120
Apparently, based on the previous explanation, cAbd al-Jabbar believes that there is
no gap between the maturity of the intellect and the obligation (taklrf). Since the fear
will appear at the latest during the maturity of the intellect, after one achieves the
maturity of the intellect, one immediately becomes an obligated person (mukallaj).
cAbd al-Jabbar believes that "the maturity of the intellect" is the sole factor that
makes human beings become obligated.
119
Madelung, "The Late Muctazild\ 245-6. For our discussion on the concept of motive, see below,
146.
120 Ibn Mattawayh, MajmA (i) 26-8. For our discussion on fear, see below, 156.
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Immediate knowledge is an important foundation for one to become capable of
acquiring knowledge. From immediate knowledge, one is able to obtain (i) the
maturity of the intellect (by obtaining it, one has the intellectual ability to perform
the task of acquiring knowledge), (ii) the foundation of proof (usul al-adilla) (this
foundation is a set of principles for one to base his argument on it in his effort to
acquire knowledge), and (iii) the sense of fear (this fear will become a motivation for
one to reflect in order to acquire knowledge). With all these in mind, cAbd al-Jabbar
systematizes the process of acquiring knowledge. So, when one achieves one's
intellectual maturity, one must start to acquire certain knowledge that becomes
obligatory upon him.
3.5. Acquired Knowledge
The main difference between acquired and immediate knowledge is that in the latter,
one plays a minimum role toward it, while in the former one has more roles in the
process of obtaining it. In acquired knowledge, tranquillity of the soul is no longer
provided by God directly to human beings such as in the case of immediate
knowledge. Instead, it is compulsory (wajib) for every obligated person (mukallaf) to
acquire this knowledge. Therefore, avoiding or neglecting acquiring knowledge,
according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is considered sinful and will be punished.121
cAbd al-Jabbar defines acquired knowledge as "knowledge that occurs after the
• 122
maturity of the intellect through reflection (nazar)." Hence, every type of
121 Mankdim, Sharh, 125.
122 Based on Ibn Mattawaylr s report, see Ibn Mattawayh, Majmit ii, 260. cf. Dughaym, S., Mausifa
Mustalahat, 445.
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knowledge that needs thinking and reflection is acquired knowledge.123 Unlike
immediate knowledge, which is simple and created directly by God in the human
soul, acquired knowledge is more complex and requires more effort and
responsibilities from human beings. Ibn al-Malahimi, meanwhile, reports another
definition of acquired knowledge from cAbd al-Jabbar. He maintains that it is the
knowledge that is possible for a knower to deny from himselfwith doubt (shubha) on
its way when it is isolated (idha infarada). The inclusion of "idha infaradcT excludes
acquired knowledge that is joined by immediate knowledge. It plays a similar role in
the definition of immediate knowledge as we discussed earlier.124
However, one might ask regarding this definition that if the means (tariq) to acquired
knowledge is immediate (cilm daruri), how is it possible for a knower to deny it from
himself with doubt {shubha), since immediate knowledge is indubitable.125
Responding to this question, Abu al-Husayn al-Basri answers that it is possible to
include doubt about the means of acquired knowledge that is based on immediate
knowledge. He explains that doubt about that knowledge is possible when the one
who asks for proof (mustadill) assumes (yazunnu) that the arrangement of knowledge
{tartib al-ulum) is invalid. When that is the case, he denies the acquired knowledge
from himself or avoids doing it.126
123 cUthman, Na?ariyya al-taklff, 62.
124 Acquired knowledge according to Ibn al-Malahimi also defined as "knowledge that is possible for
a knower to take himself out from the state of knowing of his known (mcflumih) on certain aspects; or
"knowledge from our action". Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Mulamad, 21.
125 In one of his works cAbd al-Jabbar defines immediate knowledge as "knowledge that is not
possible for the knower to deny it from his soul with doubt (shakk) or vagueness (shubha), if it is
isolated (idha infarada)" Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 48; Ibn al-Malahimi, Mu tamad, 20. See above 104.
126 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miflamad, 21-2.
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Without invalidating his predecessors' definitions of acquired knowledge, Ibn al-
Malahimi defines it as "knowledge that based on the inference of its knower." He
explains that his definition includes knowledge from reflection (nazar) and
remembering reflection (tadhakkur al-nazar). For without one's previous reflection
and his memory of it, he will not obtain this knowledge.127
In the Mughni chapter 12, cAbd al-Jabbar discussed the means (turuq) of knowledge.
He maintains that perception (idrak) is the means for immediate knowledge and
(inazar) reflection that for acquired knowledge. From the discussion, he considers
that all knowledge obtained through reflection is acquired knowledge.128 Ibn
Mattawayh explains cAbd al-Jabbar's acquired knowledge in a systematic way,
stating that:
Whenever the mukallaf (obligated person) obtains the maturity of
intellect and knows the foundations of proof (usul al-adilla), it is
obligatory on him to acquire knowledge. There are three types of
acquired knowledge: firstly, knowledge of the actions that were
obligated (kullifa), their attributes (sifatiha) and the ways (wujuh)
in which actions are supposed to occur; secondly, knowledge of
the legislator [God] (mukallif), His attributes and His wisdom
(.hikmatihi); and thirdly, knowledge of what the mukallaf
deserves from benefit (manaff) and harm (mudar).129
From this passage, one can observe the importance of acquired knowledge in cAbd
al-Jabbar's theology, since most of the theological doctrines are included there in.
Yet, due to the limitations of this study, I will focus on what is relevant to the
knowledge of God. Therefore, in the next section and the rest of this chapter, I will
127 "Fa huwaL ilm yaqifala istidlal al-Lalim bih". Ibn al-Malahimi, Mulamad, 22.
128
Mughni\ vii, 67-8.
129 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif, (i), 18; (ii) 7.
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examine the knowledge of action as the first acquired knowledge.130 The aim is to
demonstrate the importance of this knowledge as a foundation for cAbd al-Jabbar's
argument on knowing God. For when one examines cAbd al-Jabbar's theological
argument on knowing God, one will realize that knowledge of action is the
foundation for most of his arguments. Thus, this knowledge is considered a key
principle in confirming the existence of God, His attributes, and His justice. Hence,
without a similar understanding of the knowledge of action, one will not be able to
apply the main proof in the kalam argument, which is the analogy between the seen
world (al-shahid) and the unobservable (al-gha'ib).
When cAbd al-Jabbar classifies his acquired knowledge starting from the rules of
action (ahkam al-afal), followed by knowing God and knowing the reward and
punishment, he does it systematically. cAbd al-Jabbar believes that one needs to
acquire the knowledge of action before proving the existence of God. One also needs
to know God, the legislator (mukallij), before knowing what one deserves from his
action from reward and punishment. For the knowledge of reward and punishment
will be meaningless without knowledge of the giver and the punisher.131
Explaining this matter, Ibn Mattawayh considers that after one knows the rules of
action one needs to know the reward for the obedience of the command and the
punishment for breaking the rules. However, before that one needs to know the
legislator (mukallij) who produces the rules, and who also provides reward and
130 Then in the next chapter I will examine his argument on the obligation of knowing God and finally,
in the last chapter, I will investigate the application of his proof about knowing God.
131 cAbd al-Jabbar also argues that the knowledge of the news giver (mukhbir) is a foundation for al-
shariyyal, which means one must know God before accepting His revelation. Cf. Ibn Mattawayh,
Majmif ,7.
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punishment based on one's obedience toward His laws. Without knowledge of this
legislator, reward and punishment will be baseless.132
Based on the previous explanation, one might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar's
epistemology presented here is focusing on human salvation. His main objective is to
know what human beings need to know in order to live a good life in this world and
the hereafter. cAbd al-Jabbar considers that knowledge of the reward and punishment
is a divine favor (lutf) for humans to perform good acts and to avoid evil ones.
However, this knowledge will not be practically reliable without the knowledge of
the one who obligates the obligation; for He is also the one who will provide the
reward and punishment. Hence, herecAbd al-Jabbar's main concern is how one can
obtain salvation in this world and the hereafter. Knowing God in this sense is not the
main objective of knowledge by itself, but it is a way (tariq) for human salvation.
3.5.1. Knowledge of Action
Next, I will indicate that knowledge of action (afal) is the key in cAbd al-Jabbar's
theological argument that leads to many differences between his view and other
theologians' views. While the differences in immediate knowledge lead to a different
concept of obligation, the differences in acquired knowledge will lead to differences
in the concept of knowing God.
In the Mukhtasar, cAbd al-Jabbar defines action (ffl) as "what produced (yuhdath)
from an able {qadir) agent." When we know that bodies (ajsam) are produced by
132 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmd, (2). 7.
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God, we say that it is His action. Therefore, this world is God's acts since it was
created by Him. Also, we say that the writing is produced by a writer, so, writing is
his action. Then one might ask, how can we differentiate between our action and
God's action, or how can we differentiate between the actions among people? On
this, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
Say to him that what occurred is based on men's intention, will
and desire. They are based on their ability and knowledge, also
on their ignorance and forgetfulness. Actions such as writing,
shaping (siyagha), walking and standing are all their actions.
What is beyond that or what occurs not based on their states
(.ahwalihim) then it is from the acts of God.133
This passage indicates that the foundation of cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments is based on
one's knowledge of the real agent of the acts. By knowing this, one can differentiate
God's acts from human acts. Knowledge of action, as 1 will indicate, plays a major
role in developing cAbd al-Jabbar's concept of knowing God. Without this
knowledge, most of his arguments in proving the existence of God will be baseless.
cAbd al-Jabbar's proof of the existence of God, for instance, is based on the
comparison between God's acts and humans' acts. And this comparison could not
take place if the real agent of the act is unclear.134
According to cAbd al-Jabbar, action in general is divided into three main divisions:
(i) creation (ikhtirzi), such as creating a body (Jism) from nothing; (ii) direct action
(,mubashir), the act that is directly affected by human act; and (iii) indirect action
133 Mukhtasar, 233.
134 On the application of this proof, see chapter five below, 218.
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{ghair mubashir), which occurs through a secondary effect from human act. The
indirect act is also called the generated act (afal al-mutawallidat).n5
Both creation and direct acts are included in the category that called mubtada',
literally "begun," because the acting subject begins with doing it without having to
do something else. The difference between both is based on the place (mahall) where
the act is produced and its relationship with the substrate in which the capacity
(iqudra) inheres. Creation according to cAbd al-Jabbar is an act that is produced not
in a place (imahall)\ meanwhile, man's direct act is an act that is performed by an
agent in its place, which is a body (jism).m Hence, the difference between God's
acts and human's acts is in the 'place.' God needs no place to act while human
beings need a place to do so.
cAbd al-Jabbar defines a generated act as an accident that is not directly brought into
existence by the able subject but by the means of another act, another accident,
which functions as a secondary cause (.sabab)}37 Pain is one of the examples. We
cannot produce pain in ourselves or in others without first inflicting an injury. We
have to apply pressure (ftimad) to a part of the body in such a way that an injury
results. This in turn "generates" the pain. Generated acts must always be accidents.
Bodies cannot be produced by generating (tawlid), only by creation (ikhtirif), as we
mentioned earlier. In this case, he explains that the able subject produces an accident,
135 Another type of distinction between human actions is into i) voluntarily (iktiydrf) and ii)
involuntarily (idtirari'). Voluntary act is an action that intended by human with knowledge and will
(irdda). It is the foundation of obligation, such as prayer and fasting. Meanwhile the involuntary
action occurred by itself without the will of the person on it, such as the movement of blood in our
body. Cf. Frank, Metaphysics ofCreated Being, 29.
136 Mughni, ix, 124; Peters, God's Created Speech, 206.
137 Bishr al-Muctamir (d. 210/753) the founder of Baghdad school of the Muctazilites is considered the
first from the mutakallimun who spoke about generation and its particularity. Then it was followed by
the majority the Mu'tazilites.
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which again generates (wallad) another accident; this later accident is called
mutawallid.m
Based on the abovementioned explanations, creation is exclusively for God because
only a subject who is able by His essence (qadir bi dhatih) is capable of creating
bodies. Hence, it is beyond the ability of human beings, because human beings and
other living beings in this world have to use always the substrate of their ability in
acting. Therefore, human beings and other able subjects with capacity (qadir bi al-
qudra) cannot create bodies.139
However, cAbd al-Jabbar, in agreement with the majority of Muctazilites,140
maintains that human beings are the real agent of their direct and generated acts.141
He argues that our action occurs based on our intention (qasd) and motives (dawcfi);
also, our action is denied based on our dislike {karahiuna)}A1 Therefore, we must be
the agent of our actions.143 Explaining human actions, cAbd al-Jabbar states that there
are four genera of acts that we can do only directly (cala tariq al-mubashard), and the
use of secondary causes is not possible. They are will (irada), dislike (karaha),
assumption (zanrt), and reflection (nazar). As for the generated acts, there are three
138 Mughni\ ix, 11-4; Peters, God's Created Speech, 206. cAbd al-Jabbar's definitions of direct and
indirect acts were accepted by Ibn al-Malahimi. He states that direct acts according to the
mutakallimun are what originate by man from the beginning in the place of capacity (mahall al-
qudra), while generated acts are what generate from direct acts', cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 141
339 Mankdim, Sharh, 223.
140 Mucammar in this regard considers that man has no act except 'will' {irada). See, Ibn al-Malahimi,
Fa'iq, 141.
141 Mughni, xi, 370; cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 141.
142 In this regard he disagrees with the Ashcarites who state that God is the only real agent {khaliq) of
all actions including humans' actions. They believe that God creates the action while man acquires
{kasab) it. For the Ashcarites' arguments on this issue, see al-Baqillani, Tamh/d, 286; al-Razi, Arbacin,
122-54; D. Gimaret, Theories de Facte humain, 92; Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 15-44.
143 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 223.
144
genera of acts that can be done only indirectly, by making use of secondary causes;
these are sounds (aswat), pain (alam), and composition (ta'lrf).HA
The other acts from the genera of knowledge (culum), pressure (ftimad), and modes
of being (akwan) can be produced either directly or by using secondary causes.
Therefore, in relation to knowledge, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that it is a generated
act from reflection. A mukallaf produces only the first action; he reflects; knowledge
is no more than a result from his direct action, which is reflection. But he is equally
responsible for this result. He is responsible if this knowledge is wrong; God may
punish, for instance, somebody who thinks that God consists of three persons.145
He explains that we can know the relationship between the generated act and the
acting subject because of its similarity with a direct act that occurs based on our
states (ahwal), motives (dawa'i) intention (qasd), and will (irada). Therefore, the
subject who produces the cause is also the producer of the effect. When either a
direct or generated act occurs in this way, we can deduce that it is the act of the
subject concerned. Hence, in terms of responsibility there is no difference between a
direct act and a generated act.146
Based on the previous explanations, one might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar,
following Abu cAli and Abu Hashim, considers that our knowledge that we are the
agent of our acts is acquired. This knowledge is acquired after we prove that the act
occurs based on our intention and motive. However, Abu al-Husayn al-Basri
144
.Mughni, ix, 124; Peter, God's Created Speech, 206.
145
Van Ess, "The Existence ofGod" , 68.
146
Mughni, iv, 37-63; Peter, God's Created Speech, 207.
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disagrees with them on this issue. He maintains that this knowledge is immediately
known. Ibn al-Malahimi in this regard prefers Abu al-Husayn's view. Ibn al-
Malahimi argues that man's knowledge that he is the real agent of his act is
immediate knowledge because he knows the ethical value of the act immediately. He
explains that knowledge of the goodness or the evilness of the act is antecedent (farc)
to knowledge that man is the agent of the act, which is precedent (asl). Therefore, it
is inconceivable that one needs to acquire the knowledge of precedent while one
knows the antecedent immediately.147
Another issue that becomes a polemic between cAbd al-Jabbar and the Husayniyya is
the problem of motive (dtfi). Despite their agreement that motive is important in the
application of the act, they disagree on a detailed explanation of motive. Their
disagreement on the concept of motive has a significant effect on their argument of
knowing God. Therefore, it is beneficial to discuss the background of this concept in
the Muctazilites before we examine the disagreement between cAbd al-Jabbar and
Abu al-Husayn al-Basri on this issue.
3.5.2. Motives
According to Wolfson, the theory of motives was introduced in the Muctazilites by
Ibrahim b. Sayyar al-Nazzam (d. 231/845).148 He uses it in reference to the existence
of two motivational forces (khatirani) within man himself. In this regard, he reports
147 Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 131.1 suggest that, in his argument Ibn al-Malahimi applies a similar
principle to cAbd ai-Jabbar's sub-section of indirect knowledge.
148
Wolfson, Philosophy ofkalam, 628. Gimaret considers that the first Muctazilite to apply this theory
was al-Jahiz (d. 255/868). However, 1 believe that Wolfson is correct since al-Nazzam died almost 20
years earlier than al-Jahiz. Cf. Theorie de facte, 34; Madelung, "Late Mutazila", 245.
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"there must be khatirani of which one bids advancing (al-iqdam) and the other bids
desisting (al-kaff), so that one's choice between them maybe a genuine choice."149
This theory, however, was rejected by the Ashcarites in general. Abu al-Qahir al-
Baghdadi (d. 429/1037) in his Usui al-Din considers that the theory of khatir has a
foreign origin and was borrowed by al-Nazzam from the Barahima.150 Al-Baghdadi
clarifies that the Barahima acknowledge the unity of the Creator but reject the
messengers (rusuf) sent by Him. They maintain that the heart of no human is devoid
of khatirani. One of the khatirani is from God, and the other is from shay tan (devil).
Then he argues that al-Nazzam has introduced certain changes in this theory of
khatirani, among them is the view that both the khatir of obedience and disobedience
were created by God in the heart ofman.151
Among the Muctazilites, the theory of khatirani met with various reactions. Abu al-
Hudhayl and some other Muctazilites adopted it, but they made the khatir of
disobedience come from shaytan. Others, like Bishr b. al-Muctamir, however,
rejected them altogether. Bishr argues that he is free to choose his action, and as he
chooses it, is in no need of the khatirani. In addition, he argues that there is no
tradition (hadith) mentions that shaytan had a khatir}52
149
Wolfson, Philosophy of kaiam, 629. Al-Na?zam also maintained that man has no power of free
choice over that for which he has no khatirani in his heart. Cf. al-Ashcari, Maqalat, 239 & 427.
150 The doctrine most persistently attributed to the Barahima is a denial of Prophecy. For a brief
information on this group see, Rahman, F., "Barahima" in EI2, i, 1031.
151 Cf. al-Baghdadi, U?tii al-din, 26-7.
152 Al-Ashcari, Maqalat, 428-429. Cf. Wolfson, Philosophy ofkaiam, 634.
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cAbd al-Jabbar accepts the theory of khatir in general, yet the application of khatir in
his theology is different from that of al-Nazzam.153 The khatir according to al-
Nazzam is a motive that encourages a person to make a decision regarding his act
and is compulsory for every human act.154 However, cAbd al-Jabbar uses the notion
of motives in order to demonstrate that man's acts are produced by himself. Man's
acts are his own since they can be seen to occur in accordance with his own motive
(dtfi) and intention (qasd). However, neither is a necessary condition of the act. cAbd
al-Jabbar in this regard disagrees with al-Nazzam. He does not consider that a motive
is a requirement for action; for he argues that there are acts that do not have a motive,
such as the act of the unaware (sahi) and the sleeper (na'im) who performs some acts
like moving his limbs and breathing without a motive.155
Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, however, opposes cAbd al-Jabbar's view when he considers
that a motive is necessary for the act to occur. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri argument for
this, as presented by Ibn al-Malahimi, was that the capable agent (qadir) is equally
capable of contraries of the act. Since he cannot produce them together, something
additional is necessary for one of them to occur. This additional something is the
motive for one of them or its preponderance (larajjuh) over the motive for the
other.156
153 For further discussion on Naz?am's theory of al-khatir see Wolfson, Philosophy ofkalam, 628-44.
Frank defines al-khatir as "the occurrences to the mind the potentiality of the situation as desirable or
repugnant in terms of specific acts initiated from without, either by God or by Satan. See Frank,
Metaphysics ofCreated Being, 3 1.
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Among the later Muctazilites, al-Na?zam's theory has been adopted by Ibn al-Malahimi
(d.536/1141), when he considers that motive is a necessity in every act. Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi,
Miftamad; cf. al-Ashcari, Maqdlat, 427; Wolfson, Philosophy ofkalam, 628
155
Mughni, vi (i), 196; cf. Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 23-9; Madelung, Late Mu°tazila", 245-8.
156Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 510. Abu al-Husayn's arguments are also summarised by Fakhr al-Din
al-Razi in al-Matalib al-cAliya, 255-256, cf. Madelung, "Late Mu'tazila", 249-50.
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He also rejects cAbd al-Jabbar's examples of the act of a sleeping person (na'im) or
an unconscious (sahi) to prove that motive is unnecessary. He argues that the act of a
sleeper is not without motive even though he may forget it afterwards. This is
indicated by the fact that the sleeper speaks an appropriate response to his dream
experience. His presumption that his dream is real is the motive for his response.
Therefore, when he wakes up and someone tells him, "You said something [in your
sleep], he will say, "That is because I saw something in my dream." Likewise, the
sleeper turns from one side to the other because of the pain resulting from prolonged
resting on the same side, and he breathes because otherwise he would die. If he is
overcome by heavy sleep, he may indeed not recognize his pain, so that it remains
until his awakening. All this proves that whatever he does in his sleep, he does
because of his knowledge of his need for it rather than accidentally and without
motive.157
Based on Abu al-Husayn's view of motives, al-Razi proclaimed that he has proved
the definitive victory of Ashcarite determinism over the Muctazilite doctrine of
human free will.158 Al-Razi's argument, as Madelung points out, is most likely based
on Avicenna's anti-Muctazilite assertion that the human-choosing agent, in contrast
to God, is choosing in the sense of being compelled (al-mukhtar minna mukhtar fi
tnikm mudtarr), since every choice of man requires an internal or external motive to
move it from potentiality to actuality. Therefore, al-Razi argues that Abu al-Husayn's
157 For more arguments on this issue, see Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 510-14.
158
Al-Razi, Matalib, iii, 55-60; Madelung, "Late Muctazila", 245; Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 26-7.
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adoption of the position of the philosophers that act necessarily depend on their
motives, which according to al-Razi, inevitably leads to determinism.159
Gimaret, in his work Theories de I'acte humain, endorses al-Razi's claim of
victory.160 However, a thorough investigation by Madelung indicates that al-Razi's
argument on this issue made him fall into the philosopher's trap, when he ended up
describing God as the ultimate necessitating cause under the guise of a creator. This
view confirmed the philosophers' position that God is the ultimate, uncaused cause
of all causes and effects.161 Abu al-Husayn, however, manages to escape this trap
when he maintains that the creator of this world is a freely choosing agent (fifil
mukhtar).162 cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of action, however, is not included in al-Razi's
determinism since he does not consider that a motive is a condition of an act. So
cAbd al-Jabbar's theory is intact with al-Razi's criticism of Abu al-Husayn's view.
However, cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of action has been rejected by al-Juwayni.163
One might observe that the aim of the discussion of knowledge of action at this level
is to identify the real agent of the acts. By knowing the real agent of certain acts, one
is able to differentiate human's acts from God's acts. This knowledge is vital for
application of the analogical argument to prove the existence of God, His unity, and
His attributes. However, knowledge of the real agent is not enough to prove the
divine justice since knowledge also needs additional attributes (sifat al-za'ida) of the
159 Al-Razi, Matalib, iii, 55-60.
160 Gimaret, Theories de I'acle humain, 34.
161 Madelung, "Late Muctazila", 257
162 Ibn al-Malahimi, MiTtamad, 170.
163 For al-.luwayni's arguments, see his Shamil, 120; Hourani, "Juwayni's Criticism", 161-73;
Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 83-107.
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acts. This additional attribute according to cAbd al-Jabbar is the ethical value of the
act. Therefore, to prove the justice of God, cAbd al-Jabbar needs to develop his
knowledge of action to the next level by adding the ethics of actions.
3.5.3 The Ethics of Action
cAbd al-Jabbar divides the ethical value of action into three main groups: (i) a good
act, (ii) an evil act, and (iii) a permissible act. The main objective of knowing the
ethic of actions according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is to enable the mukallaf to identify
which action he needs to perform or to avoid.164 Hence, he considers that the
obligation (itakljf) includes both action (Jfl) and the omission of action (layafal). On
this issue, Ibn Mattawayh explains:
All actions are similar in deserving praise and reward when they
are performed for certain reasons. Nevertheless, they differ with
respect to omission. Someone who omits certain actions [for the
performance of which one deserves a reward by performing it],
will be punished. Yet, there are certain actions for the omission
of which no punishment is deserved. The first type of action is
obligatory (yvajib) and the second is recommended (nadb). As
for the obligation through the omission of action, they are equal
in deserving reward if they were omitted for certain reasons.
Yet, the significant difference arises when one deserves
punishment for performing one action but not another. Hence,
the former action is bad (qab/fi),]65 while the latter is better
(awla) avoided.166
cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that one can know the ethical value of the act through the
intellect alone. The main criterion that determines which action is obligatory and
which is not is based on praise (madh) and censure (dhamm). Therefore, when one
164 Mughni, xi, 502.
165 Abu al-Husayn reports that, according to Abu Abdallah al-Basri, the people of Iraq (ah! al-clrdq)
divide qabih into forbidden (muharram) and detested (makruh). In all probability, what he means by
ahl al-lraq are the followers of Abu Hanifa. Cf. Abu al-Husayn, Mutamad, 364.
166 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmd (1), 13.
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performs an act that deserves praise, it is good, and if it deserves censure, it is bad.
As for the former, one is obligated to perform it and for the latter to leave it.167
However, not all action according to cAbd al-Jabbar is included in that judgment.
There are two types of action that are excluded from the obligation. The first type is
based on the condition of the actor, and the second is based on the nature of the
action. As for the first type, it is the action that is performed by someone who is
absent-minded (sahf) or he has been forced to do so.168 Although a person performs a
blameworthy act, since he was absent-minded or has been forced to do it, he cannot
be blamed for that action. Whereas the second type is the permitted act (mubah)
where one deserves neither praise nor blame by performing it. Both of these actions
are excluded from obligation.169
3.5.4. God's Acts and Ethics
cAbd al-Jabbar is in agreement with his Muctazilite predecessors, and applies the
ethics of action to human beings and to God. cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the agent in
the seen world (shahid) is responsible when doing his act with intention (qasd) and
motive (dawtfi) and he has not been forced by anyone. Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar
argues that since God does His act based on His will and He does not sleep, His act is
also included in the judgment of ethical value. cAbd al-Jabbar believes that the rules
of action are the same irrespective of whether the agent is seen or unseen (gha'ib).
167 Fakhry, Ethical Theories, 33-4.
168 Abu al-Husayn al-Basri considers that there are four types of people that exempted from taklif,
they are: an absent minded (sahij, a sleeper, an insane and a child, cf. Abu al-Husayn, al-MiTtamad,
364-
169 |bn Mattawayah, Majmd (i), 13.
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Hence, the knowledge of the ethics of action will become the foundation to
determine the value of both humans' and God's acts.170
The Ashcarites, however, disagree with cAbd al-Jabbar's inclusion of God's acts in
ethical judgment. They believe that all God's acts are good irrespective of what the
reason considers. If God punishes the believer and rewards the unbeliever, His acts
are still good. Their main argument is that God is the owner of the universe;
therefore, He is free to do anything He wants. Also, all of us are His creation, so how
can a creation possibly be capable of evaluating its creator?171 The Ashcarites also
argue that if the acts ofGod are included under the rules of action, this will imply the
restriction of His acts by human beings. This implication is unacceptable since it
indicates the limitation of the power of God.172
However, in defending his view, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that to include the acts of
God under the rules of action does not mean to impose the restriction on the acts of
God. Instead, this rule is obtained from God's other attributes such as wise {hakim),
just {cadiP), and perfect {kamil). Therefore, when we say God will not do wrongdoing
{zulm) such as put a righteous person in hell, that was not because we say so but
because that was not compatible with His attributes ofjust and perfect.
Also, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that this does not imply the limitation of the power of
God. cAbd al-Jabbar argues that God is able to put the righteous person in hell, but
He will not do so because that is unjust and incompatible with His attributes of
170 Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 96-107.
171 Al-Baghdadi, U?ul al-din, 25.
172 See al-Razi, Matalib, iii, 289; Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 96.
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perfection (kamal) and merciful (rahmi). The analogy of this matter is a father who
gave a present to his son who behaves properly. This father is capable of hitting his
son, but the father does not do so because that action is unjust as well as unwise.
From previous discussions, we can observe the importance of knowledge of action in
cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on knowing God. Hence, no wonder why cAbd al-Jabbar
considers it the first knowledge that needs to be acquired by every obligated person
(mukallaf). Without knowledge of action, the other types of acquired knowledge will
be baseless. 1 will indicate the application of the knowledge of action in cAbd al-
Jabbar's argument in chapter five. But first, in the next chapter, I will examine the
role of immediate knowledge in developing cAbd al-Jabbar's ground for knowing
God.
Accordingly, in the process of acquiring knowledge one needs proof. cAbd al-Jabbar
divides the proof for the action into (i) that based on revelation (sharc) and (ii) that
based on reason (caql). He maintains that one can only know God's existence
through reason and not via revelation. For revelation is the speech (kalam) of God
and is considered antecedent from His essence (dhatih). The only way to know God
according to cAbd al-Jabbar is through reason (caql)}73 However, to know what one
deserves from reward and punishment in the hereafter, one needs revelation. In
another example, cAbd al-Jabbar mentions that one can know the obligation of
certain acts such as thanking the benefactor (shukr al-mnrfim) through reason. Yet,
to know a correct way of how to thank God, the benefactor, one needs a guide from
173
Here we could observe the role of the second subdivision of immediate knowledge, which is what
resemble a way to it, in his theology. See above, 124.
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revelation. It must be based on certain types of worship that are revealed through the
prophets.174
Conclusion
The mutakallimun in general agree that there are two types of human knowledge,
immediate (daruri) and acquired (iktisabi) knowledge. They agree that immediate
knowledge is created by God in a human's soul while acquired knowledge must be
obtained. However, when explaining this knowledge in detail, disagreements appear.
The main difference between acquired knowledge and immediate knowledge is that
the former is obligatory to obtain it and needs some effort from the obligated person
{mukallaf), whereas the latter occurs directly in humans with little or no effort from
the mukallaf. Therefore, immediate knowledge is not considered part of the
obligation. Perception (idrak) according to cAbd al-Jabbar is the means (tariq) for
immediate knowledge, and reflection is the means for acquired knowledge.
cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of immediate knowledge has been criticized by his
student, Mankdim. However, Ibn al-Malahimi defends cAbd al-Jabbar's definition.
The disagreement among his successors has led to some confusion amid modern
scholars. Therefore, there are diverse views of cAbd al-Jabbar's type of immediate
knowledge. The goal of immediate knowledge according to cAbd al-Jabbar is to
achieve the maturity of the intellect (kamal al-caql), which is the first step for one to
become an obligated person {mukallaf).
174 See Mankdim, Sharh, 70.
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When one becomes an obligated person, one must acquire certain types of
knowledge. cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that the only way of acquiring knowledge is
through reflection. He maintains that every obligated person must know God.
However, since the proof of knowing God is based on the concept of actions, cAbd
al-Jabbar considers that one must acquire knowledge of the action before the
existence of God can be proved. The key argument in proving the existence of God
and His attributes is based on the concept of action.
cAbd al-Jabbar's view of immediate knowledge differs from that of the Ashcarites on
several points. One is the basic ethical principles. cAbd al-Jabbar considers that they
are included in immediate knowledge, but the Ashcarites disagree with him; instead,
they consider the basic ethical principles are acquired knowledge. This disagreement
leads to a significant result in the theology of both the Ashcarites and the
Muctazilites.
In the discussion of the concept of action in acquired knowledge, there is a
disagreement between cAbd al-Jabbar and his student Abu al-Husayn al-Basri. The
latter considers that motive is necessary in every act, but the former disagrees with
this view. Due to this disagreement, both need to follow different arguments in their
proof of knowing God. I will investigate this problem further in the last chapter of
this thesis when discussing the proof of knowing God according to cAbd al-Jabbar.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE OBLIGATION OF KNOWING GOD
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how cAbd al-Jabbar established the grounds
for the obligation of knowing God. To achieve this objective, I will examine, firstly,
cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on the reason that leads human beings to know God,
secondly, his view on the concept of obligation, which includes rational obligation
and man's first obligation. Then, the study will discuss reflection (al-nazar), which is
considered the means to acquire knowledge.
I will also study cAbd al-Jabbar's view on ethical realism and its implication for his
concept of taklrf, which leads to rational obligation (taklif aqli). At this point, I will
indicate that although the rational obligation is consistent with cAbd al-Jabbar's
theory of knowledge, it is inconsistent with the principle of divine justice that is
defended by the Muctazilites.
During my discussion in this chapter, I will also compare cAbd al-Jabbar's view with
those of the late Muctazilites and the Ashcarites. I use the former to see their
responses to his view, and the latter to analyze the differences and the root of their
disagreement. I will also indicate how cAbd al-Jabbar applies his immediate and
acquired knowledge to establish the grounds for the obligation of knowing God.
First, however, I will examine cAbd al-Jabbar's view on the first thing that occurs in
an obligated person (mukallaf) after he achieves intellectual maturity (kamal al-aql).
4.1 Fear (al-Khawf)
Based on our discussion of the maturity of the intellect in the previous chapter, the
most significant characteristic of a person who achieves maturity of intellect is his
ability to use the intellect in a proper way. In his mind, there is a sum of immediate
knowledge that is created by God. Based on this knowledge, he is able to respond to
the outside world and his own psychological situation in a reasonable way.
According to cAbd al-Jabbar, fear (khawf) is one of the earliest psychological
experiences for a person who has obtained maturity of intellect. This fear creates
disturbance (idtirab) and confusion in a person's soul. Therefore, the individual
needs to reflect (nazar) in order to resolve his confusion and achieve tranquillity of
the soul. This fear, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, will become a motivation for human
beings to look for truth in their religion. He maintains that the elimination of this fear
is compulsory, since it is a type of physiological harm (darar al-nafsanf). Explaining
the nature of fear, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
Know that there is no significant difference between scholars
regarding the obligation to reflect (nazar) on religious and
worldly matters. The [only] reason is that an obligated person
experiences a terror of not reflecting. Therefore, in order to
eliminate this fear one needs to reflect.'
In explaining the cause of this fear, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
That fear must be based on harm related to religious punishments
or condemnation by others [compos mentis persons]. Since this
fear is not developed in a compos mentis person as a result of an
individual habit (cada) that he grows up with, thus, there must be
signs that create fear in the person. This fear, therefore, develops




warning by a preacher (tanbih al-dif/) and the divine motive
(khatir).2
Therefore, fear is not something habitual, and neither can it be trained, but it appears
because of certain signs. There are several signs (imarat) or causes that generate the
sense of fear in the human soul.3 The first cause of fear, according to cAbd al-Jabbar,
is an individual's introspection. This can be developed as follows: (i) based on direct
knowledge (film badihi), a person can know his existence and his state of self, such
as thinking and believing; (ii) by using the perceptible knowledge gained from the
five senses, the individual will be able to know that he has been bestowed with grace
(,nfma) from a benefactor (murfim). The first of these graces, according to cAbd al-
Jabbar, is his existence (wujudihi).4 On this, he writes:
Then if it is asked: What is the first grace bestowed upon you by
God? Say to him: It is something that I cannot account for. In
general, however, He created me as a living being, and provided
me with power and physical means (a/a). He perfected my
creation and provided me with desire and enables me with
various kinds of pleasures. Then He issued commands and
prohibitions in order for me to reach the level of reward and
enter paradise. Therefore, it is obligatory for me to prove His
existence and to know Him so that I can worship Him, thank
Him and follow His pleasure and avoid disobedience towards
Him.5
After receiving grace, a compos mentis person (caqil) will realize that he needs to
thank the benefactor6 who provides that grace for him. Without knowledge of the
benefactor, he will be unable to thank Him. Therefore, he needs to know Him. Since
a person does not know God immediately (darun), he needs to reflect in order to
2
Mughni, xii, 386-7.
3 In order to investigate the cause of fear, cAbd al-Jabbar uses, firstly, the introspection into one's self,
based on direct knowledge; and, secondly, the indirect knowledge perceived through the senses.
4
Mughni, xi, 73; Mankdim, Sharh, 83.
5 Usui al-khamsa, 79.
6
For more on the idea of thanking the benefactor, see Reinhart, Before Revelation, 107-23.
159
know who this benefactor is.7 Only by knowing the benefactor can one thank Him,
follow His commands and avoid His prohibitions. However, without knowing God,
this will not be possible. Even worse, the individual may unintentionally do
something that causes His anger. Therefore, the person's introspection can create the
fear in the human soul and the necessity of knowing God.8
The second cause of fear is that of external factors. cAbd al-Jabbar explains that if a
person hears a theological discussion and encounters warnings of punishment in the
afterlife for unbelievers and wrongdoers, he will experience fear (khawf).9
Explaining this, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
If he [a virtual opponent] asks: What is the proof that it is
obligatory upon a compos mentis ('aqil) to reflect in order to
know God? Say to him: Because when one hears disputes
among people on the sectarian (madhahib) [issues], their
accusation of infidelity upon one another and their threats to one
another, one might ponder that it is inconceivable that all of
these sects are true, since they are contradicting each other. For
instance one says that the world is eternal and the other say it is
temporal, also some say that God can be seen (yura) and other
denies it. It is also inconceivable that all these sects false since
the truth cannot be outside of it. For it is impossible to believe
that the world is neither eternal nor temporal. Hence, the truth
must be within these disputes. When a person was threatened as
someone says to him: If you are not thinking to know the truth,
you cannot guarantee that you are excluded from those liars
(.mubtil) and that will lead you with your current belief to the
hellfire permanently and great harm (al-madar al-azima). Thus
he must be terrified (yakhaf) and know with his intellect (yacraf
bi caqlih) that he needs to safeguard from what he fears. For that
reason, he needs to think and reflect.10
7
Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif, 18.
8 See Usui al-khamsa, 79.
9
Shihadeh, "The Existence of God", 199.
10
Mukhtasar, 201. In Sharh, Mankdim also reports a similar cause "Possibly because of his social
relation with people (ikhtilatih bi al-nas), when he hears their disagreements on religious matters and
their accusations of one another with heresy (tadhl), or with infidelity (takfir). One of them will say to
each other that "the truth is in my side and you are in the wrong side that will lead to destruction
{halak)." At this stage a rational person will be afraid that if he does not reflect [on these matters] he
will end up in the predicament (warfa) and destruction. Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 68
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Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar explains that the existence of a call from a preacher {df1)
alone will not necessitate the sense of fear. Instead a person must think about it and
relate it with good (muhsanat)and evil things (muqbihat) he already knows in his
mind; he will also relate this as how blame occurs for the evil and the distress
suffered by the heart because of the blame. When that occurs, a person will
experience the fear of not reflecting. The sense of fear will increase if an individual
hears a call from the preacher, then thinks about it and does so constantly (ishtadda
fikruh f'iha).'1
Ibn al-Malahimi mentions a similar argument in his book and considers that the
majority of people experience fear due to this factor. However, he explains that fear
sometimes occurs in other ways, such as when one reads a book that mentions the
harm of omitting reflection (tark al-nazar). He explains that establishing the fear in
one's soul (mukhawwif) is a real duty of the prophets, and their duties are continued
by the scholars (culama*) through advice (tadhkir) books or sermons (tadris).12
Therefore, fear is either caused by one's introspection that leads to the need of
thanking the benefactor or by external factors that lead to the fear of external
punishment. Both will lead the mukallaf to the conclusion that it is harmful (darar)
for him not to reflect on these matters. The realization of this harm eventually creates
the fear in the mukallaf. This is a type of psychological harm that must be rejected.
Since the obligation of rejecting the harm is immediate knowledge, an obligated
"
Mughni, xii, 388.
12 Different from cAbd al-Jabbar, Ibn al-Malahimi considers that all the causes of fear are the fearful
thought (khatir al-mukhawwij), cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 80.
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person (mukallaf) needs to reject the harm from his self. Furthermore, since
reflecting to know God is the only way to avoid harm and destruction, it is
incumbent upon the individual to do so.13
However, one might ask what happens if neither introspection nor external factors
are present; or, what if they do but do not cause fear? Does this imply that one does
not have to reflect in order to know God? Responding to this question, cAbd al-
Jabbar says that if neither factors appear to generate the fear in the mukallaf, God
will, by necessity producing a divine thought (khatir) to establish the eschatological
fear in the mukallaf. This khatir, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, will occur in one's
mind before or at the time one attains the maturity of the intellect.14
Therefore, the third cause of fear is divine inspiration {khatir), created by God in the
human mind. This khatir is a hidden speech, like that of the soul, but this speech is
not the act of the human subject in whose soul it exists; rather, it is the act of God
Himself.15 Ibn al-Malahimi explains that this factor is especially important for those
who live on a high mountain or far from other people. Whenever one achieves
maturity of the intellect and the condition of taklrf is fulfilled, God will create the
sense of fear in one's mind, which creates a fear of omitting reflection and
knowledge {tark al-nazar wa al-macrifa), until one realizes the obligation (wujub al-
nazar). Ibn al-Malahimi explains that the compos mentis person faqil) eliminates his
fear through reflection, for he knows that only with reflection and observation can he
13 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif, 17.
14




know something that was unknown to him before. Therefore, in order to know God,
he must reflect.16
Based on these explanations, one might observe that no one is exempted from the
obligation to reflect in order to know God. The fear will certainly occur in one's soul,
caused by one's own introspection, external factors or khatir. Since the theory of
khatir becomes the ground for establishing the rational obligation in his theology,
cAbd al-Jabbar pays special attention to this in the Mughni chapter 12. Hence, in the
next section, 1 will examine his theory of khatir.
4.2. Divine Notion (al-Khatir)
The theory of khatir is another common Arabic word that plays a significant role in
cAbd al-Jabbar's theological epistemology as a technical term. In a non-technical
sense, khatir is a thought that occurs in the mind in relation to something. Some
scholars translate khatir, based on cAbd al-Jabbar's use of the term in his theology as
a "warning"17 or "warner"18. However, as K. Ghaneabassiri rightly observes, by
doing so, they obscure its significance for the way in which cAbd al-Jabbar develops
his theology of internal human experience.19
16
Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 80.
17
Peters, God's Created Speech, 63-5.
18
Reinhart, Before Revelation, 35.
19
Ghaneabassiri, "Epistemological Foundation", 83. However, Ghaneabassiri fails to elaborate on
what he really means by that.
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I suggest that translating khatir as warning, warner or threat; will also obscure the
theory of khatir in Muctazilite theology. Ibrahim al-Nazzam, the first Muctazilite20 to
speak about the theory of khatir, reportedly said: "there must be khatirani of which
one bids proceed (al-iqdam) and the other bids cease (al-kaff), so that one's choice
between them may be a genuine choice."21 Khatir, based on al-Nazzam's
interpretation, is nearer to a motive. Therefore, based on this explanation, translating
khatir as a warning does not fit with its origin in the theology of the Muctazilites.22
cAbd al-Jabbar considers that khatir, similar to immediate knowledge, occurs in
humans as an act of God; therefore, he differentiates it from other internal
experiences such as 'talk within self (hadlth al-nafs),23 which is the act of the
humans themselves, and 'diabolical whispering' (waswas), which is the act of genies
or devils.24 By distinguishing between khatir and waswas, cAbd al-Jabbar makes it
clear that the former only comes from God and not from the devil (shaytan).
Therefore, 1 prefer translating khatir as 'divine notion'.
Like immediate knowledge, there is no doubt of the existence of khatir. Yet, unlike
immediate knowledge, we need to reflect on it in order to distinguish it from other
internal experiences. The purpose of the khatir is to warn us mainly for the sake of
avoiding the harm from one's self (daf al-darar can nafsih). The khatir points to the
20 Al-Nazzam uses it by referring to the existence of two motives forces (khatirani) created by God
within man himself, cf. al-Ashcari, Maqalat al-lslamiyyin, 427. Based on this report I suggest that
Gimaret was mistaken when he considers that the notion of motive was first introduced in Muctazilites
by al-Jahiz, cf. Gimaret, Theories de Tacte humain, 34; Madelung, "The Late Mutazila", 245.
21 He also maintained that man has no power of free choice over that for which he has no khatirani in
his heart. Cf. al-Ashcari, Maqalat al-lslamiyyin 239; Wolfson, Philosophy ofkalam, 628.
22 In this case, Ibn al-Malahimi is right when he specifies the khatir in the case of creating the fear in
one's soul as fearful thought (khatir al-mukhawwif).Cf. lbn al-Malahimi, al-Muctamad, 80.
23
For further discussion on hadlth al-nafs, see van Ess, Die Erkennlnislehre, 240-1.
24 cAbd al-Jabbar, Mughni, xii, 412.
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harm that may come to us from something. In religious terms, the khatir warns us of
the divine blame and punishment that our wrongdoing will earn us both in this world
and the hereafter. By itself, the khatir motivates (dtfi) us to look for God and to act
ethically and fulfil our religious duty.25 In this way, the khatir secures man's
knowledge that reflection is his duty; hence, he will reflect in order to know his
creator, who will also be the punisher in the hereafter.26
The role of khatir in cAbd al-Jabbar's theology is considered as a proof (hujja) from
God against human beings. By using this khatir, he will be able to establish that all
human beings who achieve maturity of the intellect will know the obligation of
reflecting. There is no exception on this matter, even if one lives far away from other
people on a high mountain or a remote island, where the teaching of Prophet is
unreachable. Based on this theory, cAbd al-Jabbar manages to develop his concept of
rational obligation.
However, what if someone says that not everyone experiences this fear as is claimed,
and the mutakallimun disagree on its reality?27 In this case, the claim that one can
experience the fear immediately is invalid. Responding to the first part of this
criticism, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that every rational person experiences the fear.
He argues that when fear exists in a person, he will be aware of that feeling. His
knowledge of his psychological situation is immediate (daruri) knowledge, created
by God in human's selves. A person's knowledge of this is similar to his knowledge
of his other psychological situations such as believing (miftaqid), willing (mur 'id)
25 Cf. Ghaneabassiri, "Epistemological Foundation", 83-4.
26
Mughni, xii, 387; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 64.
27
For the Ashcarites' arguments against the theory of Khatir, see al-Juwayni, Sham it, 116-9.
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and displeasing (karih).2S Therefore, Ibn al-Malahimi explains that this knowledge
needs no proof.29
Responding to the second part of the criticism, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the
disagreement about the characteristics (sifa) of fear cannot deny the fact that one's
experience of it is obvious. For instance the denials of accidents (cfrad), although
they disagree on the perceptible accidents (arad) themselves, the knowledge of them
(perceptible accidents) is obvious. Also people's disagreement on volition (irada)
cannot deny a person's knowledge that he is willing (murid).30
For that reason, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that a person immediately (bi idtirar)
knows that he is afraid. Those who deny the fear will not affect his ability to
distinguish between his state of fear and no fear.31 cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that
every rational person will experience the fear and know its existence without
exception. Therefore, it is obligatory for every person to get rid of that fear. This
obligation is what cAbd al-Jabbar called the rational obligation (taklrf caqli).
However, before I discuss his rational obligation further, it is worthwhile to briefly
examine his concept of obligation in general.
28
Even, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that knowledge of oneself about his fear is sometimes more obvious
since it occurs due to clear causes (asbab wadiha), such as one's fear caused by a meeting with a lion
[in the forest]. Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 73.






4.3. The Concept of Obligation
The founder of the Bahshamiyya, Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i, reportedly defined taklrf
in his work, cAskariyyaP2 as "command (amr) and obligation (ilzam) for something
that will imply discomfort (kulfa) and hardship (mashaqqa) for the one who was
commanded to do so (ma'mur bih). In his other work Naqdal-badal, Abu Hashim
defines it as "volition (irada) of certain acts towards mukallaf in which there is
discomfort and hardship."33 The terms used by Abu Hashim in his definitions of
taklrf, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, require the existence of two sides of taklif: the
first is God, as the producer of a command; and the second is human beings, as the
addressees. This means that without one of them there will be no obligation.
However, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the definitions presented by Abu Hashim are
not comprehensive enough to cover his interpretation of the concept of taklrf?A
Therefore, he defines taklrf as "notifying {flam) other of doing or not doing
something for the benefit (nafa) or eliminate the harm {darar), which come up with
hardship (imashaqqa)33 [but] not in the level of compulsion (///'a')."36 He considers
that notification {flam) is the foundation of taklff. One who is able to know that
certain acts are obligatory or prohibited will be considered an obligated person
32
Possibly some answers to the question posted from cAskar-Mukarram.
33
Mughni, xi, 293; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (1), 11.
34 °Abd al-Jabbar discuss the concept of taktlfat length in the part eleventh of the Mughni.
35
According to cAbd al-Jabbar, although mashaqqa is part of pain and suffering, in taktf it is good.
He argues that involving in temporal and minor hardship in order to gain an enormous benefit is
acceptable. Therefore, he maintains that although there are difficulty and hardship in taklif, it is still
good because human can achieve a great reward that can not be achieved without taklif. Cf. Mughni,
xi, 134.
36
Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (1), 11; Mankdim, Sharh, 510.
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{mukallaf). This notification occurs either through the creation of knowledge within
humans by God, that is, immediate knowledge, or through proof.
One might observe that the difference between cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of taklrf
and that of Abu Hashim is that the former does not consider the production of the
command to be necessary. cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that notification {flam) is
enough for one to be an obligated person {mukallaf). Therefore, even if one does not
receive any command from God, but knows that certain acts are good and others are
bad, one is considered a mukallaf therefore, one must perform the good acts and
avoid the bad ones. Meanwhile, Abu HashinTs definition, which includes the words
command {amr) and volition {irada), implies the existence of God as a producer of
the command. This means that the obligation occurs only after the production of a
command or volition from God. This view does not parallel cAbd al-Jabbar's opinion
on taklif. Instead, it supports the view of the Ashcarites, who claim that the taklrf
only starts after the advent of a revelation.
In this case, the Ashcarites believe that good and evil can only be known through
revelation; therefore, they believe that taklrf only occurs after the coming of
revelation. Before this, there is no obligation since there is no good and evil.
Therefore, we observe that al-Baghdadi defines taklrf as "addressing {tawajjuh) the
speech with command and prohibition to the addressee."38 The foundation of taklrf,
according to the Ashcarites, is command {amr) and prohibition {nahy). They claim
37 What known through immediate knowledge will be the foundation for rational obligation (taklrf
caqh) and what known through proofs will be the foundation for religious obligation (taklif sharcf).
Cf. Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (1), 11.
38
Al-Baghdadi, Usui at-din, 207.
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that the obligation will only start after the arrival of the revelation. Hence, one might
observe that the Ashcarites' foundation of takl 'if is based on the existence of two
sides; the first side produces the command and the other receives it. The first side is
God and the second is human beings.
cAbd a-Jabbar's definition of taklf was also not well accepted among the late
Muctazilites. Ibn al-Malahimi, for instance, defines taklif as "issuing (bcfth) some
hardship from action or omission (tark)". He explains that God issues what He
creates in the intellect through obligations, recommendations and omitting evils, as
well as in the revelation from action or omission.39 His foundation of taklif is similar
to Abu Hashim's and the Ashcarites' views that it requires two parties, God and man.
God is the one who issues the hardship (mashaqqa) and produces a command or will,
and man is the one who receives that hardship, command or will. However, as we
observe from his definition of taklrfabove, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that notification
(flam) is enough for one to be an obligated person (mukallaf). He considers that if
one knows the basic ethical principles through immediate knowledge but not
receiving any command from God, one is still considered a mukallaf.40
From this contention, one might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar's concept of taklif is
closely related with his theory of knowledge. In his discussion of the type of
knowledge cAbd al-Jabbar considers that one can know the basic ethical principles
through immediate knowledge. Based on these principles, one can know the ethical
39 Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 201.
40 Cf. Mughni, xi, 293-5.
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value of almost every act through rational reflection (nazar).41 Accordingly,
knowledge of ethical principles is a foundation for taklrf. Therefore, since one
already knows this knowledge through reflection prior to the revelation, this implies
the possibility of obligation before or without revelation. In this regard cAbd al-
Jabbar divides obligation into two types: (i) rational obligation {taklrf caqltf2\ and
(ii) revealed obligation {taklrfsharci). Taklrfcaqli\s, the obligation that can be known
through the intellect, such as thanking the benefactor {shukr al-mun im), knowing
God {macrifa Allah). Meanwhile, taklrfshar7 is the obligation that is known through
the revelation, such as five times daily prayer, fasting in the month of Ramadan and
pilgrimage to Mecca.43
From here, one might observe that knowing God is included in the rational
obligation, which does not depend on revelation, but only reason. Therefore,
according to cAbd al-Jabbar, knowing God is obligatory for every compos mentis
person (caqil). Hence, based on this division, he believes that every human being will
be considered an obligated person even if he does not receive any revealed teaching.
cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that since some might not receive the revelation, they will
be excused from taklifshar i, but nobody is exempted from rational obligation {taklrf
caqli).
Among the early Muctazilites, Abu al-Hudhayl is one of the proponents of takllf
caqli. However, his grounds for taklrfare different from that of cAbd al-Jabbar. Like
41
Mughni, xii, 66. There are several exceptions where the goodness of the acts is unknown to reason
such as slaughtering animal for food.
42 Frank names it as "natural taklif\ see his "Fundamental Assumptions", 14.
43 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmf (2), 14.
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cAbd al-Jabbar, AbO al-Hudhayl bases his taklrf caqli on immediate knowledge;
unlike cAbd al-Jabbar, who bases his taklif on the immediacy of ethical principle,
Abu al-Hudhayl bases it on the immediacy of knowing God (marifa Allah). He
maintains that the existence of God is known immediately in the sense that
everybody has it and can by no means get rid of it.44 Therefore, if one dies as an
unbeliever, the innate knowledge of God serves at the same time as a justification for
God to punish everybody who does not take His revelation seriously. Consequently,
he concludes that one is obliged to reflect on God's nature and to ask for His
commandments because one knows about His existence from the beginning.45
cAbd al-Jabbar, however, maintains that the foundation of taklrf caqli is the
immediate nature of the ethical principles. He believes that one can know the basic
ethical principles immediately (daruri), such as that wrongdoing (zulm) is bad and
justice is good. When one knows this, one will perform good acts and avoid bad
ones. Based on this immediate knowledge, one establishes a value system that is
compulsory (wajib), prohibited (haram), displease (makruh), permissible (ja'iz) and
recommended (sunna). This system of values can be obtained through the process of
reflection (nazar).
From this contention, we can conclude that both cAbd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Hudhayl
accept rational obligation. For cAbd al-Jabbar, the foundation of this is the
immediacy of ethical principles, while for Abu al-Hudhayl the foundation is the
immediacy of knowing God. Knowing God and ethical principles are the two
44
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 32; cf. Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 66.
45 Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 67.
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foundations of the Muctazilites in establishing rational obligation. Both are absent in
the list of immediate knowledge among the Ashcarites. Therefore, they vehemently
reject the idea of rational obligation.
4.4. Rational Obligation
In his effort to develop the concept of rational obligation, cAbd al-Jabbar defines
theological terms based on reason alone. In this section, I will examine his views on
the reality of the terms used in rational obligation. This study is closely related with
the first type of acquired knowledge, the ethics of actions {ahkam al-afal).
Therefore, I will study cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of some of the theological terms
such as compulsory, prohibited, good, evil and permissible. I will start this
discussion, following cAbd al-Jabbar's method in the Mughni, with evil (qabih).A6
This method is significant in cAbd al-Jabbar's ethical theory, since blame (dhamm) is
the main criterion that is mentioned in all the definitions of good and evil.
Accordingly, cAbd al-Jabbar defines an evil act as "an act which an able subject
when he does it, in some aspects deserves blame.47 Meanwhile, good (hasan) is what
happens in a certain way so that an individual, by doing it, if he knows it, does not
deserve blame for it in certain aspects.48 cAbd al-Jabbar applies the restriction "in
some aspects" (cala wajh) because there are two exceptions to the rule, where the
agent of an evil act does not deserve blame. First, this occurs when the individual
does not know and cannot know that the act is evil; this is the case with young
46 A similar method was also follows by Hourani in his study of cAbd al-Jabbar's Ethics. For his
reason on this see his, Islamic Rationalism, 48-9.
4
Mughni, vi (1),26; Mankdim, Sharh, 41. Cf. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 50; Peters, God's
Created Speech, 86.
48
Mughni, vi (1), 31; cUthman, Nagariyya al-takllf, 447-8; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 85.
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children, animals and lunatics. Second, this occurs when, besides a smaller evil, a
larger good is performed, and consequently the praise dominates the blame. Yet, in
both cases, cAbd al-Jabbar emphasizes that the acts remain evil but the agent does
not deserve blame.49
The examples of evil are: wrongdoing (zulm), uselessness (''abath),50 lying (kidhb),
ingratitude for a favour (kufr al-nfma), ignorance (jahl), willing evil (iradat al-
qabih), commanding evil (amr bi-al-qablh), and imposing unattainable duties (taklif
ma layutaq).5]
Abu al-Husayn, however, defines good and evil differently from cAbd al-Jabbar
when he defines evil as, "what is not for the one whom is capable of doing it and
knowing its evilness to do." In this regard, he rejects the definition of evil as "what
deserves blame from doing it." He argues that if evilness occurs in a person who
already deserves praise {madh) more than blame, this praise will prevent him from
deserving the blame for that evilness.52
His argument, however, does not repudiate cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of evil, since
the latter includes the exception of "in certain aspects" in his definition. Abu al-
Husayn's example is mentioned by cAbd al-Jabbar when he says that if a smaller evil
was performed beside a larger good, it is not blameworthy because praise dominates
the blame. Abu al-Husayn also defines good as "what for the one who is capable of
49
Mankdim, Sharh, 41; Peters, God's Created Speech, 87.
50 For cAbd al-Jabbar's view on the uselessness see O. Leaman, "Concept of Uselessness", 129-131.
51 Cf. Mughni, vi (i) 61-9; Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 69-70; Peters, God's Created Speech, 88.
52 Abu al-Husayn, Miitamad, 368.
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doing it and possible to know its situation to do it". Similar to cAbd al-Jabbar, he also
considers that the acts of an absent minded person (sahij, a sleeper, an insane person
and a child are exempted from religious obligation (/taklif)P
A permissible (mubah) act, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is an act where the doer
deserves neither praise nor blame. It is also similar for those who omit it.54 He also
defines nadb (recommended) as an act where the doer deserves praise, but one who
omits it does not deserve blame.55
An obligatory (wajib) act, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is such that the agent of this
act deserves praise, and the one who omits it deserves blame. This kind of act occurs
in three forms:56 (i) wajib mudayyaq: the concrete act concerned has to be performed.
The example is giving back a deposit and the reflection generating knowledge about
God;57 (ii) wajib mukhayyarfh (muwassf'): the subject can make a choice between
several acts and perform another act instead of the act concerned. For example, if one
has to pay back a debt, one can choose the pieces of money with which one pays it
back; (iii) furud al-kifaya\ another person can perform the act in the place of the
subject concerned. For example, the duty ofMuslim community to defend their land
can be delegated to the army.58
53 Abu al-Husayn, Mutamad, 366.
54 Cf. Mughni; vi (i), 31-2; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 86.
55 See Mughni, vi (i), 37-42. Peters, God's Created Speech, 86.
56
Mughni, vi (i), 43.
57 See Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (1), 231; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 87.
58 Cf. Mughni, vi (i), 43, Sharh\2\ Peters, God's Created Speech, 86.
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cAbd al-Jabbar defines uselessness (cabath) as every act that the acting subject
performs without a proportional recompense. In this case, he insists that uselessness
is evil just as wrongdoing is evil.59 He then defines benefit (naf) as pleasure
(ladhdha), happiness or what leads to one or both of these things. He believes that
pleasure is based on perception; it is a sensual feeling of well being. On the other
hand, happiness (surur) is mental and based on the imagination of these pleasant
things. Repulsion of harm (daf al-darar) is also a benefit because it leads to
happiness.60
By defining all these terms based on praise and blame, happiness and suffering, cAbd
al-Jabbar does not depend on the revelation to know them. Hence, he believes that
all this knowledge can be known even before the coming of revelation. Based on this
idea, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that rational obligation is possible. Therefore,
according to cAbd al-Jabbar, ahl al-fatra, who live between the times of prophets,
and do not receive any revealed teaching, are still not considered free from
obligation. He believes that they must at least fulfill the rational obligation, such as
reflection to know God, His oneness {tawhid) and justice (cadl).6]
4.5. The Exemption of Obligation
Based on the previous discussion, we observed that cAbd al-Jabbar insists that every
compos mentis person (caqil) is an obligated person since he knows the basic ethical
59 See Mughni, xi, 64; vi (i) 61; Sharh, 514, Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 75-6. Peters, God's
Created Speech, 88-90.
60
Mughni, xiv, 34; Sharh, 80. cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 90.
61
Nevertheless, the revealed obligation {taklifsharci) is exempted from them since they do not receive
any of the teaching of the prophets.
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principles immediately. However, Ibn al-Malahimi reports that in his work, Tcfliq,62
cAbd al-Jabbar exempts some people from taklrf, such as old men (shuyukh) who live
in the mountains, for whom the obligation of reflection (wujub al-nazar) does not
come to their mind. Some of them are even less mature than children. Therefore, he
argues that if children are not obligated because of the immaturity of their intellect,
the same applies to an adult who has not achieved maturity of the intellect. In this
case, he advises that it is recommended for us to tell them about the testimony
(shahada) of faith and declare the truth ifwe know its validity.63
The example previously mentioned is for the case of the ahl al-fatraM who does not
achieve the maturity of the intellect. However, one might ask about ahl al-fatra who
does achieve the maturity of the intellect. If they know the obligation of the
reflection (nazar) in order to know God, but are unable to know a true God because
of various reasons, as a result, they worship other gods such as idols, trees or
animals. Can these people go to paradise on the pretext that they have already
fulfilled the rational obligation by reflecting, or not?
The problem ofAhl al-fatra can be analyzed into several situations:
1 - Ahl al-fatra who does not reflect;
2- Ahl al-fatra who reflects but is unable to know the existence of God and His
attributes;
62 Most likely this is Tcfliq al-Baghdddlyyat since it is the only cAbd al-Jabbar's book that uses the
word tcfliq in the title.
63 Cf. ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 63.
64 Ahl al-fatra are those who live between the periods of the prophets. Or those who do not received
the teaching of the prophet.
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3- Ahl al-fatra who reflects and believes in the existence of God but does not
perform prayer, fasting or any type of worship due to the absence of
knowledge of these actions;
4- Ahl al-fatra who reflects and believes in the existence of God but undertakes
false mediation (wasila) in order to worship Him.
Based on cAbd al-Jabbar's concept of taklrf, I posit that the first Ahl al-fatra will be
punished if he has already achieved the maturity of the intellect; otherwise he will
not, because without the maturity of the intellect one cannot be considered an
obligated person.65 As for the second Ahl al-fatra, who has already fulfilled the first
obligation by reflection but fails in his effort to know God, cAbd al-Jabbar's view on
this is absurd. He considers that based on reason alone, those who do good acts and
avoid evil ones but do not know God can obtain salvation and go to paradise even
without knowing God. However, based on the revelation, they are considered guilty;
therefore they will be punished.66 Thus, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that those who
deny the existence of God or characterize Him in ways He does not deserve are
considered infidels (kafir).67
For the third Ahl al-fatra will probably not be punished but if God rewards him with
paradise, this will undermine the pillars of religion such as obligatory prayer, which
is consider a sign that differentiates between the believer and the infidel. As for the
fourth Ahl al-fatra, he fulfills the rational obligation by reflecting and knows the
existence of God. However, his decision to take an intermediate occurs out of
65 Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 63.
66 Ibn Mattawayh, MajmCf, (2), 15.
67 See Mankdim, Sharh, 125.
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ignorance. If he knows from the teaching of the Prophet that what he did is wrong,
he surely will abandon it. However, he does not know that this is wrong since he has
not received the revelation.
In these cases, if cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that the Ahl al-fatra who believes in the
existence of God after reflecting but takes a wrong intermediate (wasila) such as an
idol, or someone who does not properly worship Him, will be punished, this claim
will be contradicted by the principle of divine justice, as God has not sent any
revelation to him directly or through messengers to inform him that what he did is
wrong. However, to say that he will obtain salvation and go to paradise implies that
polytheism (shirk), the biggest sin in Islam, can bring one to paradise.
Therefore, as far as divine justice is concerned, his division of obligation into reason
and revelation implies that cAbd al-Jabbar accepts that those who do not receive any
revealed teaching (Ahl al-fatra) will not be punished. For one cannot perform true
worship such as prayer, fasting and hajj without the revelation from God, whether
directly or through a messenger. Also, those who worship idols after their reflection
cannot be blamed for that if they did not receive any revealed knowledge.
In his epistemology, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that, through reason, the individual is
capable of knowing the existence of God, good and evil, and the obligation of
thanking the benefactor; however, the knowledge of how to thank the benefactor,
that is, the details of worship, is not included within the scope of intellectual
capacity. Reason alone will not be able to determine exact methods of worship such
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as how to pray, the amount of rakcfa in prayer and its timing. This knowledge can
only be obtained after revelation.68
Therefore, I suggest that the Ashcarites' view on this issue is more plausible when
they say that rewards and punishments will only occur after the coming of
revelation. Through revelation, one will know a complete obligation. The obligation
that is based on reason alone is incomplete because it only deals with the theoretical
aspect. Since Islam is not a religion that deals only with belief ('"aqlda) and
theoretical aspects, but also engages in a practical aspect that is related with laws
(sharfa) and ethics (akhlaq), rational obligation alone is problematic.
The Ashcarites argue that the command of God (camr) from the revelation plays a
vital role in determining rewards and punishments. Without the command, there will
be no measurement to evaluate the acts of human beings. On this subject, al-
Baghdadi writes:
Reward is based on obedience. Obedience is in agreement with
the command (amr). Meanwhile the punishment (ciqab) is based
on disobedience. Disobedience is in agreement with prohibition
(nahy) and objection of the command (amr).69
On top of this, the idea of rational obligation seems to contradict the teaching of the
Qur'an. In the Qur'an, God says: "We never punish until We have sent a
messenger." 0 This verse clearly indicates that God will not punish human beings
until after He has sent them a prophet who brings the revelation from God. Hence,
68 The story of Hayy b. Yaqzan is a good example to see the limit of human intellect. Although Hayy
manages to know God and His attributes through his reflection but he unable to know the prayer,
alms, fasting and pilgrimage. He only knew that knowledge through Asal who know it from the
teaching of the prophet. Cf. Ibn fufayl, Hayy b. Yaq?5n, 145.
69




punishments as well as the obligation only occur after the revelation and not before
it.71 Also, the reports of al-Shahrastani (d. 548/1153) and al-Khayyat (d. 311/816)
indicate that the idea of rational obligation was introduced only in the second/eighth
century by Jahm b. Safwan (d. 128/745).72 Hence, this idea is considered late, and
isolated from the general teaching of Islam, due to the absence ofQur'anic support.
However, cAbd al-Jabbar insists that, since human beings are capable of knowing the
basic ethical principle immediately, they must be obligated to perform certain acts
that are consistent with this ethical theory. So, even if the teaching of the Prophet is
unknown to some people for various reasons, they still need to perform certain
obligations based on their immediate knowledge of the basic ethical principle.
Therefore, in the next section, I will examine cAbd al-Jabbar's view on what is
man's first obligation.
4.6. Man's First Obligation
The question of what is man's first obligation has become one of the disputes among
classical theologians. Dealing with this question, cAbd al-Jabbar divides the
obligation into two levels, first at a general level where he answers the question by
saying that every obligated person needs to know religious principles (usul al-din).
These principles are: i) the unity of God (al-tawhid), ii) divine justice (al-cadl), iii)
promise and threat (al-wacd wa al-wacid), iv) the intermediate position between two
positions (manzila bayn manzilatayn), and v) commanding the good and prohibiting
the evil (al-amr bi al-macruf wa al-nahy can al-munkar). In this hierarchy,
71 cAbd al-Jabbar however, tries to interpret this verse according to his theological perspective when
he writes that the meaning of "rasuT in this verse is reason ('ag/).
72 Cf. al-Shahrastani, Milal, i, 1 15; al-Khayyat, IntisSr, 232.
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knowledge of the unity of God is the first knowledge that every obligated person
must know.
However, at the second level, where a specific action needs to be identified, cAbd al-
Jabbar considers that the first duty of every obligated person is the reflection that
leads to the knowledge of God (al-nazar al-mu'addi ila mcfrifa Allah)13 or
"reflection on the way to knowing God" (al-nazarfi tariq marifa Allah tdala).14
cAbd al-Jabbar mentions "the way to knowing God," because the first thing one
needs to do is to confirm (ithbat) the existence and the temporality of accidents.
Then, it follows by reason that bodies need an originator (muhdith). Both bodies and
accidents are ways of knowing God.75
His argument is that all of the religious laws (sa'ir al-shara'f) from speeches and
actions are not good (la tuhsiri) except after knowing God. Since the knowledge of
God cannot be obtained except via reflection, it follows that reflection is the first
obligation.76 cAbd al-Jabbar also considers that no one is exempted from this
obligation. Explaining this argument, Mankdim writes that:
The proof is that all the obligations either come after knowing
God or they can be exempted from obligated person on certain
aspects...The explanation of that is the obligations are divided
into two types: rational (caqli) and religious (shadj). Rational
obligations such as returning the deposit (radd al-wadfa), paying
the debt, thanking the grace, can be exempted from some
obligated persons on certain condition. As for religious
73
U?ul al-khamsa, 79. This difference however, does not affect its meaning but both terms used need
an explanation to make it clearer, cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 69.
74
Mukhtasar, 199.
75 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif, (2)i, 17. For more on this see our discussion on the proof of the existence
ofGod, below, 231.
76
U?u\ al-Khamsa, 79; Mankdim, Sharh, 69. In this regard al-Baghdadi presents similar view with
cAbd al-Jabbar, cf. al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 210.
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obligations, it must be performed based on nearness and worship
to God. This obligation is not good except after knowing God.77
The view that reflection is the first obligation is also shared by the majority of the
mutakallimun, such as the Basran Muctazilites,78 the Ashcarites79 and some
Hanbalites.80 The difference between the Muctazilites and the Ashcarites on this issue
is the way to know the obligation of nazar. The former says that reason alone can
identify the obligation of nazar, meanwhile, the latter says that revelation (al-
shara'f) is the cause of obligation.81 Al-Ashcari, in this regard, believes that reason
is capable of knowing God but it is only a means (ala) for it. Meanwhile, the cause of
the obligation of reflection to know God is revelation.82
Agreeing with the Ashcarites, Abu Yacla, a Hanbalite theologian, argues that one can
only know the obligation of nazar through revelation. Without revelation, there is no
obligation for human beings. He mentions a verse from the Qur'an that indicates the
obligation of reflection, as: "Messengers who gave good news as well as warning,
that mankind, after (the coming) of the Messengers, should have no plea against
God: For God is exalted in Power, Wise."83 Based on this, he concludes that the
77
Mankdim, Sharh, 70.
78 Abu Hashim was reportedly held a view that doubt (shakk) is the first obligation, meanwhile his
father Abu cAli says that it is thanking the benefactor (shukr al-Murfim). Cf. cUthman, Na?ariyya al-
takl'if, 84.
79 Cf. al-Baghdadi, U$ul al-din, 210; Cf. cUthman, Nazariyya al-taklrf, 82. In his article, D. Boer
observes that nazar in traditional school is rejected at first by the traditionalists, but with the efforts of
al-Ashcari it gradually tolerated and used as an instrument against heretics and sophists and recognised
as a religious obligation. Boer, Tj. de, "Nazar", in EI2, vii, 1050.
80 Abu Yacla, Miftamad, 21.
81 cUthman, Nazariyya al-Takhf, 82.
82 Cf. Boer, Tj. de, Geschichte der Philosophie, 102. For more on this see our discussion on Ethical
Realism, below, 204.
83 Qur. 4: 165.
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reflection is the first obligation but the way to know it is from revelation and not
from reason.84
However, the Baghdad school of Muctazilite disagrees with this view. They maintain
that knowing God (mcfrifa Allah) is the first duty, since it is the aim of reflection.
Their argument is based on the general level of obligation, as mentioned earlier;
therefore, knowing God is the first obligation. Disagreeing with the Baghdad school,
cAbd al-Jabbar argues that even though knowing God is the aim of reflection, it
comes after reflection and cannot be known except with it. Therefore, reflection is
the first obligation for human beings.85
Based on a similar argument, cAbd al-Jabbar also rejects Abu cAli's view that the
first obligation is thanking the benefactor (shukr al-Munim). He argues that before
one thanks the benefactor, one needs to know (i) the benefit (nfma) and (ii) the
benefactor, i.e. His existence, attributes and wisdom. All this knowledge is possible
only after one knows God, His attributes, His justice and wisdom. Therefore,
thanking the benefactor cannot be considered the first obligation.
However, one might observe that the implication of cAbd al-Jabbar's argument is
that the intention to do reflection (qasd ila al-nazar) or the will to reflect (irada al-
nazar) can be considered the first obligation, since both of them occur before
84 Abu Yacla, Muctamad, 21. He also argues to prove the validity of reflection based on the Qur'anic




_ - - 86reflection. The first view was accepted by al-Mutawalli al-Nisaburi (d. 478/1085)
- oyand the second was reportedly held by al-Baqillani.
Responding to this critic, cAbd al-Jabbar explains that reflection is a pure action
(mujarrad al-Jfl). A pure action does not need an intention or will. It occurs
simultaneously with the intention (macah); therefore, he believes that the intention
follows it {tabcan lah). He compares this with the relation between the will to eat
(,irada al-akl) and eating. He explains that someone who is eating does not need a
'will to eat' in order to eat. Instead a 'will to eat' occurs simultaneously with eating.
Therefore, he argues that the former follows the latter. It is the same case with the
•• •• .... RR
intention to reflect. Therefore, he insists that nazar needs neither intention nor will.
To make this clearer, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that if one of us becomes obligated to
reflect but is prohibited from intention (qasd) and will {irada), that obligation is still
good. However, if reflection needs intention and will in order to occur, the obligation
of reflection [in the previous case] becomes unbearable {taklrf ma la yutaq). This
situation is dissimilar to knowledge (macrifa), because knowledge needs reflection. If
one is prohibited from reflection, it is not good to obligate him with knowledge, for it
becoming obligating something that is unbearable.89
Based on a similar argument, cAbd al-Jabbar rejects Abu Hashim's view that the
doubt (shakk) is the first obligation. He argues that although doubt probably
86 Cf. al-Mutawalli, Mughni, 5.






motivates one to reflect, yet, it is not the aim by itself. Therefore, it cannot be
considered the first obligation. Similarly, cAbd al-Jabbar refutes views that fear
(,khawf) is the first obligation. He considers that this view is unacceptable (khulfmin
al-kalam), since fear is part of the condition of obligation (min shara'it al-taklif). It
cannot be considered an obligation, let alone the first obligation. Furthermore, he
argues that if, for the sake of argument, we accept that this is true, it would be
possible for one to say that the maturity of the intellect (kamal al-caql) is the first
obligation. However, this is not the case because the maturity of intellect is only part
of the condition of takljf, and not the takllf itself. The maturity of the intellect is
gained via immediate knowledge created by God in the human mind; therefore, it is
not part of our obligation, because immediate knowledge is beyond our control.90
Based on these arguments, one might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar is inconsistent in
his argument. When arguing against the Baghdad school of Mutcazilite, his argument
is that knowing God cannot be considered the first obligation since reflection occurs
before it. Therefore, reflection is the first obligation. However, in his argument
against Abu Hashim, al-Baqillani and al-Mutawalli, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that
the doubt, the intention and the will to reflect cannot be considered the first
obligation since they are not the aim by themselves, but the reflection is. Therefore,
reflection is the first obligation.
Ibn al-Malahimi, in this regard, explains that although his teachers [the Basran




compulsory for every obligated person to know that it is the first obligation. It is
enough for him to know that reflection is a narrow obligation (wajib mudayyaq)
which cannot be delayed, let alone neglected (tadyfih). However, he maintains that
although there are many other narrow obligations, reflection is prior to all other
obligations.91
As far as the first obligation is concerned, cAbd al-Jabbar also rejects the
traditionalist {Ahl al-hadith) view, which reportedly says that the first obligation on
every obligated person is to declare the two testimonials (shahadatyn). This view
argues that when a person accepts these testimonials, he needs to follow all the
teachings of the Prophet, including the knowledge of the essence and the attributes of
God.92 In this regard, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that declaring the two testimonials is
included in the religious obligation {wajibat al-sharciyya). Religious obligation is not
good except after one knows who obligates the obligation {al-musharrf). Therefore,
declaring the two testimonials cannot be considered the first obligation.93
Agreeing with cAbd al-Jabbar, Ibn al-Malahimi argues against a similar but more
radical view, which says that the first obligation is to accept and declare the two
testimonials without knowledge {dun al-culum).94 Here, he argues by asking
questions:
91 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miitamad, 79.
92 Cf. Abrahamov, Islamic Theology, 13.
93 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 75.
94
According to Ibn al-Malahimi, this view was introduced by a man contemporary to him, known as
al-Masahi. However, the biographical information of this man is unavailable. After his death, his view
was adopted by some Atheists and they claim that it is iman. This view leads to the invalidation of
reflection and seeking knowledge. Also it leads to mere imitation (taqlid al-muhd) among people. Cf.
Ibn al-Malahimi, MiTtamad, 67.
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Is your obligation to testify the two testimonials (shahadatayri)
based on knowledge or not? If they say 'yes', they accept the
obligation to find knowledge. Thus, our discussion with them is
on the ways of knowledge. But if they say: 'no', say to them: Do
you need to know the obligation of testifying to [the
testimonials] with knowledge? If they say 'yes', that implies that
they have accepted that they were obligated with some
knowledge. Thus, say to them: why are you obligated with that
knowledge but not the other one?.. If they say 'no', say to them:
if they are not obligated to know that, how can they prove [the
validity of] their view (madhhab)? The implication [of their
inability to prove it] is that they cannot blame others who reject
their view. Say to them that, if that is the case, it is possible for
one to be obligated with a certain action without being obligated
with the knowledge of that action. If they say 'no' because it is
inconceivable to perform the action except with knowledge of it;
say to them: In the same way, if an obligated person does not
know the obligation of the acts incumbent on him, he will not
know whether it is obligatory or not; also he does not know
whether he has already fulfilled his obligation or not.95
Furthermore, he argues that if one is only obligated with the declaration of the two
testimonials without knowledge, the hypocrites must have been performing the
obligation. They must be true believers and deserve the reward because of this.
However, God says in the Qur'an that: "Of the people there are some who say: 'We
believe in God and the Last Day'; but they do not (really) believe. Fain would they
deceive God and those who believe, but they only deceive themselves, and realise (it)
not."96 In another verse, God says: "When the hypocrites come to you, they say, 'we
bear witness that you are indeed the Messenger of God.' Yea, God knows that you
are indeed His messenger, and God bears witness that the hypocrites are indeed
liars."97






These verses indicate that God denies their declaration because it must be based on
knowledge. If declaring the two testimonials is enough without knowledge, as they
claimed, God will not blame the hypocrites for what they are doing. This argument
clearly indicates that the declaration of the two testimonials without knowledge is not
the first obligation.
However, cAbd al-Jabbar does not totally reject the view that there is something else
before reflection to know God as the first obligation. He maintains that reflection on
the obligation of reflection (al-nazar fi wujub al-nazar) can probably be considered
the first obligation. cAbd al-Jabbar explains that when a mukallaf has already arrived
at the maturity of the intellect (kamal al-caqt), he must be afraid to abandon the
reflection for various reasons. This knowledge is immediately known by him without
any reflection or argumentation. However, he then adds that "when we say that the
first obligation is reflection on the way of knowing God, we make it a general
statement. Thus, if reflection to the obligation of reflection (al-nazar fi wujub al-
nazar) is part of the way towards knowing God, it is possible to consider it the first
obligation."98
From the previous discussion, we observe that cAbd al-Jabbar considers that
reflection on the way to knowing God is the first obligation for every obligated
person. Only through reflection will one be able to eliminate the fear, a psychological
harm (darar al-nafs) from his self that has various causes.99 Having examined cAbd
al-Jabbar's arguments on the first obligation, let us now analyse this obligation by
98 Mankdim, Sharh, 72.
99 On the causes of fear, see our discussion above, 158.
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examining (i) the reality of reflection; and in the next section (ii) the bases of takllf
according to the Muctazilites.
4.7. Reflection (al-Nazar)
cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the only way to acquire knowledge is through
reflection (nazar). On this, he writes that "there is nothing in the acquired knowledge
the basis of which is not attributable to reflection."100 Hence, it is important to
understand the concept of nazar according to cAbd al-Jabbar.
In the Mughni chapter 12, cAbd al-Jabbar elaborates the meaning of nazar, first by
explaining its meaning in Arabic. On this, he writes:
Know indeed [the word] nazar in general is described in several
meanings: (i) turning the iris (hadqa) towards the sight in order
to see it;101 (ii) mercy and kindness/benevolence (al-rahman to
al-ihsan)\ (iii) the view of the heart (nazar al-qalb)\ and (iv)
waiting (intizar)}02
From these four meanings, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the third, which is the view
of the heart, is the meaning of nazar from a theological perspective. He defines
nazar as thinking (fikr).w3 He argues that nobody is reflecting without also thinking,
and nobody is thinking without reflecting, too.104 As for the fikr, cAbd al-Jabbar
defines it as: "contemplating (ta'ammul) the situation (hal) of a thing, and
100 Mughni, xii, 67-8.
101 Taqlib al-hadqa a!-$ahiha nahwu al-mar
102 Mughni, xii, 4. Mandkim reports that cAbd al-Jabbar also mentions the fifth meaning of na?ar,
meeting (muqabala). Mandkim, Sharh, 44.
103 A similar definition of reflection was reported by Abu Hashim, cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miitamad, 26.
104Mughni, xii, 4; Peters, God's Created Speech, 58; cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Muc'tamad, 13.
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comparison (tamthiT) between it and other (things), or comparison between
occurrences (haditha) with other (occurrences) that come into existence."105
His definition of 'nazar' as 'thinking', however, has been criticised by many
theologians,106 including cAbd al-Jabbar's students Abu al-Husayn al-Basri and Ibn
al-Malahimi. Their argument is that this type of definition is inappropriate since it
only exchanges one word with another and does not reveal the reality of the thing
defined. Ibn al-Malahimi argues that defining nazar as fikr does not reveal the reality
of nazar, because someone who does not know the meaning offikr will again ask
what fikr is. Disagreeing with cAbd al-Jabbar, Abu al-Husayn defines reflection as
the "arrangement of beliefs (ftiqadat) or assumptions (zunun) to arrive with it on
something with belief or assumption." Ibn al-Malahimi considers that this definition
is better than the previous one, yet he adds the word contemplation (ta'ammul) at the
beginning of the definition to make it clearer (akshaf). Therefore, he defines nazar as
contemplation that contains (yatadamman), the arrangement of beliefs or
assumptions.107
However, Abu al-Husayn's definition of reflection, as previously mentioned, is
general, where invalid reflection can also be included in it. Therefore, in order to
105
Mughni, xii, 4. On this he follows Abu Hashim who defines nazar with a similar definition, cf. Ibn
al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 26.
106
A Hanbalite scholar, Abu Yacla considers that nazar is different from fikr. lie argues that at the
beginning one thinks about the body whether it is temporal or eternal, while he is thinking he is in
doubt. Then he reflects to look for the proof, cf. Abu Yacla, Mu tamad, 22.
107 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 27. One might observe Ibn al-Malahimi's role in specifying the
definitions of his predecessors when he considers that the arrangement of beliefs and assumptions is
based on contemplation. The same role is observed in his definition of acquired knowledge, when he
specifies the act of inference (islidlSI) in it. When his predecessors distinguish between immediate and
acquired knowledge based on one's ability to control this knowledge, he specifies this ability as the
inference. See our discussion above, 137.
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distinguish a valid reflection (al-nazar al-sahih) from others, he defines it as "the
arrangement of knowledge or assumptions based on the intellect to arrive at
something with knowledge or assumptions."108 in this definition, one might observe
that, in contrast to the first definition, Abu al-Husayn applies the term 'based on the
intellect' (bi hasb al-aql) and the term 'knowledge' (culum).
Ibn al-Malahimi, in this regard, observes that the application of these terms is
important in order to assure that (i) the premises used are valid; and (ii) the
arrangement of the premises is sound. He maintains that only by observing these two
conditions can the validity of reflection be assured.109 Ibn al-Malahimi explains that
valid reflection consists of the arrangement of immediate knowledge (tartlb ulum al-
daruriyya) or acquired knowledge that is based on immediate knowledge. The
arrangement of this knowledge will indicate something in which if it is unknown
(lamytflam) the immediate knowledge will be considered to have vanished (zawal).
In this case, he gives an example of a compos mentis person (caqil) who already
knows that smoke is not created except by fire."0 This person, when he sees smoke
but not a fire, will necessarily know that there must be a fire, for he infers the
existence of fire with smoke."1 Scrutinizing this example, Ibn al-Malahimi
elaborates that the argument is as follows: (a) all smoke must come from fire; (b) I
just saw smoke; therefore (c) it must be a fire. He argues that if (c) is unknown,
108 The different between the arrangement of knowledge (ci!m) and assumption {?<mri) is that the
former is based on indication (dilala) such as the knowledge of the creator based on the indication that
a temporal creature needs a creator; and the latter is based on sign (imdra) such as the sign of humid
cloudy day for the rain. Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 28.
109 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 27.
110 He probably knows it through his eye sight at the first time. This knowledge is immediately known
since it is based on perception.
Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 52.
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either (a) or (b) must be eliminated. Since neither (a) nor (b) can be eliminated from
one's self, therefore, knowledge of (c) will inevitably be acquired. Based on this
explanation, Ibn al-Malahimi posits that most of the arguments related to acquired
knowledge are similar to this. Therefore, the argument (wajh istidlal) in this example
indicates that reflection can lead to knowledge.112
According to cAbd al-Jabbar, the result of reflection (c) is generated (mutawallid)
from nazar. He explains that when (i) reflection is engaged in by a compos mentis
person (caqil) on the indication, which is known (mcflum) to him,"3 and (ii) there is
no obstacle, the reflection will certainly generate knowledge."4 Also, knowledge that
is generated from nazar must follow its premises. Hence, if one reflects on the proof
of the temporality of bodies, he will not acquire knowledge on the truthfulness of the
Prophet. cAbd al-Jabbar also explains that the generation of knowledge from
reflection occurs in uniformity (tariqa wahida), which is based on one's intention
(qasd) and motive (d£i). This reality indicates that one is a direct agent of reflection
and an indirect agent of knowledge. Therefore, the rules of generated acts also apply
to this act."5 However, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that reflection is not the aim in and
of itself, but a means; therefore, he argues that it is not valid to reflect except by
targeting knowledge, assumptions (zann), or other things."6
112 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 52.
'13Mughni\ xii, I 1.
114 Cf. Mughni\ xii, 77.
115 For our discussion on generated act see above, 143.
116 Mughni, xii, 9. I suggest that cAbd al-Jabbar's statement that nazar can also aim for something that
is other than knowledge and assumption (ghairihima) is significance; for Ibn al-Malahimi later proves
that eliminating fear is also one of the aims of reflection. Without this statement cAbd al-Jabbar's view
is very weak.
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However, Ibn al-Malahimi, in this regard, takes a more analytical approach, when he
maintains that the obligation of reflection is not only for acquiring other things, but
also the aim by itself. In this case, he explains that the obligation of reflection exists
in two aspects: first, the reflection is obligatory for itself, because through reflection,
one will be able to eliminate the fear in his self. A compos mentis person (caqil) will
know that only by reflection will he become nearer to knowing anything he does not
know. Therefore, he reflects to eliminate the fear. Ibn al-Malahimi believes that this
reason alone is enough for one to know the obligation of reflection. Fear, he argues,
is a psychological harm (darar al-nafs), and avoiding the harm is an immediate
knowledge. Therefore, since avoiding this harm is only possible through reflection,
reflection is obligatory."7
The second aspect of the obligatory nature of reflection has to do with certain
knowledge such as the knowledge of God, His unity, wisdom and justice. This
knowledge is compulsory for every obligated person, because by knowing it, an
obligated person will be further from doing evil and nearer to performing the
obligation. He argues that since the only way to know this is through reflection,
therefore, reflection is obligatory."8 Justifying his argument, Ibn al-Malahimi
explains that an obligated person has a strong desire to perform an evil thing and
dislikes performing the obligation. However, when he knows that there is a creator
who will punish him for his disobedience (ma sia) and reward him for his obedience
117 cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 80.
118 Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 81.
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toward the obligation, he will be nearer to performing the obligation and further from
disobedience."9
From this discussion, one might observe that Ibn al-Malahimi successfully argues
that the obligation of reflection is not only for acquiring knowledge but also for
eliminating the fear from one's self. Therefore, with this argument, it seems that he
manages to reject cAbd al-Jabbar's opinion that reflection cannot be the aim by itself.
However, when cAbd al-Jabbar mentions that things other than knowledge and
assumption (ghairihima) can also become the aim of reflection, 1 suggest that
eliminating fear is also included; for, if this is not the case, his view must be
abandoned.
As for the type of reflection, cAbd al-Jabbar divides it into two types; first, worldly
affairs (umur al-dunya), such as trade (tijara), medicine (tibb), crafts {sin^a) and
geometry (handasa); and second, religious affairs (umur al-diri). He divides
reflection on religious affairs into two types: (i) to look for a true knowledge based
on proof (daliT); and (ii) to defend the religious doctrine from critics.120 cAbd al-
Jabbar's main concern here is reflection on the religious affairs, particularly to look
for the true knowledge. This last type of reflection is obligatory for every obligated
person. Through reflection, he maintains that one can know the truth in religion.
Then, he explains that it is possible for us to convey the result of a valid reflection to
others by telling him the aspect (wajh) of how we find it. However, that person
119 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 81.
120 Mankdim, Sharh, 45.
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himself needs to reflect, for we cannot force him into 'knowledge'. What we can do
is explain to him how we arrange the indication (dilala) and how to reflect on the
basis that if he reflects he will know. If he follows the instruction, he will obtain the
knowledge, because the generation of knowledge from reflection is not a privilege
for only certain people. However, he argues that we need to make him refer to the
immediate knowledge that exists in him. By doing so, he will be able to respond to
the proof properly and identify the truth.121
However, one might argue that reflection is not reliable, since there are many
mistakes that occur on the part of the reflector (al-nazir). Defending his predecessor,
Ibn al-Malahimi argues that when it is clear to us that reflection leads to knowledge
in certain situations, and then we find that some reflectors are mistaken, we know
that the mistake is not because of reflection, but due to their own shortcomings.
Explaining his argument, he maintains that every product (sarfa) has a defect from
the manufacturer (sanf), but this does not indicate the whole product is faulty.
However, it does indicate that there have been some mistakes during the process
(tariq) of manufacturing. He claims that if this argument can be accepted to prove the
invalidity of the reflection, then one can consider that a mistake from an accountant
or engineer indicates the invalidity of accountancy and engineering. However, he
points out that when we say that reflection can lead to knowledge, this does not mean
all types of reflection, but rather a specific reflection that follows certain conditions.
If these conditions are fulfilled, mistakes will not occur.122
121
Mughni, xii, 73.
122 Cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 53. For his argument against those who consider reflection is
innovation (bicfa) see, 75-6.
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4.8. The Basis of Obligation
Having discussed the reality of reflection, I will now examine a question regarding
the basis of obligation. According to Ibn Mattawayh, this issue has become a polemic
among the Muctazilites. They disagree on the minimum amount one needs to know
about the unity ofGod (aqall mayulzam al-mukallafcan yacrifahu fi usul al-tawh 'id).
This question was asked in order to set a limit on what every obligated person must
know about God. The Muctazilites agree that only the scholars (ulamf) need to know
detailed theological arguments; for the general public, a brief argument is sufficient.
However, they disagree on what this brief argument or the minimum level of
knowledge should be.
Abu cAli al-Jubba'i, in this regard, maintains that the minimum level of obligation
(,taklrf) is that one must know the existence ofGod and His oneness (tawhid). Hence,
he believes that knowledge of divine justice is not compulsory, since it is related with
God's actions (afal) and not His essence (dhatih)}23 This view is based on man's
obligation to thank the benefactor who gives him many gifts (nfma). Hence, one
needs to know 'the benefactor' to thank Him. Based on this argument, Abu cAli
maintains that what is obligatory to a person is to know God and His oneness (Allah
bi tawhldih)}2*
However, Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i disagrees with him. He maintains that one is not
only obligated to know the existence of God and His unity, but also His justice and
His rewards and punishments. Abu Hashim argues that if we consider that knowing
123 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmd (2), 9.
124 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 87.
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God is a divine favour (lutf), as believed by the majority of the Muctazilites, then all
this knowledge is necessary. He argues that the lutf is not sufficient if one only
knows the existence of God, His attributes and His justice, without knowing what
one deserves from rewards and punishments.125
Responding to Abu Ali's argument, he argues that presumably we accept the claim
that thanking the benefactor is the reason for knowing God; yet, he argues that one
still needs to know the divine justice (fadl). Without that knowledge, it is uncertain
whether God's intention (qasd) in His action occurs out of beneficence (ihsan) and
therefore deserves gratitude (shukr), or it does not, and hence does not deserve
gratitude. Abu Hashim maintains that one can attain this knowledge only after one
knows that God is just (cadil) and wise (hakim).126
Expressing his view on this contention, cAbd al-Jabbar seems to accept Abu
Hashim's view; however, he adds several points to it in order to establish his own
view. Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that, after one knows the existence of
God, His attributes, His justice and His rewards and punishments, one must be
obligated with compulsory acts (Jfl al-wajib) or disengaged from evil things (amr
qabili). One should also be given some time to complete that obligation, for it is
implausible to obligate divine assistance (lutf) without obligating what has been
assisted for (maltuf), since lutf is not the aim by itself but what it was assisted for (ma
huwa lutifa fih). Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that, only by obligating some
actions on an obligated person, can he take advantage of his previous knowledge of
l25Cf. Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (2), 9; Mankdim, Sharfi, 87.
126 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (2), 9.
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God. If he performs the obligations or avoids the prohibitions, indeed he has fulfilled
what is required of him, and hence deserves the rewards; otherwise, he will be
punished.127.
Ibn al-Malahimi, in this regard, agrees with his predecessors that knowing God is
obligatory since it is a divine favour {lutf) for the mukallaf in fulfilling the
obligations and avoiding the evils. He considers that this divine assistance is a
motive for one to do good and avoid evil. Therefore, he maintains that what is
obligatory for everyone to know is knowledge of the existence of God, His attributes,
denying what is impermissible (layajuz) from Him and His oneness (wahdaniatih).
All this knowledge is a foundation for the lutf. Only by knowing this knowledge will
one be able to know the knowledge of lutf.128 Here, one might observe that Ibn al-
Malahimi does not consider that certain acts are included at the minimum level of the
obligation. Hence, by excluding any act from the minimum level of obligation, he is
consistence with Abu cAli and Abu Hashim's view, but disagrees with cAbd al-
Jabbar on this matter.
From the abovementioned arguments on the minimum level of knowing God, one
might observe that they are interrelated with each theologian's view on the cause of
fear. Abu cAli, for instance, maintains that the reason for a person's fear is his
finding that thanking the benefactor is obligatory. Therefore, it is sufficient according
127 There is a confusion regarding the translation of the text in the Majmtfs. In Azmi's edition, he
writes yakhtarimah, which means 'cause him to die', while in Houben's edition, he writes it as
"yahtarimah", 'respect him', which is confusing. My translation is based on the context of the
sentence (fa 'in faLala fih wajib"" aw ijtanaba qabi/f", faqadffala macurida lah wa istahaqqa bih al-
thawab wa ilia jaza fi al-waql al-thani min Allah jalla wa azza an yakhtarimah/yahtarimah.) Cf. Ibn
Mattawayh, Majmd (1), 19; (2), 9.
128 Ibn al-Malahimi, MuLtamad, 538-42.
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to Abu cAli for one to know God's existence and His oneness in order to thank
Him.129 In contrast, Abu Hashim, cAbd al-Jabbar and Ibn al-Malahimi emphasize the
external reasons for knowing God such as disputes among people regarding religious
truth and the warning (al-khatir) from God that establishes eschatological fear.
Hence, this will imply that one needs to know in detail about one's Creator, His laws,
rewards and punishments. Yet, cAbd al-Jabbar goes further to include the practical
aspect of taklff by performing obligations and avoiding prohibitions. Thus, by doing
this, he establishes a firm ground for his rational obligation.
However, one might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar's view is absurd because he
includes the obligation of certain acts in the minimum level of obligation. If this is
the case, we say to him that the revelation is necessary, since without revelation it is
impossible for one to know how to thank the benefactor. cAbd al-Jabbar may answer
this question by saying that it is possible to use the revelation (Qur'an) to know the
act of thanking the benefactor, because after we have already proved by reason that
God is just, His acts as well as His speech (kalam) is a proof. Therefore, we can use
the Qur'an and the hadlth in order to learn the details of obligation.
In this case, we say to him, the minimum level of obligation is no longer rational
obligation, but also includes the revealed obligation (taklrfshar i). In addition, cAbd
al-Jabbar also clearly indicates that the revealed obligation is only known through the
revelation.130 Therefore, he did not solve the problem of Ahl al-fatra. Since they did
not receive any revealed teaching that explains how to thank the benefactor,
129
See Mankdlm, Sharh, 87.
130 Mankdim, Sharh, 75.
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punishing them will imply injustice from God. Since injustice is impossible to God,
they should not have been obligated in the first place.
4.9. Knowledge of Good and Evil
The problem of good and evil in classical Islamic theology (kalam) is one of the key
issues disputed between the Ashcarites and the Muctazilites.131 The main question is:
What is good and evil? The answer to this question will also be related to the
answers for other questions, such as: How can one know good and evil? Is it through
revelation or reason? What is the role of the intellect and the revelation in religious
ethics? How was religious obligation (takllf) established? The answers to these
questions will determine the ethical theories built by Muslim scholars. Therefore,
despite their agreement that one must perform good acts and avoid bad ones,
classical Muslim theologians disagree on how to know good and evil.
The Muctazilite are concerned to establish that the nature of right and wrong can be
determined by reason alone. The grounds of their validity can be rationally justified
and independent of the divine prescription as laid down in the Qur'an.132 This view is
agreed to among the Muctazilites, except that they have divided into two schools
which are the Baghdad and the Basra school. The Baghdad school holds that good
and evil are intrinsic in the action. Abu al-Qasim al-Kacbi (d. 317/929) affirms that
the good and evil of certain acts is embedded in the act itself. Lying, for instance, is
bad ontologically. To imagine a "good lie" is as impossible as imagining a five-
legged horse. The Baghdad school believes that the moral value of an act is a real
131 See Mughni, vi(l), 25; al-Baghdadi, Uful a!-din\ 24.
132 Fakhry, Ethical Theories, 32.
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attribute in the essence of the act, and is unaffected by the agent's intention or
circumstances.133 For them, killing, stealing and lying are prohibited absolutely,
whatever their situations.134 However, the Basra school believe that the moral quality
of the act is not embedded in the act itself, but depends on the intention and
consciousness of the actor. Good and evil determined by the aspect (wajh) and the
intention (qasd) of the doer.135
cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the knowledge of good and evil is known immediately
by human being; for instance, justice (cadl) is good and wrongdoing (zulm) is bad.
However, to determine which act is wrongdoing and which is not, human beings
need to acquire that knowledge via reason. Sometimes, disagreement appears when
one wants to determine which act is just and which is not, or what is good and what
is evil. The Kharijites, for instance, although they have achieved the maturity of the
intellect, are confused regarding the morality of killing their opponents. They believe
that their opponents deserve to be killed; therefore, killing them is just, when in fact
it is not. However, cAbd al-Jabbar explains that the confusion among the Kharijites is
regarding the killing of their enemies but not the killing of their own men, since they
firmly believe that the latter is unjust (zulm).136
In this case, he argues that the action should be defined by reference to the factors
that exhibit the purpose underlying it as considered by a willing and capable agent.137
133 Abu Rashid, Masa'il, 357; cf. Reinhart, Before Revelation, 139; Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 47-
8.
|34Abu Rashid, Masa'il, 357; Reinhart, Before Revelation, 141-3.
135 Mankdim, Sharh, 325-7; cf. Reinhart, Before Revelation, 139.
136 Mughni, xii, 356-7.
137 See Mughni, vi (1), 57.
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cAbd al-Jabbar, in this regard, agrees with the Basran view. He believes that
knowledge of good and evil can be obtained through reason alone; however, the
moral quality of the act is not embedded in the act itself, as believed by the
Baghdadis, but depends on the intention and consciousness of the actor.138
He explains that the value of the acts is revealed by the faces (wajh) that arise
(waqaca) with the occurrence (huduth) of the act. They are sometimes known
immediately by the observer, and occasionally he needs an inquiry (nazar) and
contemplation (ta'ammul) in order to see the relevant wajhs of the act. When he
perceives the wajh correctly, he has perceived the moral quality of the act he
contemplates.139 However, the wajh appears only when the act is complete.
Therefore, before its production, the act cannot be assessed since its wajh of good or
evil cannot yet have manifested itself.140 In this case, he argues that the action should
be defined by reference to the factors which exhibit the purpose underlying it as
considered by a willing and capable agent.141
The Ashcarites, on the contrary, disagree with both schools of Muctazilites in this
matter. They believe that the knowledge of good and evil can only be known through
revelation. Good is what the law presents praise for when one does it. Obligation
(wdjib) is the act where the law presents a categorical command for performing it.
Good is not an attribute additional to law, which becomes known through it; rather, it
138 Mughni, vi (1), 57; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif, (1), 236:24; Reinhart, Before Revelation, 148.
139 Mughni, vi (1), 60; Reinhart, Before Revelation, 148.
wo Mughni, viii, 103; Abu Rashid, Masa'il, 375:5-6; Reinhart, Before Revelation, 149.
i4i However, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that lying (kidhb) and wrong doing (gulm) are intrinsically bad.
gee Mughni, vi (i), 103
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is the same as the law's presentation of praise for one who does it."142 Revelation,
therefore, is the primary source for moral knowledge. Most instances of lying are
bad, not intrinsically, but because God prohibits them. Some types of lying are not
bad, since God permits them. If He decides that lying is good and obligatory, then so
it will be.143 Meanwhile, bad (qabih) according to them is an act that is condemned
by the revelation.144
cAbd al-Jabbar, in this regard, rejects the ethical voluntarism of the Ashcarites. He
argues that the expression of a command or prohibition of God does not necessarily
imply obligation. For instance, sometimes He is only recommending action, not
making it obligatory, but uses the imperative verb just the same,145 as when God says
to the people of paradise: "Eat and drink merrily."146 cAbd al-Jabbar also explains
that there is always an intelligible reason for the things prohibited and commanded in
revelation. He quotes the Qur'an to support his view: "Surely God bids us to be just,
good and giving to kinsmen; and He forbids indecency, dishonour and insolence."147
Thus, God refers to these things as real virtues and vices, with their own characters
prior to command and prohibition.148
On this point, cAbd al-Jabbar writes:
If good and evil is based on the command of revelation, it
implies that if God forbids justice and honesty they will become
142 Cf. al-Juwayni, Irshnd, 228; Ibn Furak, Hudud, 11; al-Mutawwali, Mughni, 43. Cf. Shihadeh,
Theological Ethics, 53.
143 Cf. al-Ashcari, LumcT, 170. Cf. Shihadeh, Theological Ethics, 53.
144 Al-Shahrastani, Nihaya, 370.
145 Mughni, vi, (i), 108-109.
146 Qur. 17: 115.
Qur. 16: 92.
148 Mughni, vi, (i), 64 & 113. Cf. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 57.
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bad, and when He commands with injustice and lying they will
become good because the cause (cilla) of both of them is one.149
cAbd al-Jabbar also argues that based on the Ashcarites' view those who do not
believe in God, such as the Atheists, will not know good and evil. However, this is
not the case, since the Atheists also know that wrongdoing (zulm) is evil, although
they reject divine commands and prohibitions.150 Based on this argument, cAbd al-
Jabbar explains that the intellect (caq[) is divine evidence (hujja) for human beings.
With reason, man is capable of knowing God; his obligation (taklrf) is based on the
knowledge of good and evil. Therefore, thanking the benefactor, for instance, is
obligatory even prior to the coming of revelation.151
4.10. Remarks on Ethical Realism
In this section, I will analyse the position of ethical realism in theological disputes
between the Muctazilites and the Ashcarites. I will compare the view of cAbd al-
Jabbar and his contemporary Abu al-Qahir al-Baghdadi, a representative of the
school of the Ashcarites, on the ethical knowledge. Through this comparison, I will
also indicate that the points of agreement between them are far more obvious than
the points of contention.
cAbd al-Jabbar, in agreement with his predecessors, accepts ethical realism. His main
argument is based on the answer to the question: How can human beings prove the
validity of revelation? He believes that this can only be accomplished through the
intellect alone. Therefore, the principle of ethical realism is essential in order to
149 Mankdim, Sharh, 311.
150
Mankdim, Sharh. 311.
151 Amin A., Duhaal-lslam. iii, 49.
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prove the validity of revelation. Al-Baghdadi, in this respect, agrees with cAbd al-
Jabbar that the soundness of revelation is confirmed by the intellect when the former
mentions that the validity of the Prophet can be proved only through the intellect.152
However, al-Baghdadi maintains that one cannot know good and evil by the intellect
alone, but through revelation. Therefore, he rejects cAbd al-Jabbar's ethical
realism;'53 instead, he supports ethical voluntarism.154
However, one might observe that the rejection of ethical realism by al-Baghdadi is
absurd, since he accepts that knowledge of the validity of the Prophet is found
through the intellect when he writes:
Knowledge of the temporality of the world, the eternity of its
creator, His oneness, His attributes, His justice and His wisdom;
also the possibility of obligation (itakljf), the validity of the
prophets through miracles; all these doctrines are based on
rational arguments.155
This passage indicates that, in the hierarchy of proof, al-Baghdadi agrees with cAbd
al-Jabbar that the intellect is the first proof, followed by the Qur'an, sunna and ijmif
(consensus) and qiyas (analogy). The validity of revelation can be established only
after the validity of the prophets is proven; moreover, since their validity is proved
by the intellect, the intellect is the first in the hierarchy of proof.
152 Cf. al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 14.
153 For the Ashcarites' arguments against the Muctazilites, see Hourani, "Juwayni's Criticism", 161-73;
Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 83-96.
154 Hourani names this theory theistic subjectivism. It is subjective, he explains because it relates
values to the view of a judge who decides them, denying anything objective in the character of the
acts themselves that would make them right or wrong independently of anyone's decision or opinion.
And the view is theistic because the decider of values is taken to be God. Cf. l lourani, "Ethics in
Medieval Islam", 130.
155
Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 14.
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Furthermore, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that the implication of denying ethical
realism is that the foundation to prove the validity of revelation cannot be
established. In this case, he argues that the proof of the validity of the Prophet is
based on the miracle that is demonstrated to the intellect. However, this miracle must
be based on another principle: "That God will not provide the impostor (kadhdhab)
with the miracle to deviate people from the right path, because that was bad and God
will not do bad thing." Without this principle, he argues that the soundness of
revelation will not stand, because we cannot guarantee that He will not provide a
miracle for the impostor. Therefore, the knowledge of the goodness of God's acts
can be established only through the intellect, based on ethical realism.
Scrutinizing this argument, cAbd al-Jabbar explains that the validity of the Prophet is
based on the principle that "God will do good acts and He will not do bad acts." God
will support the true prophet with the miracle (mujiza) to prove that he was sent by
Him. Human intellect will infer that God will not provide the miracle to the
impostor, for that will mislead people from the right path. Therefore, the intellect
concludes that God will provide the miracle only to the true prophet, because
providing the miracle to an imposter is bad and God will never do a bad thing. It
should have been clear that without this principle, the soundness of the revelation
will not stand.156
Al-Baghdadi's argument on the proof of the validity of the Prophet is also in
agreement with cAbd al-Jabbar, when the former reports that: "It is conceivable that
156 TabaqSl, 139. For more cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments against the Ashcarites ethical theory, see
Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 55-62.
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someone who has a true claim to prophecy will be supported by a miracle to indicate
the truthfulness of his claim. And it is unthinkable that the miracle will appear in
order to support an impostor."157
This quotation indicates that one of the roles of reason is to prove the validity of the
Prophet. The miracle, he argues, will occur only from the true prophet and not from
the impostor. He explains that when the one who claims that he is a prophet manages
to produce a miracle that is consistent with what he had claimed, this indicates his
truthfulness. For God is confirming his claim and supporting it with supernatural
power, the miracle. This indication is based on the previous knowledge that God will
not provide the impostor with the miracle because it is bad, and God will never do a
bad thing.158
From here, one might observe that al-Baghdadi, although he rejects the principle of
ethical realism, applies it in his argument to prove the validity of the Prophet.159
Hence, the disagreement between the Ashcarites and the Muctazilites, as indicated
through cAbd al-Jabbar's and al-Baghdadi's arguments on ethical realism, seems to
be less than generally expected. Both of them agreed that the validity of the Prophet
is proved by the intellect. Therefore, it seems that they shared the ethical realism at
this level. However, al-Baghdadi insists that stand alone reason may provide
knowledge of metaphysical truth (e.g. that the world is created, that God exists, and
157 Al-Baghdadi, U?ul al-din, 173.
158 Mughni. vi (1), 127; Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 53; Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 57.
159 Al-Baghdadi, U?u! al-din, 173.
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that prophecy is conceivable),160 but it will never perceive moral truth in acts and
things.161
Their disagreement is more obvious in the debate on the obligation to act and
prohibition against action (wujub al-afal wa tahrimuhu), when al-Baghdadi
maintains that the knowledge of this can be obtained only through revelation. On this
issue, he writes:
One can only know the obligation of certain acts and its
prohibition via revelation. If God obligates something towards
His slave directly or through the messenger it becomes
obligatory (wajib). Likewise, if He prohibits them from
something directly or through the messenger, it will become
prohibited (haram) to them.' 2
Al-Baghdadi and the Ashcarites in general believe that good and evil are determined
by the revelation; therefore, obligation and prohibition must also come from
revelation.163 At this level, one can observe the difference between cAbd al-Jabbar
and al-Baghdadi. The former offers a totally different view when he considers that
that revelation is not essential in knowing good and evil. The revelation, according to
him, is not the key to start the obligation. After one achieves the maturity of the
intellect, one will be considered as an obligated person {mukallaf).m
1,50 In this regard al-Juwayni considers that a prophet's performance of miracles will habitually (fial-
cSda) provide sufficient motivation for people to consider his claims seriously and to reflect upon the
theological matters he refers to, see Shamil, 118-9. Therefore, according to the Ashcarites the
truthfulness of prophecy does not does not depend on reflection but on miracles. Cf. Shihadeh,
"Existence ofGod", 200.
161 Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 202-5; al-Razi, Tafsir, vii, 146. For the Ashcarites' detail argument see
Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 49-56.
162 Al-Baghdadi, U?u! al-din, 24.
163 Al-Baghdadi, U?u! al-din, 25; cf. al- Juwayni, Shaniil, 115; Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad, 96; Shihadeh,
fgleological Ethics, 49.
164 Mughni, xi, 385.
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One might agree with cAbd al-Jabbar that reason alone is capable of knowing good
and evil without revelation, but I posit that this does not necessarily implies the
obligation. For instance, one knows that thanking the benefactor is good by reason.
However, when it comes to the method of thanking the benefactor, i.e. worship
('ibada), intellect alone is unable to know the accurate way of how to perform it. If
the intellect alone tries to determine this, most probably that will lead one to go
astray. Some idol worshipers were led to this type of worship by their reason.165
Therefore, the intellect alone is not enough in order for one to know how to offer
gratitude to God.166
From the abovementioned arguments, I suggest that there are several reasons that led
cAbd al-Jabbar and al-Baghdadi to differ in their explanation of the ethical theories.
Firstly, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the principle of ethical realism (tahsm wa
taqbih al-caqlayan) is vital for proving the validity of the Qur'an. This will occur by
proving that God is just (cadil). After proving this, everything that is produced by
Him is good, including His speech, the Qur'an.
In order to prove that God is just, one needs to examine His acts. To do so, one needs
to use the principle of ethical realism. The acts of God are based on His attributes of
justice. Therefore, God will certainly not perform any type of evil because this would
contradict his justice. When asked how to prove that God will not do an evil act,
cAbd al-Jabbar answers by referring to the principle of ethical realism. In this regard,
he writes:
165 See for instance Qur. 39: 3.
166 For further discussion on this issue, see above, 175.
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Our proof is that God (jalla dhikruh) knows the evilness of
every evil; He also knows that He does not want evil neither
does he need it. Therefore, (cAbd al-Jabbar asks) who, in this
situation, will choose an evil action?167
Meanwhile al-Baghdadi concentrates his view on human acts alone. For him and the
Ashcarites in general, the acts of God are excluded from humans' ethical judgment.
They believe that God's acts are beyond human evaluation, because all His acts are
good and just. God, the Ashcarites argue, is the absolute owner and creator of this
world, so, He has an absolute freedom and power in how to run this world. No
human law can evaluate or restrict God's acts.168
Secondly, we observe that al-Baghdadi develops his theological argument towards
the Muslim society, which has already accepted the validity of the Qur'an as the
word of God. Therefore, the need for the principle of ethical realism in order to
prove the validity of the Qur'an is not essential. Meanwhile, cAbd al-Jabbar builds
up his argumentations based on his predecessors' method, which focuses on a wider
audience, including those who have not yet accepted the validity of the Qur'an.
Therefore, he needs to prove the validity of the Qur'an via reason and based on
ethical realism.
Thirdly, I also suggest that the position taken by al-Baghdadi to reject the ethical
realism is partly due to historical factors related to the formation of the Ashcarites'
school of thought. The formation of the school by Abu al-Hasan al-Ashcari (d.
167 Mukhtapar, 235. For more detailed information on cAbd al-Jabbar's argument regarding God's acts
and ethics, see above, 118 & 164.
168 Al-Baghdadi, U$u/ a!-din, 35. cf. Shihadeh, "The Existence of God", 199.
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324/935) occurred after the establishment of the Islamic school of laws.169 During
his lifetime, the jurists' methodology and their concept of knowledge was accepted
by the majority of the Muslim scholars. Following his historic leaving of the
Muctazilites, al-Ashcari abandons their ethical realism based on the early role of the
intellect.170 Instead he adopts a new methodology based on the jurists' view
regarding the hierarchy of proofs that started with the Qur'an, Sunna, Ijmf and
Qiyas}lx We posit that al-Baghdadi follows the same methodology adopted by al-
Ashcari, by rejecting the ethical realism.
cAbd al-Jabbar, on the other hand, maintains the line of the Muctazilites who believe
in the ethical realism. Therefore, he considers that the intellect determines the good
and evil of acts. However, we might ask, since we observe that al-Baghdadi depends
wholly on God to determine ethical knowledge, what is cAbd al-Jabbar's opinion
regarding the role of God on this point?
Based on his theory of knowledge, one might observe that similar to al-Baghdadi,
cAbd al-Jabbar also accepts that God is the one who determines good and evil.
Hence, I posit that there is no difference between them regarding the source of
ethical knowledge. What differs is only the way in which man knows that
knowledge. cAbd al-Jabbar considers that man knows basic ethical principles
directly from God through immediate knowledge. He believes that all human beings
have been provided with that knowledge, without exception. Meanwhile, al-
169 For more information about the development of legal thought, see J. Schact, The Origin, 269-328.
170 For more information about his conversion from a Muctazilite to Ahl al-Hadith wa al-Sunna, see
Watt, Formative Period, 304-7.
171 Cf. Watt, Formative Period, 173; Schacht, The Origin, 75.
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Baghdadi maintains that the ethical knowledge is determined by God and can only
be known through the prophets. This means that without the Prophet, there is no
good and evil, hence, no obligation before revelation. Therefore, it is not only al-
Baghdadi who considers that the ethical knowledge is from God; cAbd al-Jabbar also
upholds the same view. The latter maintains that the ethical principles are
immediately known and all immediate knowledge is created by God. Thus, God is
also the creator of ethical knowledge.
Accordingly, I suggest that translating the term "caqV in cAbd al-Jabbar's theology
as "unaided reason" is inappropriate, for this does not describe the true meaning of
cAbd al-Jabbar's view. Instead, this term gives a negative depiction, as if cAbd al-
Jabbar gives the intellect an absolute power to determine good and evil
independently from God. In his work, cAbd al-Jabbar never considers that the
intellect is capable of knowing the ethical knowledge independently from God, since
the intellect itself is created by God through immediate knowledge. One can observe
this through his definition of caql as a group of specific knowledge that, if present in
the mukallaf, will allow him to reflect for acquiring proof and to perform the
obligatory.172 Therefore, good and evil in cAbd al-Jabbar's theology is determined by
God through the immediate knowledge created in the human mind. Meanwhile, the
Ashcarites consider that good and evil is determined by God in acquired knowledge,
which is the revelation through the prophets.
172 Maghni, xi, 375. For our discussion on Laql, see above, 108.
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Before ending my discussion on the obligation of knowing God, I will briefly discuss
the role of revelation according to cAbd al-Jabbar. Unlike some Muslim philosophers
who consider revelation to be superfluous, cAbd al-Jabbar declares that revelation is
a vital part of taklif. His division of taklrf into caqli and sharci clearly indicates the
significance of revelation in takllf. However, since the scope of this study is on the
rational obligation 1 will suffice by mentioning briefly the role of revelation
according to cAbd al-Jabbar based on the report by M. Fakhry.
According to Fakry, the roles of revelation according to cAbd al-Jabbar are: (i) to
exhibit the principles already established by reason, but not to confirm or validate
them; (ii) to reconcile between conflicting revelations or parts of revelation.
Whenever error or disagreement arises, revelation is required in order to correct this
error or abrogate (nasakh) an outdate revelation;173 (iii) to specify those particular
acts which are morally commendable and whose goodness is determined by reason,
but only in general terms. The prophets are sent by God, cAbd al-Jabbar argues, in
order to instruct us concerning those actions that He had already instilled in our
intellects, with a view to confirming (taqrir) and specifying them in detail;174 (iv) to
define the kinds of sanctions attached to them in the life to come. In this respect,
revelation does no more than restate the obligation in the general theological or
eschatological context. Bad thus become equivalent to the prohibited (mahzur),
unlawful (muharram) or sinful {macsiya), all of which describe actions in terms of
violating the principle laid down by God.
173 Mughnixiv, 151 and vi (i), 64. cf. Fakhry, Ethical Theories, 34.
174 Cf. Mandkim, Sharh, 564; Fakry, Ethical Theories, 34.
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However, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that the role of revelation will never violate the
principles already established by reason' neither will it confirm them. His arguments
on this are based on three foundations: first: what established by reason is necessary;
therefore, it is obviously not in need of confirmation of any kind. Second: the
validity of revelation being dependant on reason cannot, without appealing to
principle, depend on revelation.175 Third: if revelation is needed to confirm those
principles, it would require another revelation to confirm it and so on ad infinitum}16
Conclusion
From the previous explanations, we can conclude that cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on
the obligation of knowing God is based on the immediate knowledge. When he
maintains that the basic ethical principles are known immediately by every compos
mentis person, he manages to establish a ground for a rational obligation. Based on
this immediate knowledge, one can reflect to establish the concept of ethical realism.
However, his ethical realism does not necessarily mean that cAbd al-Jabbar rejects
the role of God in determining good and evil. Instead, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that
God is the one who determines good and evil. Yet, this is not necessarily through the
Prophet, as believed by the Ashcarites, but by creating it directly in the human mind.
According to cAbd al-Jabbar, the need of knowing God is caused by the fear that
exists in one's soul. He explains that after one achieves the maturity of the intellect,
one will realize the existence of fear in his soul. The causes of this fear are either
through one's introspection or through others. God will create fear in every obligated
175




person through the divine notion (khatir). Based on this fear, cAbd al-Jabbar
establishes the rational obligation of knowing God.
cAbd al-Jabbar manages to establish the obligation of knowing God rationally due to
his view on the concept of obligation (taklrf). He considers that taklrf is not based on
the production of the command between two parties, but on notification (flam).
Therefore, the revelation is not necessary in order to establish the obligation, since
the command from God is no longer the basis of obligation. In this regard, he differs
with Abu Hashim, the Ashcarites and Ibn al-Malahimi. However, although the basis
of obligation is only based on reason and no longer depends on the revelation, there
are people who are exempted from it. For instance, people who live in remote
mountains and do not experience the fear or the need to reflect are exempted from
taklrf. The main reason for this is that they do not achieve the maturity of the
intellect.
Based on the immediacy of the ethical principle, cAbd al-Jabbar goes further to
establish the concept of rational obligation. However, his theory of rational
obligation is not consistent with the concept of divine justice (al-adl), especially
when applied to the ahl al-fatra. The eternal punishment for ahl al-fatra because of
their mistakes in belief and worship will imply the injustice of God. The intellect, as
he explains, is capable of knowing God and knows the obligation to thank the
benefactor; yet the exact way to thank Him, i.e. worship, is unknown through the
intellect alone. Therefore, if we accept cAbd al-Jabbar's concept of rational
obligation, this implies for the Ahl al-fatra who reflects but does not know God,
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either he will rewarded for not knowing God, which is bad; or he will be punished.
The latter implies the denial of divine justice, since God will punish someone
without giving him proper instruction on how to worship Him.
Therefore, in this case, the Ashcarites' view is more plausible, since they consider
that the obligation is only possible after the revelation. They base their argument on
the epistemological foundation that the ethical principle is unknown immediately but
acquired through revelation, to reject the ethical realism. Therefore, they consider
that the obligation is only possible after the coming of revelation. The Ashcarites
reject the rational obligation; instead, the only obligation they believe in is the
revealed one (taklrfshark). Although the Ashcarites seem to be inconsistent in their
arguments on ethical realism, yet, their arguments on the concept of tcikljf are more
plausible compared to that of cAbd al-Jabbar.
cAbd al-Jabbar considers that reflection in order to know God is the first obligation
one needs to undertake after achieving the maturity of the intellect. In this regard, he
follows the Basran MuTazilites and rejects the view of the Baghdad school, which
considers that man's first duty is to know God. He also disagrees with other ideas
such as the intention to know God, or the doubt, as the man's first duty. In his
definition of reflection as thinking, cAbd al-Jabbar was criticized by the late




THE PROOF OF KNOWING GOD
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine the foundation of cAbd al-Jabbar's proof of
knowing God and its application. I will investigate how his theory of knowledge
influences his arguments on knowing God, which includes his argument on the
existence ofGod, the attributes of God, the Oneness of God and Divine justice. I will
also examine the response from Abu al-Husayn al-Basri and other mutakallimun to
cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments. In this discussion, I will first examine cAbd al-Jabbar's
arguments and then explain the critique from Abu al-Husayn and other
mutakallimun. In this chapter, I will prove that a different epistemological
background will result in a different set of theological arguments.
Like other mutakallimun, knowing God is a central point in cAbd al-Jabbar's
theology. He considers that knowing God is a divine favour (lutf).' Divine favour is
something that, with it, one is closer to performing obligations (wajibat) and staying
away from evil acts. Without this divine favour, cAbd al-Jabbar believes that human
beings are unable to obey the divine laws. This favour, according to cAbd al-Jabbar,
is based on God's wisdom and His knowledge of people's inability to follow the
divine law by their own capacity (qudra). He explains that when a person knows that
he has a creator (sanf) who created and directed him (mudabbir dabbarahu), and he
knows that if he obeys Him he will be rewarded and if he disobeys Him he will be
punished, this person will do good and avoid evil actions. Therefore, he believes that
' cAbd al-Jabbar defines lutf as "what gives the motivation for obedience without omitting the choice.
See Mughni, xiv, 9; cf. Freimuth, God and Humans, 64.
God not only imposes laws, but has also taken upon Himself the duty of assisting
2
people to obey them.
Another important role of knowing God is to confirm the validity of revelation
(sharciyyat). By knowing God, who is perfect (kamil), wise {hakim) and just (cadil),
one establishes a foundation for proving the validity of revelation (wahy). The speech
of God, who is perfect, wise and just, must be true and free from error. Therefore, it
must be a valid argument.3
5.1. The Way of Knowing God
There is disagreement among Muslim scholars regarding the way to know God. The
majority of early mutakallimun maintained that rational reflection (jnazar) is the only
method that provides knowledge of God. It follows that everyone, theologians and
lay believers alike, ought to learn, not only the main creeds, but more primarily their
key theological proofs. Most traditionalist theologians took the contrary view,
holding that having a rationally unjustified belief in God, which accords with
scriptural creeds, will suffice. For them, kalam proofs were at once reprehensible
innovations and too obscure and unstable to serve as reliable bases for sound belief.4
The Muctazilites Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf (d. 226/841) and Abu cUthman al-Jahiz
(d. 255/869)s reportedly upheld the view that God is known immediately {darur 'i) by
2
Mankdim, Sharh, 64.
3 Ibn Mattawayh, Muhit, 24.
4 Cf. Shihadeh, "The Existence ofGod", 197-8.
5
He believes that the rational proofs for the existence of God are simply too complicated to be
imposed on us by the merciful God. See Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 73. See also, Mughni,
xii, 342.
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human beings.6 Abu al-Hudhayl argues that the rational proofs for the existence of
God are too complicated to be imposed on us by a merciful God.7 Therefore, he
maintains that the existence of God is known immediately in the sense that
everybody has it and can by no means get rid of it. He believes that this immediate
knowledge is the first stage before one needs to use his intellect to know God's
attributes and commandments.8 Therefore, if one dies as an unbeliever, the innate
knowledge of God serves at the same time as a justification for God to punish
everybody who does not take His revelation seriously. Consequently, he concludes
that one is obliged to reflect on God's nature and to ask for His commandments
because one knows about His existence from the beginning.9
Abu al-Hudhayl's consideration of knowing God as immediate knowledge is related
to his view on the first stage of knowing God. On this, Ibn al-Malahimi reports that
the first stage of knowing God according to Abu al-Hudhayl is that there is a creator
for the world (// al- alam muhdith).'° Therefore, when one knows this, one is
considered by Abu al-Hudhayl as knowing God. He also considers that this
knowledge is immediately known to human beings.
6 This view is also shared by Ibn Taimiyya, when he maintains that man knows God immediately and
intuitively by virtue of his innate, primordial nature (fitra), instilled in him by God. Those with a
sound fitra are able to bear witness to God's existence without reflection. For those with an unsound
fitra, Ibn Taimiyya prescribes a different mode of theological knowledge, similar to an argument from
design namely, the contemplation of God's signs in nature. See, Shihadeh, "The Existence of God",
198.
7 Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 73; Cf. Mughni, xii, 342.
8
Al-Baghdadi, U?ul al-din, 32; cf. Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 66.
9 Van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", 67.
10 For our discussion on the basis of knowing God, see above, 196.
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Like Abu al-Hudhayl, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the first stage of knowing God is
to know that the universe needs a creator;" however, unlike Abu al-Hudhayl, he does
not consider that it is known immediately by human beings. Instead, it must be
acquired (iktisab) by them. Therefore, to negate Abu al-Hudhayl's view, cAbd al-
Jabbar mentions two arguments. First, he argues that there are two indications that
indicate that our knowledge of God is generated from our actions; therefore, it cannot
be immediate knowledge. On this argument, cAbd al-Jabbar reportedly states:
Knowing God is not immediately known but acquired based on
two reasons: (i) Knowing God occurs depending on our
reflection (naznrina) in a constant way (,tariqa wahida).
Therefore, it must be generated from our reflection. Since
reflection is our action, knowing God is also from our action; for
1
the agent of the cause is also the agent of the effect. Since
knowing God is from our actions; therefore, it is not immediate
knowledge, because immediate knowledge occurs in us not from
our actions.13 (ii) Knowing God occurs based on our intentions
(iqusudina) and our motives (dawif/na), and it is denied based on
our dislike (karahatuna) and our aversion (sawarifiina).14
One might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments are based on his theory of action,
which maintains that humans are the real agents (//it) of their actions, both direct
and generated. Since we acquire the knowledge ofGod through our acts or generated
acts, this means that we can control it. Our ability to control this knowledge (either to
accept or to reject it), indicates that it is not an immediate knowledge since
immediate knowledge is something beyond our control.
" Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 175.
12
For our discussion on generated acts, see above, 142.
13 cAbd al-Jabbar considers that immediate knowledge is from God's actions, for our discussion on the




In his second argument, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that if knowledge of God is
immediately known, then it will become an excuse for the unbeliever. If knowing
God is immediate knowledge, this implies it is created by God in human beings.
Thus, it is not their responsibility to know God; rather it is God's duty to create that
knowledge in them. The consequence is that all the unbelievers will be excused for
their ignorance or rejection of God since God does not create that knowledge in
them. This consequence, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is inconceivable; therefore, he
maintains that knowing God is not an immediate knowledge, but must be acquired by
us.15
cAbd al-Jabbar also rejects the view that one can know God through uncritical
imitation (taqlid). He defines taqlid as "accepting the words of someone else without
demanding from him a proof or evidence, so he uses it like a necklace (qilada)
around his neck."16 On this, he writes:
Know that taqlid will lead one to deny immediate knowledge
(idarura); for imitating those who claimed the eternity (qidam)
of the world is not more deserving (laysa bi crwla) than to
blindly imitate those who claimed its temporality (huduthiha).
Consequently, one either believes in its eternity and temporality
equally, or rejects both of them. Both consequences [according
to cAbd al-Jabbar] are inconceivable.17
In this passage, cAbd al-Jabbar bases his argument on direct (mubtadi') knowledge,
the first type of immediate knowledge. The application of taqlid, he maintains, will
negate the principle of non-contradiction ('adcim al-tanaqud)}% Since direct
knowledge is neither refutable nor doubtable, taql 'id has no foundation in human
15 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 50.
16 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 61. cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 44.
17
Mughni, xii, 123.
18 For our discussion on this principle, see above, 131-3.
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knowledge. cAbd al-Jabbar's argument can be developed as follows: a blind imitator
(,muqallid), either knows the truthworthiness of the one he imitates (muqallad) or not.
If he does not know it, the implication is that the muqallad may be lying or ignorant;
this implication is unacceptable. Therefore, the only possibility is that the muqallid
knows the truthfulness of the muqallad.
Hence, a new question arises: how does the muqallid know the truthfulness of the
muqallad? According to cAbd al-Jabbar, there are three possible answers to this
question: (i) through immediate knowledge; (ii) through another taqlid; and (iii)
through something other than taqlid. cAbd al-Jabbar rejects the first answer by
arguing that, if the truthfulness of the muqallad was known immediately, everyone
would agree about it. The rejection of this view is similar to that of those who claim
that knowing God is immediate. cAbd al-Jabbar also rejects that one knows the
truthfulness of the one imitated (muqallad) through another taqlid, by mentioning
two examples of muqallad: (a) the most pious (azhad) and (b) the majority (akthar).
Firstly, he rejects taqlid as the most pious, for piety and asceticism are not signs of
truth, because you can see that much Christian monasticism (rahbaniyya) achieves a
high level of sanctity, although they are wrong according to the Muslims. On the
other hand, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the pious (''ubbad) are present in every group
of people. Hence, a person must either make a taqlid to every pious person in every
group, or not to make a taqlid to any of them. There is no reason to follow any of
them if there is no justification for doing so. In addition, he argues that it is
impossible for a person to make a taqlid to every group, since there are
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contradictions between the groups themselves. Therefore, he insists that one needs
not follow any of them, but one must depend on reflection and proof.
To prove the invalidity of taqlid to the majority, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the
majority is not a sign of truth and the minority is not the sign of falsehood (batik). In
the Qur'an, God criticises the majority with his words: "Most of them have no
sense";19 "But most °f y°u are averse to the Truth."20 He also praises the minority:
"But a few were they who believed with him"21 (wa qalilun min cibadiya al-
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shakur).
Having refuted both types of taqlid, cAbd al-Jabbar concludes that taqlld is not a way
to know God. However, one might argue that taqlid is valid based on the Qur'anic
verse, "Ask the followers of the reminder (ahl al-dhikf) if you do not know".23
Disagreeing with the claim, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that this verse is not a proof of the
validity of taqlid. However, it is permissible to refer to the views of a scholar in the
branches (furif) of religious laws that are based on interpretative judgment (ijtihad).
Therefore, it is implausible to compare (qiyas) these verses within the principles of
religion (usul al-din). Furthermore, he explains that what we agree on based on this
verse is that people can act (yacmal) according to the scholar's interpretive judgment
(bi qawlihi), but we do not allow people to believe that the truth is only what the














Similarly, cAbd al-Jabbar refutes the view of those who claim that doing taqlid to the
Prophet is possible. He argues that following the Prophet is not a taqlld, since we
accept his teaching based on proof. For this reason, God provides the prophets with
miracles to support them. God does not command human beings to follow the
prophet blindly, but only after they accept the validity of his message through the
miracles.25
Having proved that knowing God in this world is neither immediate nor through
taqlld,26 cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that it must be acquired through proof (adilla).
According to eAbd al-Jabbar, there are four types of proof: rational argument (hujjat
al-caql), scripture (al-Kitab), the tradition of the Prophet (Surma), and consensus
(ijmtf). Knowing God, he believes, can occur only through rational argument.27 He
argues that proofs other than rational argument are antecedents (farc) of knowing
God. Therefore, if one argues based on any of them (Qur'an, Sunna or Ijmtf) to
prove the existence of God, it implies that one is arguing with the antecedent of
something to prove the precedent (asl); this implication, he believes, is
inconceivable.
Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar criticizes those who apply proof from the Qur'an and




As for knowing God in the hereafter cAbd al-Jabbar believes it is immediate knowledge. His
argument is that the hereafter is the day of reward and punishment, not the day of obligation (taktrf).
Therefore, there is no obligation on that day including knowing God. In this regard he disagrees with
cAbu al-Qasim al-Balkhi who maintains that since God is known through reflection in this world,
knowing God in the hereafter is also through reflection. For cAbd al-Jabbar's refutation of this view
see Mughni, xii, 58. Mankdim, Sharh, 232-60.
27 Uful al-khamsa, 80.
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God, Sunna is the word of the messenger of God, and the consensus must be based
on the two earlier proofs. Therefore, all these proofs can be accepted only after the
existence of God, His oneness and His justice have been proved. Accordingly, cAbd
al-Jabbar explains that the Qur'an can be considered a proof only when it is
confirmed that it was produced by a just (cadil) and wise {hakim) God who does not
lie. Likewise, the surma will be accepted as proof when it is confirmed that it has
come from the messenger of God who is just and wise. A similar system also applies
to the consensus (ijma) since it is based on the validity ofKitab and Sunna.28
From the previous discussion, one might observe the role played by cAbd al-Jabbar's
second sub-category of immediate knowledge, which resembles a means (ma yajri
majra al-tariq) in his argument.29 The foundation for this sub-division is that one
cannot argue with the antecedent (Jar) of something to prove its precedent (ask).
Therefore, as long as one is not proving the existence of a just and wise God, His
speech cannot be considered as a valid proof.30
5.2. The Foundation of Proof
In this section, I will analyze the link between cAbd al-Jabbar's proofs on knowing
God with his theory of knowledge. Following the footsteps of the majority of the
mutakallimun before him,31 cAbd al-Jabbar accepts the method of analogy from the
seen world to the unobservable world, "istidlal bi al-shahid cala al-gha'ib." Most of
28
Mankdim, Sharh, 88-89; cf. Tritton, Muslim Theology, 80.
29 For more on this, see above, 94-97.
30
However, there are some scholars who are unaware of the significance of this sub-section in cAbd
al-Jabbar's theological arguments, and, therefore, remain doubtful about his decision to specify a
different sub-division for this principle in his epistemology. Cf. Uthman, Nazariyya al-taklrf, 60;
Peters, God's Created Speech, 53-4.
31
Al-Maturidi, Tawhid, 43; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif, (2), 165; al-Mutawalli, Mughni, 18. For a
modern studies on this see van Ess, "Logical Structure", 34-42; Shihadeh, "From al-Ghazali", 165-9.
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cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on knowing God, as I will indicate, is based on this
analogical method. The meaning of this proof is that one confirms certain attributes
or judgments on God who is unseen (,gha'ib), based on the similarity with our seen
world (shahid).
At the first stage of his argument, cAbd al-Jabbar employs immediate knowledge to
establish his existence and the seen world {shahid). Knowledge of one's self is
included in the first type of immediate knowledge, which is created by God from the
beginning (mubtadi'); knowledge of the seen world is included in perceptual
knowledge (mudrakat), which is also immediately known. In his epistemology, not
only does cAbd al-Jabbar consider that our existence is real, but also that our senses
and intellect are reliable. By using both means of knowledge, he confirms the
existence of the external world. Based on these considerations, cAbd al-Jabbar
maintains that what is reported by our senses is accepted as truth as long as it implies
the tranquillity of the soul in our mind. Therefore, in his works, cAbd al-Jabbar does
not argue to prove the existence of his self and the external seen world {shahid),
• 32since he believes that they are immediate knowledge.
According to Ibn Mattawayh, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that there are two situations
where istidlal hi al-shahid cala al-gha'ib can be applied to the unobservable world:
firstly, when there is a similarity in the indication {dilala) between the seen world
and the unobservable, and secondly, when there is similarity in the ground (ilia)




to use this proof.33 The difference between indication and cause is that the similarity
in the former is more obvious, since the foundation of proof is similar between the
seen world and the unobservable; whereas, for similarity in the ground, one needs to
reflect in order to know its ground in the seen world, and then apply it to the
unobservable based on its similarity in the ground.34
cAbd al-Jabbar uses analogy based on indication when proving the existence of God
(wujud Allah). The foundation of the indication is that "every effect must be from a
cause." Since, in the seen world, we observe that every effect must come from a
cause, this rule also applies in the unobservable world. As for the analogy with a
similar ground (cilla), cAbd al-Jabbar employs this type of argument to prove the
justice of God (cadl). In this case, he compares the cause or causes for us not to do
evil (qabih) with the unobservable world. However, first we need to contemplate in
order to know that cause.35 When we know that the cause for us not to do evil is due
to our knowledge of its evilness and that we do not need it, these causes can be
applied to the unobservable world. Therefore, since God also knows the evilness of
evil things and does not need it, He will not do evil. Hence, God must be just. In
relation to this, cAbd al-Jabar infers that the doer of an evil act deserves blame in the
seen world; this is also the case in the unobservable world.
However, regarding the relationship between God's essence and His attributes, cAbd
al-Jabbar believes that there is no similarity between the seen world and the
33 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (2), 165.
34 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmif (2), 166.
35 The judgment and cause can be affirmed in the original case through two standard kalam forms of
argument: i) Investigation and disjunction" (al-sabr wa al-taqsim).
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unobservable, either in the indication or the cause. Therefore, it is implausible to
compare both worlds when explaining the relationship between God's essence and
His attributes.36
From this explanation, one might infer that cAbd al-Jabbar's analogical method in
kalam is similar to the analogy (qiyas) in Islamic laws. In this regard, Ibn al-
Malahimi explains the kalam analogy as follows: The original case (asl) is "human
action"; the secondary case (far) is the "world"; the judgment (hukm) is "requiring
an originator"; and the "ground" Ifilia) is "being temporally originated." The process
of analogy work as follows: One needs to identify the ground for a certain judgment
in the original case, and then this same ground can be found in the secondary case; as
a result, the same judgment can be applied to the latter case.37
As we discussed earlier, cAbd al-Jabbar establishes the existence of the seen world
with the immediate knowledge. Meanwhile, to know the unobservable world one
needs to make an analogy with the seen world. However, one might observe that the
application of this analogical proofmust be based on the knowledge of action, which
is the first acquired knowledge according to cAbd al-Jabbar. The rules of action
(ahkam al-afal) play an important role in the application of the analogical argument
of knowing God. Without this foundation, one cannot apply this method in one's
theological argument.
36 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 97.
37 ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 172-4. cf. Shihadeh, 'The Existence of God", 207.
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The most vital aspect of this analogy is to confirm that human beings are the real
agents of their acts. Only by accepting this reality will one be able to compare our
world with the unobservable world. Also, by knowing the concept of action, one can
know that this world is the act ofGod. Without this epistemological background, one
has no foundation to apply an analogical proof.
Therefore, we observe that al-Ashcari does not employ the analogical proof in his
argument on the existence of God, as the Muctazilites did. One of the main reasons
for this is that he holds a different outlook regarding the concept of action. He
maintains that there is no real agent except God; therefore, it is impossible to
establish the original case (asl) of the analogy.38 cAbd al-Jabbar's student, Abu al-
Husayn al-Basri, also rejects the analogical argument to prove the existence of God
for several reasons. Although he agrees with cAbd al-Jabbar that human beings are
the real agents of their acts, he disagrees with his teacher regarding the application of
the analogical proof. In this case, both al-Ashcari and Abu al-Husayn employ a
different type of argument to prove the existence of God; the former uses proof from
design and the latter employs proof from particularisation. Neither type of proof, as 1
will indicate in the discussion on the existence of God, needs the epistemological
foundation required by the analogical proof.39
38 Al-Ashcari, Lumcf, 4.
39 Ibn al-Malahimi, Mu tamad, 167.
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5.3. The Existence of God40
Having proved that one needs to acquire the knowledge of God, and this can neither
be known through uncritical imitation nor revelation, cAbd al-Jabbar insists that the
only way to know the existence of God is through rational argument. However, he
disagrees with the view of the philosophers who say that God is the cause (cilla) of
the universe. This view will lead to the eternity of the universe, since mcflul will
follow the cilla.4]
Explaining this contention, Ibn al-Malahimi states that the relation between an effect
(ta'thir) and its producer (mu'aththirih) is of two types: i) a production based on free
choice (ikhtiyar), which is the action (ffl), and ii) a production based on a cause,
which occurs necessarily from the producer (mu'aththir mujib). According to cAbd
al-Jabbar and the Muctazilites in general, the only way to know God is through His
action. For, if we say that God is the cause of the universe, this implies the universe
is also eternal (qadim), since mcflul cannot be separated from its cause (cilla). This
implication is inconceivable since there is only one eternal being, who is God.42
Therefore, only by reflecting on the act will one know its agent (fcfil). However,
since our aim is to indicate an eternal agent, who is different from other agents, we
must reflect on His action, which is beyond the ability of other agents who are able
with power. To do so, cAbd al-Jabbar divides produced things (maqdur) into two
categories based on the capacity of the subject: (i) produced things that are beyond
40 For the detail discussion on the proof of the existence ofGod see Davidson, H. Prooffor Eternity,
170; Shihadeh, "The Existence of God", 197-217.
41 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 89.
42 Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 83.
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our power or someone who is able by power (qadir bi al-qudrci); (ii) produced things
that are within our ability.
He maintains that there are twelve kinds (ajnas) of produced things that do not come
within human ability. Hence, they can be used to prove the existence of God. Of
these twelve kinds of produced things, one of them is body and the others are
accidents. The twelve ajnas are: substances (jawahir), colours (alwan), tastes {tu urn),
odours (rawa'ih), warmth (harara), coldness (buruda), wetness (rutuba), dryness
(yabusa), life (haya), ability (qudra), desire (shahwa), and aversion (nafra). None of
these ajnas, he argues, can be made by human beings and cannot be our acts.
Therefore, they must be the acts of God.43
As for the produced things (maqdur) that come within our ability, there are ten kinds
of genus {ajnas). These are all accidents, and can be subdivided into two sub¬
categories: first, the acts of limbs (afal al-jawarih) and second, the acts of hearts
(iafal al-qulub). The five acts of limbs are: modes of being (akwan), pressures
{ftimadat), compositions {ta 'lifat), sounds {aswat) and pains {alam). The five acts of
the heart are: beliefs {ftiqadat), will (iradat), dislike (karahat), assumptions (znnun)
and reflections (anzar).44
43
Mankdim, Sharh, 90. cAbd al-Jabbar includes annihilation (fana') in the category of actions that
beyond human ability but rejects it as a way to prove the existence of God since annihilation can only
be known by revelation (samc). cf. Peters, God's Created Speech. 127.
44
Mankdim, Sharh, 90; cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, 127
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According to cAbd al- Jabbar, the second type ofmaqdur, which is within our ability,
cannot be used for proving the existence of God.45 When this maqdur occurs, one
will be confused as to whether its agent is God or one of us. However, there is an
exception in this regard, when the maqdur will clearly indicate that its agent is God.
If so, it can be used to prove the existence of God, although the act is within our
ability. For example, cAbd al- Jabbar mentions the intellect (caql), which he defines
as a sum of immediate knowledge that is created by God in humans.46 He argues that
although the intellect belongs to the genus of belief, which is under our ability, since
we have no power over it, it must be created by God. Therefore, the intellect,
according to cAbd al- Jabbar, can be employed to prove the existence ofGod.47
In another example, cAbd al- Jabbar mentions increasing pain (alam al-za'id) from
the sting of a hornet or a scorpion. Although it comes under the ability of able
subjects with power (qudra), which are animals, it also indicates the existence of
God. The strongest of able subjects will not be able to produce such a power that can
generate (yatawallad) pain even after the animal is gone. According to cAbd al-
Jabbar, an able agent with capacity {qudra) can only affect others through reliance
(iftimad). Therefore, in our example, since the hornet has already gone but the pain is
increasing, it indicates the existence of another agent who creates that pain. This
agent, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is God.48
45
What cAbd al-Jabbar means here is that the produced thing (maqdur) which is under our capacity
{maqdurina) cannot become a secondary case (fad) in the analogy (qiyas). But for the original case
(a?f) it is possible, since in the original case we need to establish that we are the real agent of our act.
46
For more on the knowledge of actions, see above, 141.
47 Cf. Mankdim, Shard, 91.
48
Mankdim, Shard, 90. Peters, mentions this example without paying attention to the word increase
(za'id). He interprets it as "The pain cause by the sting of a hornet or a scorpion stands in no relation
to its cause and therefore must be caused by God, although the genus 'pain' comes under the ability
of able subjects (animal too) in this world.'" See his God's Created Speech, 128. This we believe is
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cAbd al-Jabbar divides produced things (maqdurat) into bodies (ajsam) and accidents
(cfrad). Both can be used to prove the existence of God.49 Nevertheless, cAbd al-
Jabbar considers that using bodies to prove the existence of God is more plausible,
since there are scholars who deny the existence of accident.50 A body, according to
cAbd al- Jabbar, is characterised by length, breadth, and depth, or what is long, broad
and deep.51 He also maintains that one can know the existence of bodies immediately
without a need for proof. Therefore, the first stage of proving the existence of God
through bodies, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is not to prove the existence of bodies,
but instead to prove that they are temporal (huduth).
To prove the temporality of bodies, cAbd al-Jabbar argues based on the relation
between bodies and accidents. He argues that bodies are temporal because they are
related with accidents. The accidents are called akwan in this case. There are four
akwan: combined (ijtimif), separation (iftiraq), movement (haraka) and immobile
(sukuri). These akwan are not eternal but temporal because it is possible for them to
be non-existent (cadam), whereas this is not possible for the eternal (qadim) being.
Therefore, since bodies cannot be separated from these temporal accidents {akwan),
bodies themselves must be temporal.52
debatable since cAbd al-Jabbar's main argument in this example is the increasing pain that occurred
upon the sting. This increasing pain is something beyond the ability of able subjects with capacity
(qadir bi al-qudra); therefore it must be created by God.4
Mankdim, Sharh, 92-5.
50
Mughni\ vi (2), 166, and (1), 54; Mankdim, Sharh, 94; Peters, God's Created Speech, 233.
51 See Mughni, vii, 6; Mankdim, Sharh, cf. Peters, God 's Created Speech, 122.
52 For cAbd al-.labbar's argument on the temporality of the akwan, see Mughni, xv, 171; ibn
Mattawayh, Majmif (I), 45; Mankdim, Sharh, 95-97; cf. Madelung, "al-Basri's Proof', 276.
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Having proved that bodies are temporal, the next stage is to establish that the
temporal bodies need a creator. To do so, cAbd al- Jabbar applies the analogy (qiyas)
of the seen world (al-shahid) to the unobservable world (al-gha'ib). To establish the
link between the seen and the unobservable world, cAbd al-Jabbar refers to his
concept of action.53
He argues that our actions need us (muhtaj ilayna) to exist. What comes into
existence from our side needs us because our state ihaluna), the state in which we
are, has influence (ta'thir) upon that thing. We discover this because the action
occurs based on our intention (qasd) and motive (dif /); also, it is rejected based on
our dislikes (karahat) and dismissals (sawarif). Then he argues that our actions need
us because of their temporality (// huduthiha).54 On this he states:
[There are three possible] reasons why the action needs us: (i) for
the persistence of its existence; (ii) for the persistence of its non¬
existence; or (iii) for the origination (tajaddud) of its existence. It
is implausible that the action needs us for the persistence of its
non-existence since before its existence the action has been
persistently non-existent. Similarly it must not need us for the
persistence of its existence since its existence perseveres even
after we have been out of our state of living or our state of being
able. Hence, the only possible solution is that the action needs us
to originate its existence, which is its coming into existence
(huduthiha).55
Having proved that our acts need us to originate their existence due to their
temporality, cAbd al- Jabbar applies this outcome into the unobservable world. He
53 For our discussion on the concept of action, see above, 140.
54 Mankdim, Sharh, 181. The term huduth or hadith is the contrary of the term qadim (eternal). The
difference between what is eternal and what is temporal is that eternal is an existence of which has no
beginning and the non-existence is not possible. Meanwhile temporal (huduth or hadith) is described
as the existence of which has a beginning and the non-existence is possible. The other meaning of the
term huduth is coming into existence. Here we combine the twofold meanings of the term as used by
cAbd al-Jabbar in different contexts in his works "coming into existence" and "temporal". Cf. Peters,
God's Created Speech, 111; cf. Frank, Metaphysics, 13
55 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 119.
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argues that we know that everything that comes into existence from our side needs us
to exist; it needs us as an originator (muhdith), the subject who brings it into
existence. By way of analogy (qiyas), we can deduce that everything that comes into
existence needs a muhdith. In this analogy, the "ground" Cilia) is "temporality"
(.huduth), and the "judgment" (hukm) is "a need for the originator" (haja ila al-
muhdith). Since everything that has the same cause must have the same judgment,
everything that has the cause that is "temporality" must necessarily need an
"originator" to exist. For that reason, cAbd al- Jabbar posits that since the bodies
share the ground of need, which is "temporality" with our action, they must also
share a need for an "originator" to bring them into existence.56
The final stage of his argument to prove the existence of God through bodies is to
establish that the originator (muhdith) of bodies is God. In this regard, cAbd al-
Jabbar argues that the originator of body is either (i) the body itself, or (ii) something
other than body. It is implausible that it was created by itself, since an able subject
(iqadir) must be ahead (mutaqaddim) of its act on something. If we said that the body
is the originator of itself, this implies that the body is able while it is in the state of
non-existence (;mcfdum). This implication, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is unlikely.
Therefore, he maintains that the originator must be other than the body and separate
from it. This separate originator is either similar to us, who have capacity (qudra), or
different from us.
56
According to Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf, this is the first knowledge in knowing God. Meanwhile Abu
cAli al-Jubba'i considers that knowing that the muhdith of the bodies is different from us is the first
knowledge of knowing God. Whereas Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i claims that the first knowledge is that
the creator is powerful by His essence (qadir bi dhatihi). cAbd al-Jabbar in this contention inclines
towards the view of Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf. See Mankdim, Sharh, 65; al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 175,
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He argues that it is impossible that the originator is similar to us who are able with
ability since, if that were so, the implication is that we also can create bodies such as
wealth and children. However, reality does not supporting that,57 for bodies can only
be produced by invention (ikhtirif). This type of action is beyond the power of the
subjects who are able by ability. Therefore, bodies must have been produced by the
one who is essentially able (qadir bi dhatih).5& In addition, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that
since bodies are temporal, we must draw the conclusion that bodies cannot be
produced by a temporal subject. Rather, they must be produced by the one who is
eternal (qadim). Therefore, all bodies are produced by one producer and doer, whom
we call God, who is eternal and essentially able. At this stage, cAbd al- Jabbar is able
to prove the existence ofGod through bodies.59
As we indicated earlier, cAbd al-Jabbar's cosmological argument to prove the
existence of God is based on the kalam analogy between the "unobservable" (gha'ib)
and the "seen" (shahid) worlds. This analogy, however, is applicable if only one
accepts the concept of action that is defended by cAbd al-Jabbar in his first acquired
knowledge. Without admitting that human beings are the real agents of their acts, the
analogy will be baseless since its original case (ast), which is human action, is
missing.
Consequently, since the Ashcarites reject the Muctazilites' concept of action in the
acquired knowledge, they follow another method in dealing with the existence of
57
Mnkhtasar, 178-9; Mankdim, Sharh, 119.
58
For related discussion on the theory of actions according to cAbd al-Jabbar, see Mankdim, Sharh,
223; cf. above, 118-9.
59
Mughni, iv, 81 & 277; vi, (1), 160-2; Ibn Mattawayh, Majnid (2), 88.
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God. The earliest form of argument used by the early Ashcarites is the argument from
design or the so-called teleological argument. Abu al-Hasan al-Ashcari first started
this argument in his al-Luma . He argues to prove that there is a creator for this
world by saying that, indeed, it is confirmed that the world is created (sunfa/san)\
therefore, it must be in need of a creator (sani ).60 However, the argument from
design, as Shihadeh rightly observes, is rarely utilized or considered as secondary
importance in kalam works, since they prove only the existence of a designer, but not
the generation of matter and hence creation ex nihilo. This argument is also often
seen to lack methodological rigour.61
Therefore, the Ashcarites employ another argument, the so-called argument from
particularisation. Al-Baqillani, in this regard, argues that we observe identical things
coming into being at different times. If the occurrence of one thing at a particular
moment is due to an intrinsic quality thereof, all similar things should occur at the
same time. It thus appears that nothing intrinsic to the thing itself could make it more
likely to occur at a particular moment rather than at another moment, or more likely
to occur at a given moment than another similar thing. Therefore, there must be an
external effecter (muqaddim) who causes particular things to occur based on His
will.62 By using the argument from particularization, al-Baqillani manages to
establish another cosmological argument without depending on the analogy of the
Muctazilites.
60 cAbd al-Jabbar criticized al-Ashcari's argument in his book naqd al-lumac. He argues that
knowledge of the world is created already included the knowledge that it has a creator; therefore, this
argument is implausible, cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 325.
61
Shihadeh, "The Existence ofGod", 205.
62
Al-Baqillani, Tamhld, 43; cf. Shihadeh, "The Existence of God", 209.
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Nevertheless, cAbd al-Jabbar's analogical argument is not only rejected by the
Ashcarites, but also by his immediate student, Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, and the
latter's follower Ibn al-Malahimi. Their arguments against the analogical proof are
focused on the unsound application of it. First, they criticized the 'ground of need'
suggested by cAbd al-Jabbar in his analogy On this point, they argue that cAbd al-
Jabbar's argument does not indicate that the cause of need (cilla al-haja) is
temporality (huduth); instead, it indicates that a temporal thing needs us in order to
exist (yahtaj ilayrta fi al-huduth). Explaining this argument, Ibn al-Malahimi states
that after its actual existence, a temporal thing does not need us anymore because the
need, which is to exist, is fulfilled. A temporal thing, he argues, after its existence,
maintains its temporality {huduth), but it does not need us anymore. Therefore, he
insists that to say that the cause of need is "temporality" is implausible, since it
implies that a temporal thing is still in need of us even after its existence, which is
not the case.63
The second criticism regards the establishment of the basis (asl) of analogy, which is
human action. In cAbd al-Jabbar's analogical proof, human beings are considered
real agents of their acts, since they produce accidents {acrad). The dispute, however,
occurs in regard to the reality of accidents. In this debate, cAbd al-Jabbar, in
agreement with the traditional Muctazilites' view, maintains that although they are
dependent on the body for existence, accidents possess a separate independent
reality.64 He maintains that some accidents, such as the ctkwan, i.e. motion (haraka)
and rest {sukun), composition {ta 'lif) and separation (iftiraq), can be given existence
63 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 173.
64 On proofs for the existence of accidents, see Davidson, H. Prooffor Eternity, 180.
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by human beings with their limited capacity (qudra). Based on the knowledge that
those accidents that are produced by us, they are in need of us for their origination
(.huduth); by analogy, we can infer that bodies and other accidents that we are unable
to produce must be created by a Creator with unlimited power. Therefore, the basis
of this analogy is our recognition that accidents and bodies are all different essences
(idhawat mukhtalifa).65
However, Abu al-Husayn rejects the existence of accidents as real independent
essences. Instead, he believes that these accidents are merely attributes (sifat) and
changeable characteristics (ahkam) of bodies. Existence is inseparable from essence.
Creation thus means producing essence themselves. Humans are able to affect
existing bodies, but not to produce them. Since Abu al-Husayn does not consider that
accidents are real existence, therefore, there is little basis for an analogy between
man's free choice of activity and God's creation of the world.66 Subsequently, Abu
al-Husayn rejects traditional Muctazilite's arguments to prove that the temporal
bodies need an originator (muhdith) based on the analogical method.
One might think that, with that argument, Abu al-Husayn was able to deny the
original case (ask) in cAbd al-Jabbar's analogy, which is "our action." However, I
suggest that that was not the case. In his theory of actions, cAbd al-Jabbar did not
claim that human beings are capable of producing something from nothing. The
production from nothing can only be possible through the act of creation (ikhtirif),
65
Mankdim, Sharh, 223; Ibn al-Malahimi, Muclamad, 168; Madelung, Rational Theology, 5.
66 Ibn al-Malahimi, Mu tamad, 167-70; Madelung, Rational Theology, 6.
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which can only be produced by God, who is able by His essence (// dhatih).67 cAbd
al-Jabbar's argument in developing his original case is based on humans' action in
regard to the available bodies or atoms. Thus, the argument is not about the
production (ikhtirf) of a thing but the doer (fifil) of a thing. Therefore, cAbd al-
Jabbar's original case in his analogy is sustained even after the critique from Abu al-
Husayn.
Having rejected the analogical argument to prove the existence of God, Abu al-
Husayn al-Basri presents a different rational argument.68 He develops a detailed
argument from particularization. He states that we find that bodies share in
corporeality yet differ in various respects, such as their division into the four
elements earth, water, air and fire. He argues that there must be some matter (amr)
causing their difference, since otherwise none of them would be more likely (awla)
to belong to one element than another. In a lengthy investigation, he arrives at the
conclusion that the cause must be a powerful, freely choosing (qadir mukhtar) eternal
agent who can be neither a body nor an atom (jawhar).69
In this argument Abu al-Husayn did not apply the analogical method of traditional
Muctazilites preserved by cAbd al-Jabbar. Instead, he bases his proof on a principle
of causality that is similar to that of the philosophers.70 However, to avoid the
67
See our discussion above. 142.
68 Abu al-Husayn's proof of the existence of God has been the subject of through investigation by W.
Madelung on which the following discussion will largely be based. See mainly his Abu 1-Husayn al-
Basri's Proof', 273-80. For the counter argument of Abu al-Husayn's Proof, see Madelung &
Schmidtke, Rational Theology, 3-8.
69 For Abu al-Husayn's argument in detail see, Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 169-70.
70
Madelung suggests that Abu al-Husayn obtained his philosophical knowledge during his study of
Aristotelian physics with the Christian logician Abu Ali b. al-Samh (d. 418/1027), cf. Madelung, Abu
1-Husayn al-Ba?ri's Proof', 278.
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controversial implication among the philosophers, which is the eternity of the world,
Abu al-Husayn maintains that the Creator must by a freely choosing agent (ffil
mukhtar) and not a necessitating cause {mujib).1]
5.4. The Attributes of God
cAbd al-Jabbar follows the majority of the Muctazilites, such as Abu cAli and Abu
Hashim al-Jubba'i, by believing that God is omniscient (calim) through His essence
(.dhatihi) and not through the attribute of knowledge (cilm).72 His argument about this
is based on his belief that God is a perfect being. The perfection of God is through
His essence. Therefore, he believes that God has no attributes {sifat) that are
additional to His essence. The existence of attributes within God would undermine
the perfection of His essence, because this implies that God needs the attributes. As a
result, cAbd al-Jabbar insists that God is omniscient through His essence and not via
the attributes of knowledge (c//w).73
However, before we go further into the problem of the attributes of God, it is
important to clarify Muctazilite's position on the meaning of attributes {sifat). On this,
Ibn al-Malahimi states that:
Know that what we mean by attribute in this topic is everything
that includes in the knowledge of the essence [of God], either it
is denial {nafy) or confirmation {ithbat)\ either it is state {hat) or
judgment {hukm) for the essence; either it is action or the denial
71
For Abu al-Husayn's argument on the existence of freely choosing agent, see Ibn al-Malahimi,
Muctamad, 170.
72
Mankdim, Sharh, 210. However, the parts of the mughni relevant to this discussion are not known
to be extant and thus his view on this is based on his more concise works such as U?ul at-khamsa and
Mukhta$ar\ and the works of his disciples and such as Majmit, Sharh and Tasaffuh al-Adilla.
73 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmit, (1)172. Accordingly, cAbd al-Jabbar clarifies that what means by God
knows through His essence is that His essence is the cause of His omniscience. Hence, God's essence
solely is enough to make Him omniscience without any need to something that outside or additional to
it. This is what cAbd al-Jabbar means by the perfect being. Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 185.
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of action. Therefore, we say that omnipotence, omniscience and
living are God's attributes. For us that means judgment (ahkam)
that includes the knowledge of His essence, and according to our
teachers, the followers of Abu Hashim, that means the states
(ahwal) of the essence.74
This passage indicates that the concept of attributes, in a wider sense, was accepted
by the Muctazilites in general. Therefore, what cAbd al-Jabbar and the Muctazilites
reject are attributes as entitative beings that are additional to the essence of God.
Other than this, they accept this concept. Hence, we observe many discussions on the
attributes ofGod in their works.
In proving the necessary attributes of God, cAbd al-Jabbar again employs the analogy
between the seen world and the unobservable. On this, he writes:
Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He is omnipotent
(iqadir)? Say to him: because the acts in the seen world (al-
shahid) will not happen except from an able subject. Indeed it is
confirmed that the action is from God; therefore, it must be said
that He is qadir. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that God is
omniscient (''alirrifi Say to him: Because precise acts {afal al-
muhkamat), such as writing and crafts (al-sinda), can only be
done by one who is omniscient. And already it is true for God, in
creating human beings, has exceeded the wonders of crafts,
therefore, He must be calim. Then if it is asked: What is the proof
that He is living (hayy)? Say to him: Indeed, everyone who is
powerful and knowing must be living.
In the case of the attribute of knowledge, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that in our world (al-
shahid) we can differentiate between two persons: the one knows and the other is
ignorant of the process of writing (ta 'Irf). The one who writes is a knowing person;
the one who cannot write is considered an ignorant. Hence, the production of a
74
Ibn al-Malahimi, Mutamad, 182.
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precise act (ficl al-muhkam) is a ground by which someone is considered omniscient
(''Him).75
Then, cAbd al-Jabbar infers this outcome to the unobservable world. On this, he
argues that God's creation of animals with all their magnificence, His control of the
orbits and subjugation (taskh/r) of the wind and other things are proof that God is
producing the precise act. Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar concludes that God is
omniscient based on the precise acts displayed by Him. In this analogy, the judgment
is "omniscient"; the ground is "production of precise acts." When our observation
indicates that there is a precise act in the creation of this world, therefore, this
indicates that its creator, who is God, is also omniscient, for He also shares the same
ground, which is producing a precise action, thus implying the same judgment.76
The Ashcarites, in this regard, reject the Muctazilites' view. They believe that God's
essential attributes are neither entailed by, nor identical with, His essence. Rather,
they are entailed by eternal essence (dhawat) or entitative determinants (met ani)
which subsist in God's essence (qa'ima bi dhatih). Thus, these are attributes that
inhere in His essence, such as God being knowing and powerful, etc.77 Therefore, the
Ashcarites maintain that God knows through the attribute of knowledge, which is
eternal (qadim) and additional to His essence (za 'id cula al-dhat).7S
75 A precise act according to cAbd al-Jabbar is every act which proceeds from an acting subject in a
way that does not proceed from other subjects. Cf. Mughni, vi (2), 115, xi, 375; Mankdim, Sharh, 156;
Ibn Mattawayh, Majmrf, (1), 113. See Peters, God's Created Speech, 51.
76 See for instance al-Baqillani, Tamhid, 46.
77 Al-Ashcari, Lumac, 18; al-Shahrastani, Milal, I, 94. cf. Schmidtke, S., Theology ofal-Hilli, 166.
78 Cf. al-Ashcari, Lumac, 26. For details arguments from the Ashcarites see al-Shahrastani, Milal, i, 92;
al-Baghdadi, U?u! al-din, 90; al-Ghazali, lqti?ad, 121.
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Their argument is based on verses in the Qur'an, such as: "He has sent from His
(own) knowledge;"79 and "For God is He who gives (all) sustenance, Lord of Power,
- Steadfast (forever)."80 They argue that the literal (zahir) meaning of the verses
clearly indicates that God has attributes such as knowledge (cilm) and power (qudra).
Therefore, the existence of God must be accepted by all.81
The Ashcarites also employ the analogical argument between the seen world and the
unobservable to prove that God is omniscient (calim). In this observable world, a
person is considered knowing (calim) when he has knowledge. There are two
different realities: (i) a person and (ii) knowledge. Comparing this principle to the
unobservable world will imply that the omniscient God also has knowledge. Hence,
• 82He knows with knowledge.
For that reason, they reject the Muctazilites' view that God knows by His essence. On
this, al-Ashcari argues that believing that God knows with His essence implies that
God or His essence is knowledge (cilm). He maintains, however, that God is not His
knowledge, but a knower (calim). God knows with knowledge, which is not His
essence.83 This rule also applies to other essential attributes such as power, will and
living. These attributes, they believe, are those of an eternal entitative being (macani
-
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81 cf. al-Ashcari, Lumac, 31.
82
See al-Baghdadi, Usui al-d/n, 90; al-BaqiIlani, Tamh/d, 46.
83 Al-Ashcari, IbSna, 114.
84
Al-Shahrastani, Milal, i, 95.
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Similar to other Muctazilites, cAbd al-Jabbar disagrees with this view. He maintains
that accepting any type of attribute for God will affect the concept of the oneness of
God (al-tawhid). He argues that if we assume that God knows through knowledge,
either it exists or it does not exist. It is implausible for God to know through the non¬
existent knowledge; if so, it would be possible for us to know with non-existent
knowledge as well. However, this is not the case. Therefore, knowledge must exist,
whether it is eternal or temporal.
He argues further that if we assume that the attribute is eternal (qadim), this implies
the existence of multiple eternal existences (ta addud al-qudama'). This implication
is unacceptable because it implies the existence of more than one God.86 Likewise,
cAbd al-Jabbar argues that it is implausible for God to know through a temporal
knowledge (cilm muhdath), since this implies that God, who is omniscient (Allah al-
cAlim), is a combination of an eternal essence and temporal knowledge. This
implication, he believes, is inconsistent with the concept of tawhld. Therefore, it
07
must be rejected.
Abu al-Husayn, in this regard, agrees with cAbd al-Jabbar. He reports another
argument from Abu cAli al-Jubba'i against the Attributists. Abu cAli states that:
If God knows by a macna, He would either know that mcfna or
not knowing it. In the latter case, it would be possible for us
humans to know many things God does not know from the




Mankdim, Sharh, 195-7. cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that accepting the existence of eternal attributes
of God implies a belief similar to Dualism (al-Thancnviyya) or Trinity in Christianity, who believed in
more than one eternal being. For more detailed arguments on this, see Ibn Mattawayh, Majmit (2),
175-84.
87
For more cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments, see Mankdim, Sharh, 186-8.
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through His essence or through knowledge. If He knows by His
essence, He would not be more likely (awla) to know it by His
essence than to know all other things by His essence. In this case
He knows everything by His essence. If He knew it by
knowledge, either He knows it by His essence or by knowledge.
In the latter case, this could lead to ad infinitum of knowledge. 8
The Attributists answer this argument (that the acceptance of additional attributes in
God destroys his absolute unity) by giving a special definition of the attributes of
God. They sought to escape this consequence by considering the divine attributes as
"neither Him nor other than Him" (la huwa wa-la ghayruh).89 However, one might
observe that this argument is clearly opposed to the logical principle of non¬
contradiction (cadam al-tanaqud). cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the knowledge of the
principle of non-contradiction is immediate (daruri). Therefore, the Attributists'
solution to the issue of God's attributes is problematic, especially for those familiar
with logical and philosophical discussion.
Regarding the use of analogical proof by the Ashcarites, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains
that it cannot be applied to explain the relationship between God and His attributes.
He argues that in this world, we realize that one knows through knowledge, because
it is clear that knowledge distinguishes one's state of knowing from ignorance.
Without knowledge, one would be in a state of ignorance. He then states:
This way [of argument] cannot be applied to God, because God
is essentially knowing (calim), not in the sense of contingency
(jawaz) [such as in the case of the seen world]. Therefore, it is
impossible to compare the unobservable with the seen in this
88 Abu al-Husayn, Tasaffuh, 16.
89




In this passage, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that, in the seen world, a person knows
something because he obtains certain attributes, which compose knowledge. Without
this knowledge, the person will not know anything. However, in the unobservable
world, this is not so. Therefore, based on this argument, cAbd al-Jabbar asks his
opponent: "Since when does God not know? Therefore, is He in need of knowledge
(cilm) to become knowing (calim)?" He explains that, as an eternal being, no change
occurs in God. Thus, since God knows from the beginning and no change occurs in
His essence, there is no ground (cilla) that is shared by humans and God in order for
the proof to be applicable. Therefore, without the ground, the analogical reason is
unsound.91
cAbd al-Jabbar argues further by using an ad hominem proof. He states that the
argument that God has knowledge, since a knowing person in the seen world has
knowledge, is unacceptable, since the ground is only based on the similarity with
regard to existence (mujarrad al-wujud). cAbd al-Jabbar argues that "as you do not
see in the seen world a knowing person (al- alirri) unless he has knowledge, you also
do not see him except when he also has a body and heart. [If you dare] apply a
similar rule to the unobservable world i.e. to God."92 Therefore, he maintains that the




92 Mankdim, Sharh, 205.
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Regarding the essential attributes, cAbd al-Jabbar follows his predecessors' views that
there are four essential attributes of God.93 They are: omnipotence (qadir),
omniscience (calim), existence (mawjud) and living (hayy).94 However, in his
argumentation, to deny the existence of a second eternal being beside God, cAbd al-
Jabbar mentions another essential attribute, which is eternality (qadim).95 Based on
these attributes, he infers other attributes of God such as hearing (samf), seeing
(,basir), and perceiving (mudrik) perceptible things (mudrakat). On this, he argues that
God is a living being with no deficiency, and any deficiencies are impossible for
Him; anyone who has these attributes must be hearing, seeing and perceiving
perceptible things, similar with what we comprehend (naqiluh) in the seen world.
cAbd al-Jabbar argues further,
If it is asked: What is the proof that God exists (mawjud)? Say to
him: Because He is powerful, and it is impossible for non¬
existence (mcfdum) to act, because it is implausible for it to be
related to a possible entity (maqdur). Therefore, He must be
existent. If not, it would open the way of much ignorance. Then
if it asked: What is the proof that He is eternal (qadim)? Say to
him: Because if He was temporal (muhdath) He will need
someone to originate Him, and that would lead to infinity {la
nihaya). Therefore, He must be eternal.96
All these attributes, however, as an entitative being {ma am), must be denied from
God. According to the Muctazilites, God is omniscient with His essence and not with
the attribute of knowledge. A question has been raised by Watt regarding this
problem. He asks why it was so important to deny that God had the attribute of
knowledge. He suggests several possible answers for this.97 I will not analyze his
93
For the essential attributes according to Abu Hashim, see Frank, Beings, 58-64.
94
Mughni, vii, 64; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmtf, (1), 170; cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 182.
95 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 278-9.
96
Uful al-khamsa, 82-83; Mankdim, Sharh, 65-6.
97 One ofWatt's suggested plausible answer is that it is a fear of confusion with the Christian doctrine
of the Trinity. Cf. Watt, Formative Period, 246.
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answer here, but rather pose another question related to the attributes of God. The
question is: what is the cause of the difference between the Muctazilites and the
Attributists on the attribute of God? 1 suggest that the difference on this issue is
closely related with the epistemological approach.
The foundation of this problem relates to the question of which type of source of
knowledge one deals with in order to understand the issue of the attributes of God. If
one chooses reason as the prominent source of knowing God, one will inevitably
achieve a similar result to that of the Muctazilites, which is to deny the existence of
the attributes. This is because, if one accepts the existence of attributes in an eternal
entitative being (macani qadima) that has a real existence; one cannot escape the
implication of multiple eternal beings (tacadud al-qudama') or the need (al-haja) of
God. Therefore, since the Ashcarites' solution on this issue considers that the attribute
is "neither Him nor other than Him" (la huwa wa-laghayruh),9& which lacks a logical
principle; the only apparent way to deal with this is to deny the existence ofGod from
the beginning.
Meanwhile, the Ashcarites who held a different understanding of the theory of
knowledge do not follow this route. When they believe that the obligation of
reflection in order to know God is engendered by revelation, the position of the
Qur'an is slightly different from that of the Muctazilites. Although both of them agree
that the existence of God is proved through reason," their position on the obligation
of reflection, I suggest, has a significant effect in their argument on the attributes of
98 Al-Maturidi, Sharh, 18-9; El-Bizri, N., "God: Essence and Attributes", 127.
99 See al-Baghdadi, Usui al-din, 25; al-Juwayni, Shamil, 119-20.
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God. The Qur'anic proof is applicable from the beginning of their argument on
knowing God. Thus, when they read the verses of the Qur'an (such as Qur. 4:144 &
51:58) that indicate the existence of God's attributes such as knowledge, capacity and
living, they adopted this as a principle in their theology. Therefore, the existence of
God's attributes as an entitative being are not problematic for them, since it has been
confirmed by the foremost source of knowledge in dealing with this issue, which is
the Qur'an.
However, this approach is slightly different among the Muctazilites, as one can
observe in cAbd al-Jabbar's theory of knowledge. In his discussion on direct
knowledge, cAbd al-Jabbar specifies a sub-section called what resembles a means (ma
yajri majra al-tariq). One of its significant principles is that "knowledge of the
antecedent (farc) is not possible without the precedence (asl)".100 Based on this
principle, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that before the existence of God, His unity and His
divine justice is proven, the Qur'anic proof cannot be used for understanding the
attributes of God; this knowledge is the precedent and the Qur'an is the antecedent,
since it is a speech of God. Therefore, he maintains that knowledge of God's
existence and His attributes is possible only through reason alone.101
For that reason, cAbd al-Jabbar, following his Muctazilite predecessors, develops the
argument on knowing God by reflection on the world. So, when reason is the only
sound justification, it is conceivable that the creator of the world must be different
from the world. In addition, this creator must be omnipotent in a way that differs from




other able agents; if this creator is omnipotent by capacity (qudra), the problem is
whether this capacity is a real existence. If so, is it eternal or temporal, and so on?
They need to answer all the questions that arise from reason without going to the
Qur'an except after the existence and the justice of God have been proved. In dealing
with these questions, their only reference is to reason alone. Therefore, a plausible
and logical solution for this problem is to deny the existence ofGod's attributes.
However, although the Muctazilites manage to avoid the problem ofmultiple eternal
beings (tcfaddud al-qudama') by rejecting the existence of God's attributes, they
need to reconcile their views with some verses in the Qur'an that clearly indicate the
existence ofGod's attributes.102 Rejecting the existence ofGod's attributes is similar
to rejecting some of the Qur'anic verses, which is the word of God. From here, we
observe that Wasil's predecessors came up with several views to answer this
question.
The first view is from Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf, who is considered the founder of the
classical Muctazilite tradition.103 He believes that God knows with the attribute of
knowledge and his knowledge is His essence. On this, al-Ashcari reports
Abu al-Hudhayl said: "He is knowing in an act of knowing that
is He and is qadir in a power of efficient causality that is He and
is living in a life that is He" and he spoke in a similar fashion
concerning His hearing, seeing, eternity, might, majesty, glory,
grandeur, and concerning His other essential attributes. Further
he used to say: "When 1 say 'God is knowing', I affirm that He
has an act of knowing that is God and deny that there is
ignorance in God and indicate that there is something known [by
102 Such as Qur. 4: 166 and 51: 58.
103 Frank considers that the system developed by Abu al-Hudhayl is the earliest comprehensive view
and become a foundation of the theology of later Muctazilites. Cf. Frank. "The Divine Attributes",
452.
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Him] that has come to be or will come to be; when 1 say qadir, I
deny that there is any incapability of efficient causation in God
and indicate that there is something subject to [His] power of
efficient causality."104
Abu al-Hudhayl affirms that God knows by virtue of knowledge, which is He
(,huwa), and He is powerful in virtue of power, which is Himself, and He is living by
virtue of life, which is Himself. Abu al-Hudhayl also makes this argument with
regard to God's hearing, His seeing, His eternity, His glory and His other attributes,
which are by virtue of His essence (// dhatih).]05
Frank considers that despite a number of difficulties, Abu al-Hudhayl's system
presents itself as one that is highly articulated and strikingly original.106 Regarding
the origin of Abu al-Hudhayl's theory, Frank reports a claim by al-Ashcari that Abu
al-Hudhayl took this doctrine from Aristotle. However, he doubts this claim when
Ibn al-Rawandi was cited by al-Khayyat in commenting on Abu al-Hudhayl's view,
saying that "not one person of all mankind was so brash as to say this before him."107
Despite the uncertainty of the origin of his doctrine, what is certain is that Abu al-
Hudhayl is familiar with Greek philosophical works. During his lifetime, some Greek
works were translated into Arabic. According to Ibn al-Murtada, Abu al-Hudhayl
investigated some of the works of Aristotle.108
Based on this report, I suggest that what Abu al-Hudhayl took from the Greeks is not
Aristotle's doctrine on the attribute of God, but Plato's concept of ontology. The
104 Al-Ashcari, Maqalat, 165; cf. Frank, "The Divine Attributes", 453.
105 Al-Ashcari, Maqalat, 165. cf. Wolfson. "Problem of Divine Attributes", 77.
106 Frank, "The Divine Attributes", 453
107 al-K.hayyat, Intifar, 59; cf. Frank, "The Divine Attributes", 455.
108 Ibn al-Murtada, Tabaqat, 44; Frank, "The Divine Attributes", 455.
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latter is a dualist who posits the existence of two irreducible kinds of things: the
mental (or intelligible) and the physical (or visible).109 The translation of Plato's
work, such as Timaeus and Laws, was completed during his lifetime. Although the
translation of the Republic was only completed after his death, the familiarity with
oral sources of this work cannot be denied. The Allegory of the Cave, with its objects
and ideas, according to Lawless, gives us a dualist vision."0 The discussion on the
types of existence (wujud) to external and mental existence was well known during
Abu al-Hudhayl's time. Although, his extant works are not available for our
reference, a clear example comes from Abu al-Hudhayl's contemporary, al-Kindi.
The latter divides existence into external existence, which is based on particularity
(juz'i), and mental or internal existence, which is based on general {kulli) meaning.1"
One might observe that in his view on the attributes of God, Abu al-Hudhayl
distinguishes between mental existence (wujud al-dhihnj) and external existence
{wujud al-khariji). When he says that "God knows with knowledge and knowledge is
He and is qadir in a power of efficient causality that is He," he considers that the
existence of God's essence is external and the existence of the attribute is mental.
This means that the mental existence of God's essence and His attributes are
different, for the definition of each of them is different. However, the external
existence of all these different realities is one, the essence ofGod who is perfect.112
109 Lawless, A. Plato's Sun, 34.
no first is the shadow on the wall of the cave and second is the real object. Lawless, Plato's Sun, 34.
in See Hourani, "Islamic & Non-Islamic Origin"; cf. al-Kindi, Fa/safa al-ula, 72.
n2 Cf. Tritton, Muslim Theology, .89; Watt, Formative Period, 246.
253
Therefore, with an ample philosophical background, Abu al-Hudhayl was able to
develop a system that reconciled the Muctazilites' predicament of multiple eternal
beings (tacaddud al-qudama) and verses of the Qur'an that confirm the existence of
the attributes of God. Verse 4: 146, for instance, indicates that God has the attribute
of knowledge. However, to claim that God's knowledge is additional (za'id) to His
essence in comparison with the seen world entails problematic implications, such as
the existence of more than one eternal being; it also cannot deny from God a
composition (tarkib) and need (haja). Therefore, Abu al-Hudhayl concludes that
God's knowledge is His essence (cilm Allah hnwa dhatuh).'13
However, Abu al-Hudhayl's solution on the attributes of God is not well received
among his predecessors. cAbd al-Jabbar is among many Muctazilites who reject Abu
al-Hudhayl's theory of attributes. However, he refutes this view with a simple
argument. He argues that it is unacceptable to say that God's knowledge is His
essence, since both of them are different realities. It even seems as if cAbd al-Jabbar
does not consider Abu al-Hudhayl's view to be serious enough when he concludes
that Abu al-Hudhayl's intention is to state a similar view to that of Abu Ali, but he
has mistakenly chosen the wrong words."4
One might observe that cAbd al-Jabbar's argument against Abu al-Hudhayl is too
simplistic compared to his previous argument against the Ashcarites. This contention
of imbalance is probably because Abu al-Hudhayl's argument is too philosophical
for cAbd al-Jabbar and other Muctazilites. This interpretation is supported by the
113 Mankdim, Sharh, 182; al-Ashcari, Maqalat, i, 179.
114
Mankdim, Sharh, 183. Abu al-Husayn also reports a similar view from Abu Hashim, see Abu al-
Husayn, Tasaffnh, 58.
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previously mentioned fact that Abu al-Hudhayl reportedly studied some Greek
philosophy."5
However, what surprises me is that despite his philosophical background, Abu al-
Husayn al-Basri also cannot appreciate Abu al-Hudhayl's concept of attributes. On
this issue, he agrees with Abu Hashim and cAbd al-Jabbar that Abu al-Hudhayl was
mistaken in the terms used (mukhalifficibara). Commenting on Abu al-Hudhayl's
view that God's knowledge is He but he does not say that God is His knowledge,
Abu al-Husayn states that:
If he confirms that the essence is knowledge and God is not His
knowledge that implies God is essence and His knowledge is
[another] essence. Each of them is differed from the other. This
view is inconceivable from any compos mentis person (caqil) let
alone from the leader (shaykh) of the mutakallimun. Therefore, it
must be that what he means by knowledge of God is the state of
knowing (kaunuhu caliman).u6
Therefore, since most of Abu al-Hudhayl's successors cannot accept his
philosophical solution on the concept of the attributes of God, they develop several
other solutions. One of them is by Abu cAli al-Jubba'i (d. 303/915). He considers
that God knows through His essence and not by knowledge. Therefore, God needs
neither the attribute of knowledge nor the state of knowledge. The attributes
mentioned in the Qur'an do not comprise a real existence, but only a mental
consideration (f itibarat al-caqliyya). However, he explains that, although God does
not have an attribute, He has the effect or the quality of the attribute. He argues that
although the attribute of knowledge, for instance, was denied from God, the precise
act (itqan al-camal), which is the effect of knowledge, is in Him. With this
115 Ibn Murtada, TabaqSl, 44; Frank, "The Divine Attributes", 455; Hourani, "Islamic and non-Islamic
Origin", 81.
116 Abu al-Husayn, Ta?affuh, 58.
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explanation, Abu cAli considers that he manages to avoid confirming other additional
existences beside God, while maintaining the perfection of His essence."7 Al-
Nazzam is one of his predecessors, who maintain a similar view when he states that
the meaning of saying "knowing" is the affirmation of His essence (dhat) and the
denial of ignorance of Him. He also considers that the attributes belonging to the
essence differ only in what is denied ofGod.118
Because of this, cAbd al-Jabbar prefers the view of Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i. The
latter reformulated Abu cAli's concept of attributes and introduced the theory of
states (ahwal). Abu Hashim maintains that God knows through the state of knowing
(,kaunuhu caliman). This state was caused by God by His essence, while in human
beings it was based on accidents of knowledge (culum).u9
However, cAbd al-Jabbar's and the Bahshamiyya's method in dealing with the
attributes of God has been criticized by Abu al-Husayn al-Basri. He disapproves of
the complicated method developed by the Bahshamiyya of assigning the ground for
the theory of states (ahwaf).uo Agreeing with Abu al-Husayn, Ibn al-Malahimi also
117 Cf. Mankdim, Sharh, 182. However, one might observe that Abu Ali's theological approach is
based on rational argument alone and unable to reconcile it with the Qur'anic verses that deal with the
attributes of God such as Qur 4: 146 & 51:58. Abu Ali's solution is less convincing compared to that
of Abu al-Hudhayl's when the latter manages to reconcile these Qur'anic verses with the Muctazilites'
rational approach. Explaining the different between the view of Abu al-Hudhayl and that of Abu cAli,
al-Shahrastani states that "The difference between saying 'knowing per se, not by an act of knowing'
and saying 'knowing by an act of knowing that is His essence' is that the former is a denial of the
attribute while the latter is the affirmation of the attribute that is itself an essence". Milal, 72; cf.
Frank, "The Divine Attributes", 469.
118 Al-Ashcari, MaqSISt, i, 227; cf. Watt, Formative Period, 246. Frank considers that al-Jubba'i's
theory is a basic attitude and tendency already at work in the teaching of his predecessors in the
Basrian Muctazilites in the drift of their difference from the SifStiyya, the followers of Ibn Kullab and
Ibn Hanbal, cf. Frank, Beings and Their Attributes, 14.
119
Mankdim, Sharh, 82. For detail analysis on Abu Hashim's theory of ahwal, see Frank, "Abu
Hashim's Theory of State", 85-100.
120 Abu al-Husayn, Ta?affuh, 7.
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criticizes the Bahshamiyya's theory of states. He argues that according to Abu
Hashim, God has an attribute because of a certain state. For instance, God is
omnipotent (qadir) because he is in the state that without this attribute the act will
not occur from it. Ibn al-Malahimi posits that this view gives a similar implication to
the Sifatiyya's view. The only difference between the Sifatiyya and the Bahshamiyya
is in the term cibara. Similar to the view of the Sifatiyya on the attributes, the latter
also consider that the states are not the essence and not other than essence (la hiya
dhatih wa la ghairaha). The only difference explained by Ibn al-Malahimi is that the
Sifatiyya confirm the entitative beings (mcfna) while the Bahshamiyya confirm the
121
states.
Clarifying his view on the attributes of God, Ibn al-Malahimi states that he maintains
that God is omnipotent, omniscient and living but that is a judgment (hukm) that is
included in the knowledge of the essence of God.122 However, similar to Sifatiyya
and Bahshamiyya, he also considers that this judgment is additional to the essence.
Hence, to avoid the implication of the Sifatiyya, he argues that
Ifwhat they mean by capacity (qudra), knowledge and life is His
essence (dhatih)]2i and what is included in the judgment (hukm)
that we mentioned, then they are in agreement with us; but if
they consider it similar to our teachers' (Bahshamiyya) views,
they are agreeing with them; but if they consider that the
entitative being is an independent existence, they differ from us
and from our teachers.124
121 Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 69 & 81.
122 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 182.
123 1 am not entirely sure whether to whom 'dhatih' if referring to? If it is to God therefore, lbn al-
Malahimi's view is near to Abu al-Hudhayl al-Allafs.
124 Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 69.
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This passage indicates that although Ibn al-Malahimi considers that his judgment is
additional to the essence, it does not have real existence. This view, I suggest, is
similar to the view of Abu cAli al-Jubba'i, who maintains that the attributes are only
mental considerations (itibarat al- aqliyya).125
Based on the epistemological background that considers reason as the prominent way
to prove the existence ofGod and His attributes, cAbd al-Jabbar goes on to argue that
we need to deny from God what is inappropriate to Him. He argues that when we
realize that God is eternal, He certainly has neither body (jisrri) nor accident (carad).
If God has a body, the implications are: (i) He needed to be originated (muhdath),
similar to other bodies; or (ii) bodies must also be eternal, similar to God. Both of
these implications are false, since there is only one eternal existence.126 Hence, God
has no quality of bodies or accidents such as nearness (mujawira), incarnation
(.hulul), and other attributes that indicate change of states such as ascending (su ud),
descending (nuzul) and moving from place to place (intiqal). Also, it is wrong to say
that there is addition (ziyada) and deficiency (nuqsan) in God.127 Therefore, since
God has no bodily attributes, He cannot be seen with eyesight (layura bi al-absar).
However, in the case of seeing God, cAbd al-Jabbar's main argument is not based on
reason but on revelation. The shift of proof from reason to revelation is possible in
his epistemology if the justice of God and His wisdom have been proved through
reason. Therefore, he argues that God is unseen (la yura) because God has said
125 See above, 255.
126 For our discussion on the oneness of God, see below 259.
127 For cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments in details, see Mankdim, Sharh, 216-23.
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"vision (absar) does not perceive Him,"128 and the perception involved in vision is
seeing (ru yd). Hence, He is necessarily unseen, for being able to be seen is one of
the signs of temporality (Irnduth). Therefore, He must be unseen by vision, but only
seen by the heart, cognition (mcirifa) and knowledge.129
However, this view has been rejected by the Ashcarites. They argue that this
interpretation is inconsistent with another verse: "On that day there will be radiant
faces, looking towards their Lord."130 Therefore, they conclude that based on this
verse, God can be seen in the Hereafter. The denial of seeing God in the first verse
(Qur. 6:103) refers to this world, not the Hereafter.131
As a reply to the Ashcarites, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the right interpretation of
verse 75: 22-23 is "those faces are waiting for God's reward, or waiting for His
mercy." He maintains that only this interpretation is suitable with the proofs from
reason and revelation.132 On this, he argues that:
It is proved that perception when joining with vision will not
mean anything except seeing; also it is proved that God denies
Himself from perceptive vision (idrak al-basar). [Therefore] we
consider it as a glory (tamadduh) that refers to His essence.
Hence, [if] a thing is such that its denial [from His essence] is a
glory of His essence, confirmation of it is a deficiency (nuqs).
And deficiency is impossible for God in any situation.133
128 Qur. 6:103.
129 Usui al-khamsa, 83.
130 Qur. 75:22-3.
131 For the Ashcarites' arguments in details, see al-Ashcari, Ibana, 59; al-Shahrastani, Milal, i, 100; al-
Qaghdadi, U?ul al-din, 97.
'32 U?ul al-khamsa, 84.
133 Cf. Mughni, iv, 70; Mankdim, Sharh, 233.
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Based on these arguments, cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that God cannot be seen in this
world or in the hereafter, because the denial from al-ru'ya is a glory towards the
essence of God. Hence, establishing the possibility of al-ru'ya either in this world or
the hereafter is considered a denial of this glory. As a result, cAbd al-Jabbar
concludes that this glory will remain forever in this world and in the hereafter.
Otherwise, it would imply a change and a deficiency in the essence of God. These
implications, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, are impossible.134
From this argument, we observe that cAbd al-Jabbar also uses the Qur'anic proof in
his theological disputes on knowing God. However, the Qur'anic proof is applicable
only at the last stage of his argument on the attributes of God, i.e. after the divine
justice has been proved. Thus, we observe that unlike his argument to prove the
existence of God that is based on purely rational argument, in his dispute on the
attributes ofGod, he employs arguments from both reason and revelation.
5.5. The Oneness of God
cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that to prove the oneness of God, one must prove that there
is no other eternal being (qadim) except God.135 God is eternal by His essence (//
nafsih). Therefore, if other being share with Him the attribute of eternity, he will also
share all His other essential attributes such as omnipotence (qadir), omniscience
('calim) and living (hayy)Pb He explains that eternal being has no need for other
134 For cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments on the denial of al-ru 'ya, see Mughni, iv, 51, 116; v, 223;
Mukhta?ar, 191; Mankdim, Sharh, 232-277.
135 cAbd al-Jabbar defines qadim as 'the one who has neither beginning of his existence nor starting'.
Cf. Mughni; iv, 250.
136 Mughni, iv, 252.
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existence to make it exist. Its existence is without cause (cilla). If this is so, it will
lead to the many aspects of impossibilities (muhalat).
cAbd al-Jabbar elaborates on these aspects of impossibility in his tcfliq al-muhlt,
when he reportedly states that accepting that both are possible (qadirayn) implies the
occurrence of mutual hindrance (tamanu); furthermore, assuming that both are
possible by their essence (qadiryn li anfusihima) will imply the invalidity of the
mutual hindrance, which is impossible.137 His argument on the mutual hindrance that
occurs between two eternal beings is based on the ability of both to act in two
opposite ways (diddayn) in the same genus (Jins). For instance, if one of them
wanted to move something while the other wanted to keep it still, the object cannot
be moving and still at the same time. If the tamanu occurs, cAbd al-Jabbar suggests
that there are three possibilities: (a) the wills of both of them will be implemented;
(b) neither of their wills will be implemented; and (c) only the will of one of them
will occur, implying that the other is weak.
cAbd al-Jabbar argues that (a) and (b) are impossible; therefore, the only option is
(c). He argues that (a) is impossible because one produced thing (maqdur wahid)
cannot be produced by two able agents (qadirayn); since both are capable of the
opposites (diddayn), the occurrence of their wills implies a combination of
contradiction (ijtima ol-diddayn). cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that (b) is also
impossible, since this implies that both of them are weak. He argues that an eternal
being who is able with His essence has unlimited ability to produce a thing
137 Ibn al-Malahimi, Mtftamad, 508.
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(imaqdur); therefore, His will cannot be hindered. If His will is hindered, this implies
his weakness, which is not possible. Both implications, according to cAbd al-Jabbar,
will deny the status of the first eternal being that has been proved as essentially able
(,qadir bi dhatih)P8
Therefore, he maintains that what will happen is (c): the will of one of them will
occur while the other is obstructed. Hence, the one whose will happens is essentially
able and God, whereas the other is not because of its weakness. This is because, if it
is possible for his will to be hindered, it will also possible that he can be hindered
from rewarding those who worship him or punishing those who disobey him. In this
case, it is not good for him to obligate others, or for him to be worshiped. Hence, he
is neither eternal nor able with his essence, but able with power (qudra) and has a
body.139
However, this argument has been criticized by Abu al-Husayn. He considers that the
mutual hindrance will not occur between two eternal beings who know with their
essence (li dhatih), because both of them know every aspect of wisdom and
goodness; therefore, they will have the same motive.140 Explaining this argument,
Ibn al-Malahimi states that cAbd al-Jabbar's arguments based on the ground that
mutual hindrance is possible because of the two are able (qadirayn), are unsound. He
argues that the ability of the two able agents on the two opposites ('~ala al-diddayri) is
not enough for an act to occur. There must be an additional thing that makes it occur,
138
Mughni, iv, 275-6; Mankdim, Sharh, 278; Peters, God's Created Speech, 264-5.
139 cAbd al-Jabbar considers that an able agent with power is a body because power needs a place
(mahall) to occur, cf. Mughni, iv, 281; Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 517. See also our discussion on
the categories of acts, above 140.
140 Abu al-Husayn, Ta?affuh, 7.
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and this thing is a motive (difi). Without motive, there will be no act; therefore,
motive is a condition (.shart) of action. In this case, he compares a motive to a tool
(,ala). Without a tool, an able agent cannot perform the act.141
Therefore, in the case of proving the oneness ofGod, Ibn al-Malahimi argues that the
mutual hindrance between two able beings is only possible when they disagree on the
motives. For instance, the first being, due to certain motives, intends to perform a
certain act, and the other, due to another motive, intends to do the opposite.
However, if both of them are motivated by the same motive, then mutual hindrance
will not occur.142 He explains that mutual hindrance is possible between two able
agents who are able with power and know with knowledge. However, when the two
able agents are powerful and knowing with their essence without limit, mutual
hindrance will not occur between them. Both of them are wise (hakimayn) and they
will only choose what wisdom (hikma) is. The second has a similar knowledge to
that of the first. The implication is that both of them will have the same motive and
will therefore choose the same thing; hence, mutual hindrance will not occur.143
Responding to this critique, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that it is implausible since, in the
states of action (ahwal al-afal), there are things that are possible for one to do
without the action, such as a good thing (hasan) that is permissible (mubah). He
argues that in this situation, it is possible for one of them with his knowledge to
141 Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 513-4.
142 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 515.
143 Ibn al-Malahimi, Muctamad, 515.
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perform a certain act without the other, such as punishment (ciqab). Therefore, he
insists that his argument is plausible.144
However, one might ask, what if the mutual hindrance does not occur at all? cAbd al-
Jabbar responses to this question by arguing that "we are not basing our argument of
the mutual hindrance (tamanif) on the actuality of its occurrence, but on the
assumption (taqdir) of it." The assumption of mutual hindrance, he argues, is enough
to become a foundation for its implications, such as the occurrence of the will of
both, or the denial of both wills. When the implications indicate that it is
inconceivable for the existence of two eternal beings, this implies that there is only
one eternal being who is omnipotent and omniscient by His essence.145
In another argument, cAbd al-Jabbar states that the existence of the second eternal
being besides God is impossible, since this implies that one produced thing (maqdur
wahid) is created by two able beings (qadirayn), which is impossible. Explaining this
argument, he states that
If there is another eternal being with God, he must be able with
his essence [too], and if there is another eternal being who is able
by his essence, that necessitates the produced thing (maqdur) of
both is one; for the essence of one of them is similar to the other
[due to their eternity]. And since their essence is similar, so are
their relations (tcfalluq) with the produced thing, otherwise both
will not be similar.146
To confirm his ground of the impossibility of a produced thing created by two
agents, cAbd al-Jabbar argues first by proving that an agent (muhdith) cannot create
144
Mughni, iv, 262. Based on this argument, Ibn al-Malahimi is mistaken when he said that cAbd al-
Jabbar does not reply on this critic, cf. Ibn al-Malahimi, Miftamad, 515.




(mukhtarf) in two ways (wajhayn). Explaining this argument, he states that a thing
that can be created, if it has not been created, is non-existent (madum). Therefore,
for a thing to be created there is only one way for this to occur. Without following
this way, a thing cannot be created. If it is possible for an agent to create in two
ways, it implies that it is possible to create a thing from another way, which is non¬
existent. This implication, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, is impossible.
Having proved the impossibility of an agent creating in two ways, cAbd al-Jabbar
argues that if this is impossible from one agent, it also impossible for two agents.
Elucidating his argument, cAbd al-Jabbar states that if it is possible for a thing to
exist from two ways, this implies both of the agents (qadiryan) are capable with two
powers, because what one of them is specifically associated with cannot be shared by
the other. Therefore, this implies the existence of two powers in one able agent.
Since this implication is false in one agent, it also false in two able agents (qadirayn).
Based on this argument, cAbd al-Jabbar insists that the creation of one produced
thing (maqdur wahid) from two able agents is impossible. Therefore, there is no
second eternal being beside God.147
After rejecting LAbd al-Jabbar's argument on the occurrence of mutual hindrance
0tamanu), Ibn al-Malahimi again rejects cAbd al-Jabbar's second argument because,
for him, the production of a produced thing by two able agents is possible.148 By
rejecting both of cAbd al-Jabbar's rational arguments, it seems that Ibn al-Malahimi





proof of the oneness of God. Therefore, we observe that Ibn al-Malahimi's difficulty
in proving the oneness of God by reason alone is obvious when he develops two
arguments to prove it based on the revelation.
In the first proof, he argues that there is no way to know the existence of the second
eternal being in the first place, and neither is he known by himself. If this is the case,
it must be denied, because confirming it will lead to ignorance. Therefore, there is no
second eternal being beside God. He argues that there is no way of knowing this
because the way to know is either through our reason (caqlina) or revelation
(sarnina), and nothing in either indicates the existence of a second eternal being.149
Meanwhile, in his second proof, he argues that if there is a second eternal being
besides God, he will also share all other essential attributes and must be wise
(hakim). If both are wise, it is inconceivable for them to send messengers who are
lying in their messages. One of those messengers, Prophet Muhammad, for instance,
told us that God is one. He also reports the word of God in His book: "Say He is
Allah the One; and there is none comparable unto Him."150 All other prophets also
transmit the same message of the oneness of God. All of these proofs indicate that
there is only one God and no second god with Him.151
From this contention, one might observe that Ibn al-Malahimi is having difficulty in
establishing the proof of the oneness of God based on reason alone. One obvious
point is his disagreement with cAbd al-Jabbar on the concept of action. In this regard,
149 Ibn al-Malahimi, MuLtamad, 535.
150 Qur. 112: 1&4. See also Qur. 42: 11; 2: 163
151 lbn al-Malahimi, Muclamad, 537.
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the former holds a theory of action similar to the idea of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri,
who maintains that motive is necessary in every act. Since motives are created based
on knowledge, two eternal beings will definitely have the same motive because they
know all the aspects of wisdom and goodness. Therefore, mutual hindrance will not
occur. Meanwhile, cAbd al-Jabbar, in his theory of action, does not consider that
motive is a necessary part of it. He maintains that when an agent is able (qadir) and
there is no hindrance (manf), the act will occur, even without motive.152
5.6. Divine Justice
cAbd al-Jabbar, in agreement with his Mi/tazilite predecessors, considers that
'justice' (cadl) is one of the attributes of God. cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that God is
exalted from any types of injustice and all types of acts that appear to be evil or
unethical based on the seen world (al-shahid). On this he writes:
And you know that God does not impose faith upon the
unbeliever without giving him the power (qudra) for it, nor does
He impose upon a human what he is unable to do (taklrf ma la
yutaq), but He gives to the unbeliever [freedom] to choose
unbelief by his own choice. And you know that God does not
will, desire or want disobedience. Rather, He loathes and
despises it and only wills obedience, which He wants and
chooses and loves. And you know that He does not punish the
children of polytheists (mushrik/n) in Hellfire because of their
fathers' sin, for He has said: "Each soul earns only on its own
account";153 and He does not punish anyone for someone else's
sin because that would be morally wrong (qabih), [and] God is
far removed from such. And you know that He does not
transgress His rule (hnkm) and that He only causes sickness and
illness in order to turn them to an advantage [for human beings].
Whoever says otherwise has allowed that God is unjust (zulm)
and has ascribed disrespect to Him.154
152 For more on cAbd al-Jabbar s concept of action, see above, 141.
153 Qur. 6:164.
154 U?ul al-khamsa, 81. See also, Martin, Defenders ofReason, 92.
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cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on the divine justice (adil) is based on the principle that
all God's acts are good and He is completely free from any evil act. He argues that
God does not do what is evil (qablh) because (i) He knows the evilness of all evil
acts and (ii) He does not need them (ghaniyy). Therefore, it is impossible for Him to
do evil. His argument is based on the analogical reasoning between the seen (shahid)
world and the unseen (gha'ib). cAbd al-Jabbar argues that if one knows that injustice
and lying are bad, and does not need them (ghaniyy), it would be impossible for one
to choose injustice and lying. Consequently, if God is self-sufficient without need of
any immoral or evil thing, it necessarily follows that He would not choose it based
on His knowledge of its evilness. Therefore, no evil thing that happens in the world
is the act of God.155
In this argument, the original case (as/) is 'human action'; the secondary case (farc)
is the unseen 'God's action'; the ground (cilla) is 'knowledge of the evilness of the
act and the self-sufficiency of the agent from it'; and the judgment (hukm) is 'not
doing evil'. When this ground is similar in the seen world and the unseen, the
judgment applies in both worlds. Based on this analogical argument, cAbd al-Jabbar
manages to prove the justice ofGod.
However, as we discussed earlier, Abu al-Husayn al-Basri and the Husayniyya reject
the analogical argument. Therefore, they cannot apply this proof in confirming divine
justice. Consequently, Yusuf al-Basir (d. 431/1040), a Karaite Muctazilite scholar,
155 cAbd al-Jabbar also uses revelation to support his case. He argues that that God has distanced
Himself from immoral thing with his saying: "But God never wishes injustice to His servants" (Qur.
40:31); and his saying "Verily God will not deal unjustly with man in anything" (Qur. 10:44). Cf.
Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 72.
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has accused him of being unable to prove the justice of God due to his rejection of
this proof. Al-Basir insists that without analogical argument, one will not be able to
prove that God will not do evil because one has no grounds to do so.156
However, Ibn al-Malahimi, in defending the Husayniyya's view, considers that the
analogical proof is not the only way to know the divine justice. Instead, he applies
the concept of motive to prove the divine justice. He argues that every act produced
from the able agent must be based on a certain motive (dif i). The motive to do an
evil act is impossible to God, for that motive is 'ignorant' (jahl) of the evilness of the
act and also the need (haja) to do an evil act. Therefore, Ibn al-Malahimi maintains
that it is impossible for an evil act to occur from God due to the absence of a motive
for it.157
From this argument, Ibn al-Malahimi seems to be able to free himself from the
analogical proof of the traditional Muctazilites. However, one might ask him how it
is possible to know that the motive preponderates the occurrence of certain produced
things in the unseen world (gha'ib). This knowledge must be known through the seen
world (shahid). The implication is that the analogical proof that is defended by cAbd
al-Jabbar and other traditional Muctazilites is necessary. To answer this question, Ibn
al-Malahimi goes back to the immediate knowledge. He considers that the
knowledge that (i) we are the real agents of our action; (ii) we are capable of doing
156 Al-Basir's criticism toward Abu al-Husayn is based on the latter's rejection of the existence of
accidents as an independent being or essence (dhcrwat) that normally inhere in bodies and are the
cause of attributes (sifat) and characteristic (ahkam) in them. The rejection of accidents, al-Basir
argues will obstruct the path to knowledge of the doctrine of Unicity and Justice. Cf. al-Basir, Y.,
Refutation, 37-8.
I5' Ibn al-Malahimi, Faiq, 129-30.
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different acts and (iii) we choose certain acts due to motives, are all immediately
(darurij known. This situation, he considers, is the same in every living agent who is
able. Similarly, this state also applies in the unseen world.158
However, I suggest that Ibn al-Malahimi does not answer the previous question
adequately. He still needs to rely on the seen world in order to establish that the
motive outweighs (yurajjih) in the unseen world. From here, one might observe that
Ibn al-Malahimi cannot get away from using the analogical proof in his argument on
divine justice. Yet, he applies this proof without detailing it, in contrast with what we
observed in cAbd al-Jabbar's argument.
From this contention, we observe that because of his rejection of the analogical proof
by the traditional Muctazilites, Ibn al-Malahimi chooses another route by stating that
knowledge that every act occurs based on motive is immediately known. However,
he does not come up with any convincing argument to establish the immediacy of
that knowledge. Perhaps to consider a statement as immediate knowledge is a less
difficult option for the mutakllimun to maintain without a need for proof. Immediate
knowledge is improvable and created by God directly in the human mind.
cAbd al-Jabbar supports his argument by describing the possible implications if one
accepts that God can do an unethical thing. If so, He will possibly punish the
prophets and righteous ones (salihin) and send them to the Hellfire (al-nar), or send
enemies of the prophets to paradise. Also, He could possibly send human beings a
158 Ibn al-Malahimi, FS'iq, 130.
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messenger who called them to unbelief (kufr) and error (dalal), and manifest through
him a miracle and proofs. This is because, if it is possible for Him to do what is
unethical, what would prohibit Him from doing all the evil acts we mentioned
earlier? These implications, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, will lead to disbelief of the
Qur'an and Sunna, and ignorance of the revelation. Furthermore, it will lead to
uncertainty as to whether what we are doing is true or not. Whoever reaches this
level of thinking, according to cAbd al-Jabbar, his error is shameful (fahusha) and his
disgrace is great.159
Having proved that God will not perform an unethical acts, cAbd al-Jabbar goes on to
prove his second foundation of divine justice by dissociating God from evil acts
performed by human beings. On this, he reports:
You know that all humans' acts of injustice (zulm), transgression
(jcrwr) and the like cannot be of His creation (min khalqih).
Whoever attributes that to Him has ascribed to Him injustice and
insolence (safh) and thus strays from the doctrine ofjustice.160
He argues that humans' acts are not created by God but by themselves; for if they are
created by God, the implications are that (i) praise and blame, or rewards and
punishments, will be useless; (ii) they will not occur based on our intention and
motivation, for since they occurred based on our intention and motivation, that
indicates that our acts are not created by God; (iii) God will not create human acts
that include cursing and insulting Him and (iv) the creator of injustice must have
been unjust, therefore, if God created injustice, it implies He is unjust. Whoever says
159 U?ul al-khamsa, 84-5
160 Uful al-khamsa, 81.
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this is an unbeliever (kufr). Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar concludes that all humans' acts
are created by themselves and not by God.161
cAbd al-Jabbar maintains that since God does not perform evil acts, instead they are
performed by human beings; therefore, God is just (cadil). He indicates that to know
the divine justice is to know that God is free from (tanzih) all that is morally wrong
(<qabih) and all His acts are good. However, what if someone asks, how can you say
that God does not do evil acts, while there is pain and suffering in the human beings
that were created by Him?
To see cAbd al-Jabbar's answer to this question, it is important to observe the
concept of pain and suffering according to him. cAbd al-Jabbar considers that pain
and suffering are perceived in a direct, immediate way that does not need reflection;
however, one needs to reflect to know their causes.162 He defines pain as "a form of
separation which occurs in a composite substance."163 Suffering, in cAbd al-Jabbar's
theology, is considered evil if it is any injury without benefit exceeding it or
repulsion of harm greater than it, and which is not deserved. But when these reasons
are reversed, that is when pain and suffering (i) confer benefit, (ii) avoid a greater
injury or (iii) are deserved, they should not be considered evil.164
Answering the previous question, cAbd al-Jabbar argues that pain and suffering
created by God is not injustice, since the reasons why God causes pain and suffering
161 U?ul al-khamsa, 85.
162 See Mughni, xiii, 229-30. Cf. Friemuth, God andHumans, 69.
163 For details on pain see Mughni, ix, 52; see also Peters, God's Created Speech, 134.
164 Mughni, xiii, 299; cf. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 71; Freimuth, God and Humans, 69.
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are either because of benefit or because it is a deserved punishment. cAbd al-Jabbar
regards this benefit as an admonition (ftibar) or lesson (mihna), which leads to
reflection on the reasons for this pain and its warning of danger. On this he writes:
He [God] only causes sickness and illness to turn them to
advantage [for human beings]. Whoever says otherwise has
allowed that God is unjust (zulm) and has ascribed disrespect to
Him. And you know that, for their sakes, He does the best for all
of His creatures, upon whom He imposes [moral and religious]
obligation (yukallifuhum), and that He has indicated to them
what He has imposed upon them and clarified the path of truth so
that we could pursue it, and He has clarified the path of
falsehood (,tariq al-batil) so that we could avoid it. So, whoever
perishes does so only after [all this has been made] clear.165
Therefore, cAbd al-Jabbar explains that the sufferings caused by disasters are
considered trials and probably warn others who are influenced by this disaster.
Therefore, God will compensate (ciwad) these sufferings with some rewards in the
Hereafter, in order to remove all of their evil aspects. For that reason, cAbd al-Jabbar
infers that the suffering of children is evil if it is perpetrated by human beings, but it
is not evil if it is done by God, since God can compensate for the suffering in the
Hereafter.
cAbd al-Jabbar considers that, although there is difficulty (mashaqqa) in the taklif, it
is not evil because by implementing the obligation, one will be able to obtain praise
and rewards in the hereafter. Instead, he maintains that the taklif is good. For without
this obligation, one cannot achieve the position and reward provided by God.166
Supporting cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on the goodness of taklrf, Ibn al-Malahimi
explains that taklif is good because it is an act of the Wise (Hakim) who does no evil.
He argues that despite its difficulty, taklif enables man to acquire a great benefit
165 Mughni, xiii, 298.
166 Mughni, xi, 134.
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(manaff cazima) that cannot be achieved through other means. In this regard, he
insists that taklif is no evil because, if so, the all wise would not do it.167
Conclusion
In his argument on knowing God, cAbd al-Jabbar considers that the only way to do
so is through reflection (nazar). By doing this, he disagrees with the view of Abu al-
Hudhayl al-cAllaf, who maintains that knowing God is immediate knowledge. cAbd
al-Jabbar also argues against those who consider that knowing God is possible
through uncritical imitation (taqlid). His main argument in rejecting uncritical
imitation is based on his immediate knowledge. He argues that by doing taqlid on
two or more contradicting views will imply the combination of two contradictions,
which is inconceivable.
cAbd al-Jabbar also disagrees with Ashab al-hadith who maintain that the Qur'an is
the proof of knowing God. Based on the principle established from the subsection on
indirect knowledge (what resembles a means), cAbd al-Jabbar argues that the validity
of the Qur'an can only be accepted after the existence of God and His attributes has
been proved. He argues that the Qur'an is antecedent (far ) and the essence of God is
precedent (ast). Therefore, the antecedent cannot prove the existence of the
precedent, since the former's validity depends on the latter. Therefore, he concludes
that the only way to know God is through rational reflection.
167 Ibn al-Malahimi, Fa'iq, 201.
274
The analogical proof between the seen world (shahid) and the unseen (gha'ib) is the
key argument employed by cAbd al-Jabbar on knowing God. To establish the shahid,
he bases this on immediate knowledge; first on the direct knowledge for confirming
his existence, and second on the perceptible knowledge to establish the outside
world. In order to establish the unseen world, cAbd al-Jabbar bases this on the
acquired knowledge through reflection. Based on a similar analogy (qiyas) applied in
Islamic jurisprudence, he establishes the existence of the unseen world. cAbd al-
Jabbar's analogical proof also relates with his theory of action. The ground (cilla) of
his analogy is based on the knowledge that man is the real agent of his act.
Therefore, due to the difference in their theory of action from cAbd al-Jabbar and the
traditional Muctazilites, the Ashcarites and the Husayniyya do not employ the
analogical proof, based on the temporality of the world, in their argument on the
existence of God. Both groups, however, apply the proof of particularisation and
proof from design.
cAbd al-Jabbar also employs the analogical proof in confirming the attributes of God,
the oneness of God and the divine justice. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri again faces a
problem regarding the oneness of God and the justice of God. The main reason for
this is his rejection of the existence of accidents because God is an independent
being. Yusuf al-Basir accused him of being unable to prove that God is one and just.
However, when examining the Husayniyya's argument, we observe that Abu al-
Husayn manages to solve the problem by referring to his concept ofmotive (dfi).
275
GENERAL CONCLUSION
cAbd al-Jabbar is a prominent Muctazilite scholar who lived in the fourth/tenth
century during the cAbbasid Caliphate. One of the significant features of this century
was the revival of the role of the intellect among Muslim theologians. For several
centuries previously, it had been the Muctazilites who had been considered the
defenders of reason in religious doctrines. However, during cAbd al-Jabbar's time,
the role of reason in theological argument became significant and well accepted
among the majority of scholars. This development can be observed through the
revitalization of the Ashcarites school, a Sunnite version of rational theology by al-
Baqillani and al-Baghdadi. We also observe the approach of some Hanbalites, which
is similar to the method of kalam, such as in the work of Ibn al-clmad al-Hanbali.
The balance of political power between the cAbbasid Caliphs and the Buyid Amirs,
also contributed to the revitalization of kalam schools during this century. Both
parties belonged to different theological schools; the cAbbasid Caliphs inclined
towards the Sunnites, while the Buyid Amirs were Shicites. Therefore, political
interference in religious doctrines rarely happened and were not significant. The
Caliphs had no army to enforce the theological decrees. The Amirs, in turn did not
impose Shicism on people due to their political interest. During this time, inter-
religious debates between Jewish, Christian and Muslim also occurred widely. This
phenomenon in turn contributed to the survival of some of cAbd al-Jabbar's and his
students' works, even today.
The discussion on the theory of knowledge also becomes a significant part of kalam
discussions during this time in the learned circles at the court of the Caliph and the
Amirs in Baghdad, Shiraz and Rayy. The translation of Greek philosophy into Arabic
during the time of al-Ma'mun and his successors also contributes to the enrichment
of the discussion, which leads to a significant result in the works on the theory of
knowledge among the mutakallimun.
In his theological epistemology, cAbd al-Jabbar in general bases his argument on the
traditional Muctazilites' epistemology, with some modification. From our discussion,
we can observe the relationship between cAbd al-Jabbar's epistemology and his
theology in his discussion on the definition and the types of knowledge.
In his discussion on the definition of knowledge cAbd al-Jabbar follows the method
of Wasil b. cAta' and the majority of the Muctazilites who reject the existence of
God's attributes, including knowledge. Therefore, when defining knowledge, cAbd
al-Jabbar excludes God's knowledge from the discussion. For this reason, he
conceives that defining knowledge with belief (itiqad) and entitative being (mcfna)
is plausible. However, in contrast with the Muctazilites, the Ashcarites consider that
God has the attribute of knowledge; therefore, when defining knowledge they also
include God's knowledge in their definition.
The mutakallimun in general agree that the human's knowledge is divided into two
types, immediate and acquired. Yet they disagree on the content of immediate
knowledge. This disagreement has resulted in a different theology. cAbd al-Jabbar,
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for instance, considers that basic ethical principles are immediate knowledge; by this
he establishes the ground for rational obligation (taklif caqli)\ for when one knows
good and evil, one must act based on those principles. The immediacy of ethical
knowledge, however, was rejected by the Ashcarites. They considered that one can
only know ethical principles through revelation; therefore, without revelation there is
no obligation since good and evil is unknown.
The dispute concerning the content of immediate knowledge also occurred between
cAbd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Hudhayl al-cAllaf. The latter suggests that knowing God
is immediate knowledge; therefore, he considers that every compos mentis person
(caqil) has the knowledge of God in his mind. This knowledge, according to Abu al-
Hudhayl, becomes a ground for the obligation of knowing God in detail, such as His
laws, the ways to worship Him, His commands and prohibitions. However, cAbd al-
Jabbar considers that knowing God is not immediate but acquired knowledge;
therefore insists that every compos mentis person needs to use his intellect in order to
acquire the knowledge ofGod.
In the arrangement of the types of knowledge cAbd al-Jabbar includes what
resembles a means in the immediate knowledge. This arrangement plays a significant
role in the discussion on the sources of knowledge. The Ashcarites, however, do not
include this knowledge in their immediate knowledge. The difference appears when
they discuss the hierarchy of proof. cAbd al-Jabbar, based on the principle derived
from what resembles a means that the antecedent (far ) cannot prove the existence of
the precedent (as/), states explicitly that reason is prior to the Qur'an in the hierarchy
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of proofs. The Ashcarites, however, despite their agreement with the Muctazilites that
the validity of the Qur'an is proved through the intellect, do not consider it as the
main emphasis; therefore, they maintained that the hierarchy of proofs starts by the
Qur'an.
This approach is significant when they deal with the proofs of the attributes of God.
Because of the principle that precedent cannot be proved by the antecedent, cAbd al-
Jabbar and the Muctazilites do not use the Qur'anic proof in order to prove the
existence of God, His attributes, and the oneness of God. They only use the Qur'anic
evidence after the existence of God, who is just and wise, is proven through reason
alone. Therefore, we observe that they have to deal with many questions that are
related to God's attributes, such as, what are God's attributes? Are these attributes
existent or nonexistent? If they exist, are they eternal or temporal? The answers to
these questions are problematic for the Muctazilites. Therefore, they choose the safest
way, in their opinion, by denying the existence of the attributes of God in the first
place.
The Ashcarites, meanwhile, who maintain that obligation is only possible through
revelation, have a different epistemological background. They deal with the issue of
the attributes of God differently, since they have Qur'anic support from the
commencement of the obligation. Therefore, the validity of the Qur'anic argument is
accepted by them from the beginning. The Qur'an becomes an important source for
them in dealing with the issue of the attributes ofGod. Since there are several verses
in the Qur'an that explicitly indicate the existence of God's attributes, such as
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knowledge (cilm) and power (qudra), they consider them as the ground for their
argument on the attributes ofGod.
The difference is in the knowledge of action, the first acquired knowledge:
According to cAbd al-Jabbar, the knowledge of action is considered an introduction
to knowing God. He differs with the Ashcarites and his own student Abu al-Husayn
al-Basri on this issue. cAbd al-Jabbar differs with the Ashcarites, since the latter
maintain that all acts including human acts, are created by God. God is the only real
agent, while human beings have only acquired (kasab) their actions. Due to this
view, the Ashcarites have no ground to establish the original case (asl) of the
analogical proof. Therefore, we observe that the analogical proof is not their main
argument for knowing God.
The difference between cAbd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Husayn in the knowledge of
action is due to their disagreement on the concept of motive (dtfi). The former
considers that motive is not a requirement for action. However the latter disagrees
and maintains that motive is a requirement in every act. This disagreement has led to
a different argument in proving the oneness of God and divine justice.
The difference also relates to their dispute on the reality of accidents (cfrad). cAbd
al-Jabbar, in agreement with the majority of the Muctazilites, maintains that accident
is a real independent being that exists in bodies (ajsam). However, Abu al-Husayn, in
contrast, maintains that accident is not a real independent being. Therefore, he rejects
the foundation of cAbd al-Jabbar's analogical argument that is based on the role of
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human beings as the real agents of their actions. Due to his rejection of traditional
Muctazilite analogical argument, Abu al-Husayn faces a problem in proving the
justice of God. He was accused of not having a ground to prove the principle of
God's unity and justice.
Yet he manages to prove divine justice by depending on his theory of motive. Abu
al-Husayn's theory of motive, however, leaves him with another problem in the
argument to prove the oneness of God. cAbd al-Jabbar applies the proof of mutual
hindrance (tamarnf) to prove the oneness of God. However, based on Abu al-
Husayn's theory of motive, mutual hindrance will not happen between two eternal
beings, since both have the same motive, for both of them know with their essence
and have an unlimited knowledge; therefore, they know all goodness and evil. For
this reason, Abu al-Husayn has to prove the oneness of God based on the proof from
revelation.
cAbd al-Jabbar establishes the obligation of knowing God based on his immediate
knowledge. He considers that several concepts are known to every compos mentis
person immediately, such as fear (khawj), divine notion (khatir), and thanking the
benefactor (shukr al-muncim). Based on these concepts, he manages to establish
rational obligation (iakl 'ifcaqlij. cAbd al-Jabbar considers that man's first obligation
is to reflect in order to know God, which is to know the existence of God, His
attributes, His oneness and His justice.
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Epistemology plays an important role in cAbd al-Jabbar's theology. This reality can
be observed in his discussion on the types of knowledge. By using immediate
knowledge, he manages to establish the existence of the self, the existence of the
seen world (shahid), and the obligation of certain acts upon human beings. This
knowledge became the foundation for his analogical argument, which is considered
the key proof of knowing God. By using analogical proof, he goes further to
establish the existence of the unseen world (gha'ib) based on his first acquired
knowledge, which is the knowledge of actions. Based on the analogical proof, cAbd
al-Jabbar manages to prove the existence of God, His attributes, His oneness and His
justice.
The Husayniyya, the last school ofMuctazilites formed by Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, is
considered the most critical of cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on knowing God. The
points of difference between them can be observed as follows: The first is the
difference on the definition of knowledge. This dispute, however, does not
significantly affect the general structure of their theology, since Abu al-Husayn,
despite his criticism of cAbd al-Jabbar's definition of knowledge in the Mughn/,
defends the definition that is introduced by Abu Hashim al-Jubba'i, which was also
accepted by cAbd al-Jabbar in his earlier works before the Mughni.
The disagreement between Abu al-Husayn and cAbd al-Jabbar is more obvious in the
discussion on the types of knowledge. Although they agree that man is a real agent of
his action, both disagree on the details regarding the concept of actions. cAbd al-
Jabbar, for instance, considers that an agent only needs a capacity (qudra) in order to
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act. However, Abu al-Husayn disagrees, considering that capacity alone is
insufficient, since an agent needs something else in order to prefer action to non¬
action. Therefore, he maintains that, in addition to capacity, an agent needs a motive
to act. Abu al-Husayn's disagreement with his teacher on this issue left him with no
option except to follow a different route in his argument on the oneness of God, for
his theory of motive does not support the proof of mutual hindrance (tamanif) that is
defended by cAbd al-Jabbar and the traditional Muctazilites. However, in his
argument on the justice ofGod, the theory ofmotive provides him with an alternative
foundation after his rejection of the traditional Muctazilites' analogical argument.
Abu al-Husayn's argument is that an able agent who is omnipotent and omniscient in
His essence will definitely know the difference between good and evil acts.
Therefore, His motive will be good all the time. An agent who is in this situation, he
argues, will not do evil acts, and all His acts are good.
Abu al-Husayn's disagreement with cAbd al-Jabbar was most likely influenced by
the philosophers. This influence can be observed in his critique on cAbd al-Jabbar's
analogical argument. Abu al-Husayn argues that the ground of need of the created
being for its creator is not temporality (huduth), as maintained by the traditional
Muctazilites including cAbd al-Jabbar. Instead he argues that the ground of need is
contingent (imkan). This argument had been applied earlier by Ibn Sina. Most likely
Abu al-Husayn was influenced by Ibn Sina's view, since the latter's idea was not
unfamiliar during his time.
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Abu al-Husayn rejects the analogical proof of the traditional Muctazilites with the
argument that it was based on a wrong ground, therefore implausible. Abu al-Husayn
also criticizes the original case (ast) of the analogical argument, which is human
action. He argues that humans are able to affect existing bodies, but not to produce
them, for he maintains that accidents are not real existence, but merely attributes and
changeable characteristic (ahkam). Based on this critique, he maintains that there is
little basis for an analogy between man's free choice of activity and God's creation
of the world. However, Abu al-Husayn's argument does not at all demolish cAbd al-
Jabbar's analogical proof, since the latter does not claim that human beings are the
creator (mukhtarf) of their actions from nothing. He maintains that the only agent
who acts from nothing is God. Hence, cAbd al-Jabbar's argument in developing his
original case is based on humans' actions in relation to existing bodies or atoms.
Thus, the argument is not about the production (ikhtirf) of a thing, but about the
doer (fa il) of a thing. Therefore, Abu al-Husayn's critique does not demolish cAbd
al-Jabbar's original case in his analogical proof.
By rejecting the traditional Muctazilite analogical proof, Abu al-Husayn has to find
another solution in his effort to prove the existence of God, the oneness of God, and
His justice. In his argument on the existence ofGod, he applies the detailed argument
from particularization. This argument is based on the principle of causality that is
similar to that of the philosophers. He manages to avoid the controversial implication
of the philosophers' view, which is the eternity of the world, by maintaining that the
creator must be a freely choosing agent and not a necessitating cause. In his
argument on the oneness of God, Abu al-Husayn cannot apply the proof of mutual
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hindrance (tamanif), since this proof is not compatible with his theory of motive.
Therefore, he bases his argument on the proof from revelation. As for his argument
on divine justice, Abu al-Husayn depends on his theory of motive. However, when
he was asked how to establish the relation between the seen world and the unseen,
Abu al-Husayn answered: by immediate knowledge.
One might observe from his arguments that Abu al-Husayn is using immediate
knowledge and the proof from revelation to prove the existence of God and the
oneness of God. This approach, however, is different from that of cAbd al-Jabbar,
who maintains the rational argument throughout his proof on knowing God. Abu al-
Husayn's rejection of the analogical argument on knowing God seems to be the main
reason for the differences between the two men in their arguments on knowing God.
Although Abu al-Husayn manages to establish several arguments to prove the
existence of God, His oneness and His justice, which are not based on the analogical
argument, he still has a problem in establishing the relation between the seen and the
unseen world. His solution of using immediate knowledge is not entirely satisfactory.
Therefore, I suggest that cAbd al-Jabbar's argument on knowing God is more
plausible than that of Abu al-Husayn.
In general we observe that the difference between cAbd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Husayn
in their theological epistemology is at the level of argument and not at the doctrinal
level . Both of them believe in the oneness of God,and the justice of God and believe
that human beings are the real agents of their actions. They also deny the attributes of
God. Where they differ is their arguments in order to establish that doctrines. This
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phenomenon, however, is different from the Ashcarites'. Their differences with cAbd
al-Jabbar on theological epistemology seem to end up in a different doctrine, such as
on the attributes of God and the justice of God. However, 1 suggest that the
differences among the mutakllimun in general, including the Ashcarites and the
Muctazilites, are based on their interpretation of the doctrines that are agreed by all,
such as the existence of God, the oneness of God, the perfection of God, and the
justice of God. All of these doctrines are in general accepted by all mutakallimun.
The disagreement only occurs when interpreting these doctrines.
As al-Razi mentioned earlier, the roots of contention are based on the attributes of
perfection (kamal) and imperfection (nuqsan). The Muctazilites consider that a
perfect being must be different in every aspect from an imperfect being, for any
similarity with an imperfect being implies imperfection. Therefore, they try to deny
any similarity between God and His creation. For instance, since by accepting that
God knows through knowledge will imply a similarity with human beings, they
reject the existence of knowledge in God. However, the Muctazilites' rejection of the
attribute of knowledge is not to deny God's perfection, since they believe that the
outcome of knowledge; the precise acts, are still in God. The Ashcarites and the
Sifatiyya, in contrast, maintain that the perfect God must have all the attributes that
bring perfection in human beings, such as knowledge, power and life. Without these
attributes, God will be considered imperfect.
As for future research, I suggest a comparative study should be made on the
theological epistemology of the Muctazilites and the Karaites. Several new
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publications from the group of the "Muctazilite Manuscripts Project" have shed light
on this issue, which is significant for understanding the relationship between Islam
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